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The Power of Congress over Courts in 
Nonfederal Cases 
Louise Weinberg* 
We really have no clear idea about what the power of 
Congress is over the jurisdiction of courts. This obscurity may 
even lend the subject an uncanny interest, like the London fog 
in one of Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes stories. But as long as 
good theory eludes us we will be stumbling along like so many 
Dr. Watsons, without a clue. 
My starting point here (but only a starting point) is the 
hitherto little-discussed question of national power to confer 
jurisdiction upon the state courts over cases that do not arise 
under federal law. This odd question is now raised by a 
proposal by the American Law Institute for federally-conferred 
state-court jurisdiction over mass torts.' In this article I will 
have little to say about the Proposal ~pecifically.~ The Proposal 
furnishes pretty barren ground for thinking about the question 
with which I began. For one thing, it would devolve this 
controversial jurisdiction upon state courts only with their 
 ons sent.^ Even supposing that a state would consent, if nicely 
* Wynne Professor in Civil Jurisprudence, The University of Texas. I am 
grateful to Rex Lee for his invitation to me to contribute an article to this special 
issue of the BYU Law Review. 
1. COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS A D ANALYSIS WITH 
REPORTERS STUDY: A MODEL SYSTEM FOR STATE-TO-~TATE TRANSFER AND 
CONSOLIDATION ("ALI Proposal" or "Proposal"), $9 4.01, 5.01 (1994) [hereinafter 
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL]. The Institute proposes, among other things, that 
Congress authorize the discretionary removal of both federal and state mass-tort 
cases, without regard to the citizenship of the parties; and transfer of such cases, 
not only to a single federal court, but alternatively to a consenting state court, 
which would have the needed federal procedural and remedial powers to deal with 
the consolidated cases. Id. 
2. The most comprehensive consideration of the Proposal's possible 
constitutional and other infirmities is Joan Steinman, Reverse Removal, 78 IOWA L. 
REV. 1029 (1993). 
3. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, $3 4.01(a)(3), 5.01(d). 
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asked, to such crowding, trouble, and expense, the provision for 
consent can only clutter the argument I want to make. 
So I will be tackling broader questions. I will begin with 
the general subject of national power over state-court 
jurisdiction in nonfederal cases, a power the exercise of which 
the ALI Proposal presents only one model. I will move on to 
examine the underlying problem in its more familiar context, in 
which Congress confers jurisdiction upon federal courts over 
state-law eases; here, my effort will be to show not merely that 
theory developed for the former context can be generalized to 
extend to the latter, but that the theory is simply part of a 
more general theory of the power of Congress which has long 
been substantially, if implicitly, understood. 
It probably has been one of our mistakes that we tend to 
separate the two sets of courts in our minds. As a subject of 
separate study each set of courts, state or federal, must 
inevitably be a somewhat artificial construct. After all, the two 
sets of courts comprise one legal system. Of course there are 
pockets of exclusive jurisdiction in each judicial system. We 
know Article I11 imposes limits on the Article I powers of 
Congress in dealing with federal, but not with state courts. 
Then, too, there are the prudential policies that encourage 
federal courts to turn certain cases away. Those things said, 
surely the preferred position should be one of general 
jurisdictional congruence. When litigants are sent shuffling 
from one set of courts to the other to forage for a piece of 
missing jurisdiction we are not deluded into thinking it an 
example of efficiency or even fairness in the administration of 
civil j ~ s t i c e . ~  Whatever we know about federal supremacy on 
4. The Supreme Court contemplates bifurcated litigation in such recent 
interesting cases as California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989) (holding 
unrealistically that claims of indirect purchasers, lacking "antitrust standing" under 
federal case law, do not conflict with federal policy favoring the claims of direct 
purchasers and therefore may be pursued on state-law theories, even if the 
consequences include bifurcated litigation); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (holding that federal courts sitting in equity in 
civil-rights cases have no pendent jurisdiction over state-law claims, 
notwithstanding that this would lead to bifurcated litigation). For comment on this 
aspect of Pennhurst, see David Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment 
and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984); see also Louise Weinberg, 
The New Judicial Federalism: Where We Are Now, 19 GA. L. REV. 1075 (1985). For 
comment on this aspect of ARC America, see Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State 
Conflict of Laws: "Actual" Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1760-72 (1992). For an 
effort to patch up the wreckage in the wake of ARC America, see Barry Hawk et 
al., Report of the M A  Section on Antitrust Law Task Force to Review the Supreme 
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the one hand and Erie on the other also suggests that focusing 
narrowly on either set of courts may give us skew theory. 
We have made other problems for ourselves. The Supreme 
Court has given us a body of jurisprudence that makes the 
subject of national power over the state courts an obligatory 
part of any serious course on federal courts; but our thinking 
has never extended much beyond federal-law cases. We see the 
supremacy of federal law as the driving force, and the 
correlative duty of state courts to apply federal law as the 
feature that makes the subject eye-opening.5 Yet we still do 
not have a reasonably clear idea of the power of the nation 
even in this traditional context. We are unclear about where 
the duty of the state courts under the Supremacy Clause begins 
and end$ and about where to locate constitutional controls on 
state procedures and remedies in these federal-law cases.? 
As for state-law cases, it has been the convention to 
emphasize the power of Congress to  confer8 jurisdiction over 
Court's Decision in California v. ARC America Corp., 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 273 (1990) 
(criticizing the case and suggesting legislative override; recommending in the 
alternative, among other things, that a state be recognized as a "citizen" for 
diversity purposes in parens patriae indirect-purchaser actions; and remarking that 
Congress could confer federal jurisdiction "by invoking the concept of protective 
jurisdiction. Under this theory, Congress can confer federal jurisdiction over purely 
state-law claims simply by enacting a jurisdictional statute."). 
5. If you were wondering how it happens that state courts enforce the 
federal civil rights statutes, you might consult the classic, if mundane, case of 
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (holding under the Supremacy Clause that state 
courts are not free to decline jurisdiction over a federal claim arbitrarily); see also 
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) (same; states adjudicating federal civil-rights 
cases against local authorities may not dismiss even when the defendants have 
sovereign immunity under state law); and see F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 
760 (1982) (holding that Congress has Commerce power to require state 
administrative tribunals to adjudicate disputes arising under federal standards). 
6. For critiques of the jurisprudence of supremacy, see infra notes 100-02, 
189. 
7. For the debate on whether the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendment controls 
the validity of service of process in state courts adjudicating federal questions, see 
infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
8. I pass over the enduring debate on the power of Congress to limit the 
jurisdiction of federal courts, see, e.g., Gordon G. Young, A Critical Reassessment of 
the Case Law Bearing on Congress's Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower 
Federal Courts, 54 MD. L. REV. 132 (1995); Barry Friedman, Federal Jurisdiction 
and Legal Scholarship: A (Dialogic) Reply, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 478 (1991); Michael 
Wells, Congress's Paramount Role in Setting the Scope of Federal Jurisdiction, 85 
Nw. U. L. REV. 465 (1991). The position i s  reasonably clear, see Gerald Gunther, 
Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to 
the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984) (arguing that the power of 
Congress is virtually plenary). 
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state-law cases on federal rather than state courts. Article I11 
limits the power of Congress over federal, not state courts; and 
it is hard to see a problem of comparable interest in the state 
courts. But in my view this traditional emphasis upon Article 
I11 has obscured theoretical understanding. 
Why, then, do I take the bait on this occasion and begin by 
isolating and focusing on one set of courts only, the state 
courts? The real object of this paper is to shed light on the 
classic Article I11 problem of federal courts by generalizing it in 
advance. By deleting Article I11 from the picture we can 
consider national jurisdictional policies that may exist without 
Article 111. It is then a further question whether Article I11 
reflects or is surrogate for these more general concerns or 
represents some additional limit on the power of Congress. 
My argument, spelled out in the remainder of this article, 
can be summarized here. I begin the excursion in terra 
incognita: the little-explored power of Congress over the 
jurisdiction of state courts in matters likely to arise under 
nonfederal law: state law, or perhaps foreign law. It turns out 
that, surprisingly, there are many ways in which Congressg or 
the Supreme Court1' or both can and do act with impact upon 
the jurisdiction of the states over even nonfederal business. 
Sometimes this impact seems incidental, sometimes integral to 
the national purpose. But when the nation acts in ways having 
impact upon state courts in matters of apparently little 
national concern, whether by inadvertency or by design, the 
national intervention in state jurisdiction will have legitimacy 
The important insight has always been that due process ultimately requires 
state if not federal jurisdiction. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to 
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 
1362 (1953). But today the Supreme Court not infrequently struggles a t  the brink 
of total ouster of jurisdiction in all courts. See generally LOUISE WEINBERG, 1996 
SUPPLEMENT 78-94 (1995) to FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND COMMENTS ON JUDICIAL 
FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL POWER (1994). 
9. When I say "the power of Congress," I should be read-unless the context 
precludes it-as referring to the power of the nation, including the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court cannot enact a positive grant of jurisdiction, but as a practical 
matter its rulings can so affect the jurisdiction of either set of courts that the 
question of its power is bound up with the question of national power generally. 
10. When I say "the Supreme Court," I mean to be understood as saying 
"courts." I would prefer to use "courts" because it more accurately captures the 
way issues of law, even issues of allocations of power between the nation and the 
states, must be decided in courts of first instance, even in state courts. But here I 
use "the Supreme Court" when I need to convey that the courts are exercising 
national power. 
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only to the extent that there is some identifiable national 
interest or interests that support that result. 
In other words, the ultimate source of national power over 
nonfederal law in the state courts, as over everything else, 
must be an identifiable national interest. Further, the scope of 
national power over nonfederal adjudication in state courts is 
presumptively co-extensive with the national interest so 
identified? The weaker the interest the weaker the 
interference. In the strong instance in which Congress 
expressly confers new jurisdiction upon state courts over 
nonfederal questions, the inchoate national interest in and 
power over federalizable but unfederalized law generally, but 
not always, authorizes the assertion of national power to confer 
such jurisdiction. 
I argue, further, that within these limits the nation can 
and already does bestow not only jurisdiction on the state 
courts, but also procedural and remedial powers; these latter 
phenomena have interesting implications for our under- 
standings of the nature of due process review of state 
procedures. 
Further, the state courts, in turn, come under a 
proportionate duty to effectuate the national jurisdictional 
interest. The source of that duty is the Supremacy Clause, even 
when the jurisdiction that the nation has devolved upon the 
states is jurisdiction over state-law issues--contrary to what 
might have been supposed. 
Further, because national power ends where the national 
interest ends, the nation must have a rational basis for-a 
legitimate governmental interest in-a federal law or decision 
that constrains or enlarges state jurisdiction over nonfederal 
issues. This requirement of a rational basis is an absolute, 
11. This assertion is particularly controversial. That national power might be 
coextensive with the national interest is not self-evident. For a fine student 
exposition of the problem, see Alan R. Greenspan, Note, The Constitutional Exercise 
of the Federal Police Power: A Functional Approach To Federalism, 41 VAND. L. 
REV. 1019, 1020 (1988) (arguing that deference to rational exercises of Congress's 
Commerce power has given to the central government general police powers 
properly reserved to the states). If only to protect the existence of reasonably 
autonomous states, we are schooled to think of national power, rather, as  under 
special constraints-as opposed to state power, which (except for powers delegated 
to the nation) we are schooled to think of as plenary. When I use the limiting 
word "presumptively" in the text I do not refer to these supposed special 
constraints on federal power, but rather to general constitutional principles 
constraining exercises of state as well as federal power. 
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however liberal, limit upon national power. It  is a constraint of 
substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment, in the 
sense in which the Due Process Clauses protect against 
arbitrary or irrational governmental action.12 
Finally, although there are always extrinsic constitutional 
constraints on any exercise of national power-constraints 
deriving from the equal protection principle, the First 
Amendment, and other fundamental safeguards against 
power-the constraint of substantive due process, contrary to 
what might have been supposed, is intrinsic to the existence of 
national power. In addition, this constraint of substantive due 
process under the Fifth Amendment provides the only 
significant intrinsic limit on national power to affect state 
jurisdiction over nonfederal business. In this context the Tenth 
12. This traditional form of substantive due process should be distinguished 
from the Lochner-era incorporation into the Due Process Clause of "liberty of 
contract," see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND 
DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993) (exploring the 
possible unity of the two concepts). The general legitimacy of rational exercises of 
governmental power was perceived and defended in the Lochner era from Lochner- 
style assault. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (supporting as reasonable an economic regulation supposedly affecting 
liberty of contract); cf: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 377-78, 382- 
83 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Is the subject-matter within the reasonable 
scope of regulation? Is the end legitimate? . . . If so, the act must be 
sustained . . . ."). 
Rather, this form of substantive due process is the standard "rational-basis" 
scrutiny both the Constitution and the common law give, a t  a minimum, to law 
under challenge. I t  is an easy test, but law that is arbitrary or irrational should 
flunk it. The classic references are United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 
U.S. 144 (1938), and Justice Douglas's opinion in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 
348 U.S. 483 (1955). For other contexts, see infra notes 120, 137-45 and 
accompanying text. For recent writing, see R. Randall Kelso, Considerations of 
Legislative Fit Under Equal Protection, Substantive Due Process, and Free Speech 
Doctrine: Separating Questions of Advancement, Relationship and Burden, 28 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 1279 (1994); Charles B. Blackmar, Neutral Principles and 
Substantive Due Process, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 511 (1991); Robert E. Riggs, 
Substantive Dud Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941 (1990). 
The other side of this coin, of course, is that jurisdiction devolved arbitrarily or 
capriciously, like all other irrational exercises of governmental power, is illegitimate 
and will be struck down. Cf. the analogy of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U.S.C. $0 702, 706(2)(A) (providing federal judicial review for arbitrary and 
capricious federal agency action). 
(References to Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., are sometimes accompanied by 
references to Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337 (1929) (Holmes, J.). This relentlessly 
ophthalmological string of citations probably comes down to us from an overly 
specific bit of long-ago research. There is no necessary connection between 
eyeglasses and rational-basis scrutiny.) 
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Amendment, Article 111, and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment are all substantially irrelevant. 
Once we can begin to see general theory emerging from 
this particular context, unobscured by the special problems 
presented by Article 111, we can then turn to the more familiar 
problem of the Article I power of Congress as it may conflict 
with Article 111. I argue that the analysis offered in this paper 
provides more convincing theory than we now have on the 
classic problem of the power of Congress to vest federal 
jurisdiction over state-law claims without regard to the 
citizenship of the parties. Just as Congress may devolve upon 
the state courts jurisdiction over nonfederal business in the 
presence of a national jurisdictional interest, so may Congress 
confer such jurisdiction upon the federal courts. 
The analysis offered here implies that substantive due 
process must be satisfied before any independent Article I11 
question can be reached. Further, it is possible that Article I11 
itself may be satisfied by a substantive due process inquiry. In 
other words, perhaps even for Article I11 purposes, nondiverse 
federal cases can "arise under" purely jurisdictional statutes, 
contrary to what has been supposed. This latter argument is 
not essential to my thesis; Article I11 can be regarded as an 
independent textual constraint on the power of Congress 
without fatally compromising my more fundamental argument; 
but in my own view Article I11 is a surrogate for rational-basis 
scrutiny. 
In Part 11,'~ I present a taxonomy of examples of federal 
intervention into the jurisdiction of state courts over nonfederal 
business, discussing national power over exclusive and 
concurrent state jurisdiction, national ouster of state 
jurisdiction, and national regulation of state jurisdiction, all in 
state-law cases. 
In Part 111,14 I explain the counter-intuitive phenomenon 
of federal supremacy in the nonfederal cases described in Part 
11. With the material in these two Parts before us, we will have 
examples of jurisdiction conferred by the nation, the propriety 
of which we can consider free from the difficulties Article I11 
usually introduces into such an inquiry. 
13. Infra notes 20-89 and accompanying text. 
14. Infra notes 90-128 and accompanying text. 
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In Part IV,15 I consider the sorts of national interests that 
might justify intervention in the jurisdiction of state courts. 
In Part V,16 I consider whether there might be sources of 
national jurisdictional power that are independent from or 
cumulative to national substantive interests, sources thought to 
be found in constitutional text, and reject these alternatives. 
In Part VI,17 I show how reasoning from the national 
interest illuminates analogous recent Supreme Court cases 
dealing with the jurisdiction of federal courts, cases in which 
federal jurisdiction and state jurisdiction are at  least nominally 
concurrent. It becomes at  least plausible that Article 111 
furnishes not some independent, further test of federal 
jurisdiction over nonfederal questions, but rather is more 
intelligibly read as reflecting the scope of and limits on the 
national interest. 
In Part VII,18 I consider some of the objections that might 
be raised to the general theory offered in this paper, including 
the objection that the theory yields the apparent paradox of 
federal-question jurisdiction over the diversity jurisdiction. 
In my final remarkslg I conclude that the substantive 
due-process limit on national power over the jurisdiction of the 
state courts in state-law matters, which I have described as a 
theory of the national interest, is a general theory that explains 
national power over nonfederal business in federal courts as  
well, and extends in a way that has been long understood, if 
only implicitly, to other exercises of national power. 
Let us begin with the power of Congress, if any, to confer 
jurisdiction upon the states in state cases. 
We are inquiring into intervention by the nation in the 
litigation of nonfederal matters in state courts. This is an 
inquiry that seems not only unpromising, but unreal. We would 
not expect to find much case law, and there is very little 
l i terat~re.~'  One is reminded of Dr. Johnson's boast that he 
15. Infra notes 129-56 and accompanying text. 
16. Infra notes 157-90 and accompanying text. 
17. Infra notes 191-236 and accompanying text. 
18. Infra notes 237-81 and accompanying text. 
19. Infra notes 282-84 and accompanying text. 
20. But see the nice discussion of federally-conferred state diversity 
jurisdiction over mass torts in George T. Conway 111, Note, The Consolidation of 
Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 96 YALE L.J. 1099 (1987). 
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could repeat by heart, in English, a whole chapter of a Danish 
book on The Natural History of Iceland: "CHAP. 72, Concerning 
snakes. There are no snakes to be met with throughout the 
whole island."21 
It might be amusing, then, to see the ways in which such 
national interventions in state jurisdiction can occur. If we 
could find cases raising the question, it would be of at  least 
theoretical importance to have some answers. If there is 
national power to devolve jurisdiction upon the states over 
business unlikely to be federal business, we would like to know 
the source of that power. We would like to know whether such 
jurisdiction would be compulsory or merely permissive. If this 
jurisdiction is compulsory upon the states, we would like to 
know what limits might constrain the national power to confer 
it. We would like to know if it matters whether or not this 
devolved jurisdiction over state business is new to the states or 
was previously exercised by them and would be exercised by 
them in any event. We would like to know the implications of 
this state jurisdiction for our understanding of national power 
over federal jurisdiction. 
It turns out that national power can be and has been 
exercised so as to affect state judicial powers over state law. 
Many of the following examples will have some analog among 
the more familiar assertions of national power over federal law 
in state courts. For this and other reasons, even though both 
cases and commentary have for the most part been confined to 
this latter question, neither the jurisprudence nor the 
literature is without relevance to the discussion. 
A. National Power over Exclusive State Jurisdiction in  State- 
Law Cases 
Before I try to describe the ways in which the nation can 
create a head of exclusive state jurisdiction over state law, let 
me begin with a caveat. Exclusive jurisdiction is almost always 
somewhat fictional. Even though Congress may explicitly place 
claims arising under some statute within the exclusive jurisdic- 
tion of federal courts, the reality is that sooner or later a claim 
falling within exclusive federal jurisdiction will be adjudicated 
21. I am indebted to David Gunn, Head of Reference at the Tarlton Law 
Library, for finding a reference for the story in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF 
QUOTATIONS 279 (3d ed. 1979). This source dates Dr. Johnson's joke at April 13, 
1778. 
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in a state court anyway. Sooner or later some state court will 
adjudicate even an exclusively federal question, whether by 
way of counterclaim, or defense, or trial of a sub-issue, or other 
exigency of litigation. True exceptions to concurrent jurisdic- 
tion over federal questions are surprisingly rare, and generally 
entail exceptions to federal as well as state jurisdiction, as we 
shall see. 
Exclusive state jurisdiction over state-law claims also turns 
out to mean very little as a practical matter. Sooner or later 
some federal court will adjudicate such a claim, whether within 
its ancillary jurisdiction, or by way of counterclaim, or defense, 
or trial of a sub-issue, or other exigency of litigation. In either 
set of courts, state law can even furnish a defense to a federal 
claim, a t  least when the defense is not on the merits. Federal 
claims can be dismissed in either set of courts because, for 
example, a state statute of limitations has run, or for forum 
non conveniens, or because a state judgment is preclusive. True 
exceptions to concurrent jurisdiction over state-law questions 
are rare. But because state courts are under few Supremacy- 
Clause obligations in administering state law, such exceptions 
do not tend to strip both sets of courts of power, as do true 
exceptions to concurrent jurisdiction over federal-law questions. 
What usually distinguishes the truly exclusive state-law 
question, as we shall see, is that federal courts have perceived, 
or that the Supreme Court has announced, a federal policy, as 
a matter of federal common law, of avoiding federal adjudica- 
tion of that state-law question however it arises. 
We do find occasional instances of explicit conferral upon 
state courts by Congress of exclusive jurisdiction of a class of 
claims arising under state law. One thinks, for example, of the 
McCarran-Ferguson providing that state courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction, with governance by state law, over mat- 
ters relating to the business of insurance. Nothing in the perva- 
sive ERISA~~ is intended to change this underlying position; 
ERISA explicitly "saves" state-law governance of the business 
of insurance.24 We also have the example of the Jackson- 
Vanik ~ m e n d m e n t s , ~ ~  which provide federal benefits in the 
22. 15 U.S.C. $8 1011-1015, 1012(a). 
23. Employees' Retirement Income and Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 
U.S.C. $$ 1001-1461. 
24. Id. $ ll44(a), (b)(2)(A). 
25. Trade Act of 1974 (Jackson-Vanik Amendments), 19 U.S.C. $ 2192 passim. 
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form of "trade readjustment allowances" to displaced workers. 
Congress places administration of the program in the agencies 
of consenting states. What is interesting for our purposes is 
that Congress also provides that state courts have the sole 
power of judicial review of these trade readjustment allowan- 
c e ~ . ~ ~  But such examples are rare; and we are not always cer- 
tain whether state law in such instances is intended to operate 
of its own force or is incorporated as federal law-bumping the 
example out of our category. Finally, in some of these instances 
of conferred exclusive state jurisdiction, one cannot discount 
the possibility of federal judicial review under the Constitution 
or related federal statutory law, even when the litigation may 
have the effect of reopening the question supposedly confided to 
the "exclusive" jurisdiction of the state court.27 
More familiarly, Congress and the Supreme Court implicit- 
ly recognize, even if Congress does not explicitly "confer," exclu- 
sive state jurisdiction over a variety of claims that seem much 
more convincingly to be true state-law claims. This happens, 
for example, when the Constitution does not explicitly permit 
federal judicial power to extend to a class of preexisting state- 
law cases.28 Thus, the nation in effect isolates a sphere of ex- 
26. Section 2311(d) of the Trade Act provides: 
A determination by a cooperating State agency with respect to enti- 
tlement to program benefits . . . is subject to review in the same manner 
and to the same extent as determinations under the applicable State law 
[regarding unemployment compensation benefits] and only in that manner 
and to that extent. 
19 U.S.C. 3 2311(d). The Senate Report accompanying the bill explains that this 
provision was intended to confide exclusive jurisdiction to the state agencies and 
courts, under state law, over allowances to workers of trade readjustment benefits. 
S. REP. NO. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., at  139 (1974) ("The bill would have the 
effect of channeling all questions arising from determinations by State agencies 
through the normal State review procedure."). Note that this "grant" of exclusive 
jurisdiction is only to consenting states. 
27. See, e.g., International Union, United Auto. Workers of Am. v. Brock, 477 
U.S. 274, 283 (1986) (holding that although review of federal trade readjustment 
allowances to displaced workers under the Trade Act of 1974 is committed by Con- 
gress to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state courts, the state agency's process is 
judicially reviewable by the Supreme Court). 
28. U.S. CONST. art. 111, 5 2, provides: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Trea- 
ties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases 
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases 
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the 
United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more 
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens 
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clusive jurisdiction for the states in cases arising exclusively 
under law that is not federal, when the parties are not within 
Article 111's enumeration of judicial powers extending to those 
parties. In this way the states can be said to have "exclusive" 
jurisdiction over nondiversity, nonfederal claims simply because 
the Constitution does not explicitly authorize anything else. 
But digging beneath the constitutional text, we can say on a 
deeper level that both the constitutional and statutory grants 
of federal diversity jurisdiction reflect the narrowness of, and 
help us to understand the nature of, the national interest in 
federal jurisdiction over some of the cases that arise exclusively 
under law that is not federal. 
Similarly, when Congress requires that a minimum 
amount of money be in controversy before a diversity case may 
be heard in federal court-as it has since the First Judiciary 
A~t~~-Congress in effect creates an "exclusive" sphere of state 
governance over questions that today arise exclusively under 
law that is not federal, even when the parties are of diverse 
~itizenship.~' 
There is a class of cases in which Congress or the Supreme 
Court seems implicitly to expand the area of "exclusive" state 
power over state-law issues by interpreting the constitutional 
grant of diversity jurisdiction strictly. For example, neither 
of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands 
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens 
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
. 
29. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 8 11. The purpose of the original juris- 
dictional "amount-in-controversy" requirement in diversity cases seems to have been 
the political one of accommodating the general interest in limiting the federal judi- 
cial role in creditors' suits, and the specific concern of agrarian debtors that they 
might be called upon to answer for small debts in remote federal courts. This 
debtor interest was in opposition to the view of the Federalists that federal courts 
were needed, precisely, to compel payment of debts, including small private debts. 
Small private debts were the major part of some British creditors' assets. Just as 
the Federalists tended to believe that the importance to the nation's credit of re- 
payment of the public debt outweighed the hardships of a proportional tax upon 
the states, so also did they tend to believe that the importance to the nation's 
commerce of repayment of private debts, and particularly those private debts held 
by foreign creditors, outweighed the hardships imposed upon debtors in difficult 
times. See E. JAMES ~ R G U S O N ,  THE POWER OF THE PURSE 306-25 (1961); Wythe 
Holt, "To Establish Justice*: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention 
of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1518 (1989). 
30. Cf Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850) (sustaining the power of 
Congress to vest only that part of Article I11 diversity jurisdiction that could not 
be created by an assignment of rights). 
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Congress nor the Court has recognized diversity jurisdiction 
created by assignment of a claim.31 Moreover, the Court held 
in Strawbridge u. Curtiss that diversity must be "complete;" 
that statutory jurisdiction does not attach to a case in which 
one of the parties is not in diversity of citizenship vis-a-vis all 
adverse parties.32 And in the 1973 Zahn the Court 
held that each claimant in a federal class action in diversity 
must independently satisfy the jurisdictional amount. On the 
other hand, in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur u. Cauble," the 
Court held that in a federal class action only the named parties 
need be of diverse citizenship, in effect extending ancillary 
diversity jurisdiction over nondiverse absentee class members, 
and thus in theory reducing the scope of "exclusive" state juris- 
diction over diversity claims. 
In another class of cases, federal courts will decline to 
exercise jurisdiction over some state-law diversity claims, as a 
prudential matter of federal common law. Those of us familiar 
with federal courts issues are aware of the controversial cases 
in which federal courts are authorized to "abstain" from exer- 
cising their jurisdiction over federal  question^.^^ But we do 
31. Id. at  444-49; Judiciary Act of 1789 9 11; 28 U.S.C. 9 1359 (1988). Sec- 
tion 1359 provides that a district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action 
in which any party "by assignment or otherwise has been improperly . . . joined to 
invoke the jurisdiction . . . ." Id. 
32. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). But see State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. 
Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) (sustaining the constitutionality of federal 
interpleader in the absence of complete diversity). 
33. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). The Supplemental 
Jurisdiction Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. 8 1367(b) (Supp. 1993), probably should be read 
as overriding Zahn. Cf: Free v. Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that the statute overrides Zahn, but noting that opinion is divided among the 
district courts and among writers). 
34. 255 U.S. 356 (1921). 
35. E.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that federal courts 
should dismiss actions seeking injunctions against pending state criminal proceed- 
ings); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (holding that federal courts 
should abstain in cases in which exercise of their concurrent jurisdiction might in- 
terfere with a complex state regulatory scheme); Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pull- 
man Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (holding that federal courts should abstain from 
reaching major constitutional questions in cases in which a reinterpretation of state 
law might forestall invocation of federal equity powers). For an early discussion of 
Younger, see Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 
1191 (1977). For a comprehensive current survey of the debates over the legitimacy 
of federal abstention, see James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to 
Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (1994). For an  informa- 
tive entry into one of the major elements of the debate, see Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Book Review, The Seduction of Deduction: The Allure of and Problems with a De- 
ductive Approach to Federal Court Jurisdiction, 86 Nw. U .  L. REV. 96 (1991) (re- 
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not always focus the same intense attention upon cases in 
which federal courts are authorized to "abstain" from exercising 
their jurisdiction over state questions. Federal courts, for exam- 
ple, avoid adjudicating family-law matters, notwithstanding 
diversity of citizenship between the parties, particularly in 
equity cases that might oblige them to supervise domestic rela- 
tions or to gain expertise in local family service agencies.36 
Similarly, a federal court may decline to hear a transnational 
diversity case on the ground of forum non c~nveniens,~? even 
when the court sits in a state which would adjudicate those 
cases.38 Arguably within this category is the recent ruling that 
federal courts have discretion to abstain from exercising diver- 
sity jurisdiction in declaratory actions, if they deem abstention 
to be in the interest of "considerations of practicality and wise 
judicial admini~tration."~~ 
In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,4° an 
viewing MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDI- 
CIAL JURISDICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY (1% 1)). 
36. Although Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992), held claims of 
intra-familial tort triable in federal diversity courts, Justice White, for the Court, 
distinguished cases falling more properly under the traditional "domestic relations 
exception* to federal jurisdiction. Id. at 702-04. Federal courts, he reasoned, should 
not be in the business of issuing divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees: 
Issuance of decrees of this type not infrequently involves retention of 
jurisdiction by the court and deployment of social workers to monitor 
compliance . . . . [Sltate courts are more . . . suited to work of this type 
than are federal courts, which lack the close association with state and 
local government organizations dedicated to handling [such] issues. 
Id.  a t  704. 
37. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
38. The Court has never held federal forum non conveniens doctrine generally 
binding upon state courts. Cf. American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981 
(1994) (holding state courts free to adjudicate transnational admiralty claims a 
federal court would dismiss for forum non conveniens); In  re Air Crash Disaster 
Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that federal courts in 
the Fifth Circuit are not bound in diversity cases by state laws declining to recog- 
nize forum non conveniens). 
39. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 115 S. Ct. 2137, 2143 (1995) (O'Connor, J.) 
(reasoning in part from the fact that federal statutory declaratory judgments are 
discretionary). Wilton is a clearer example of the phenomenon of federal abstention 
from state-law cases than Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 
U.S. 800 (1976) (holding that federal courts should stay actions in which there are 
prior actions pending in the state courts, state adjudication is part of a complex 
regulatory scheme, and to go forward would result in piecemeal litigation). In Colo- 
rado River, the United States was a party, and important issues of federal law 
were involved. 
40. 465 U.S. 89 (1984). It  is pointed out by my august colleague, CHARLES 
ALAN W R I G ~ ,  THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 114 (5th ed. 19941, that the Supple- 
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important 1984 case, the Supreme Court placed certain state- 
law claims within the truly exclusive jurisdiction of state 
courts. The Court found constitutional authority in the Elev- 
enth Amendment to hold that state-law claims for injunctive 
relief against local officials may not be heard by federal courts 
in their pendent jurisdiction over federal civil-rights claims. 
Pennhurst blocks federal court orders restraining state officials 
from violating state law. Pennhurst thus devolves upon the 
states an exclusive jurisdiction over all injunction suits against 
local authorities when pleaded as a matter of state law. 
In the Westfall Act of 1988;' amending the Federal Tort 
Claims Congress clarifies that the states have exclusive 
jurisdiction over tort cases under state law against federal 
employees, making such cases nonremovable when the Attor- 
ney General finds that the defendant employee was not acting 
within the scope of federal employment when the tort oc- 
curred." To be sure, the 1995 case of Gutierrez de Martinez v. 
mental Jurisdiction Statute of 1990 cannot cure Pennhurst because Pennhurst was 
decided under the Eleventh Amendment, not simply as  a matter of the scope of 
federal equity or of a federal court's pendent jurisdiction. To this it  might be add- 
ed that Congress could override Pennhurst under its powers to "abrogate" the Elev- 
enth Amendment. Cf: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (under 5 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (under 
the Commerce Clause). Congress need only use clear language extending federal 
pendent or diversity jurisdiction to state-law equitable claims against state officials. 
Id. a t  14-15 (Brennan, J.) ("[Tlhe power to regulate commerce includes the power 
to override States' immunity from suit, but we will not conclude that Congress has 
overridden this immunity unless it does so clearly."). But see id. a t  36 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting in part) ("Better to overrule Hans [v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (hold- 
ing the Eleventh Amendment bars federal suits against states even in nondiversity 
cases arising under federal law)], I should think . . . . We do not need Hans for 
the 'clear statement' rule . . . ."). For pre-Union Gas writing on the issue, interest- 
ingly considering, among other things, a theory of protective jurisdiction, see 
George D. Brown, Beyond PennhursGProtective Jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amend- 
ment, and the Power of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response to the 
Burger Court, 71 VA. L. REV. 343 (1985). 
41. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 
(commonly known as the Westfall Act), Pub. L. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563-67. 
42. 28 U.S.C. 88 1346(b), 2674, 2679(d) (1988). This replaced the Government 
[or Federal] Drivers' Act of 1961, 28 U.S.C. 5 2679(b). 
43. 28 U.S.C. 5 2679(d)(l). Such a case will be dismissed from federal court 
in the absence of diversity of citizenship between the parties. When such a case is 
first filed in state court it becomes unremovable. In contrast, when the Attorney 
General certifies that a defendant employee was acting within the scope of her 
federal employment a t  the time of the alleged tort, the United States is substitut- 
ed as party defendant; the federal courts then have exclusive jurisdiction; and any 
cases pending in the state courts are removed without possibility of remand. The 
Attorney General's certification is conclusive for purposes of removal. 
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L ~ m a g n o ~ ~  may have modified this exclusivity somewhat, but 
leaves it untouched in the general run of cases under the Act. 
In Lamagno, the Court held, 5:4, that the Attorney 
General's determination that the federal employee did or did 
not act within the scope of her employment is judicially review- 
able. This result creates the intriguing possibility that the 
federal courts might have to adjudicate a nondiversity case 
arising under state law. This can be seen by supposing that the 
Attorney General issues a within-the-scope certification and 
removes the case. Then, since the correctness of the certifica- 
tion is now judicially reviewable under Lamagno, the district 
court reviews it, and holds that the certification was erroneous. 
There is no possibility of remand, because under the Westfall 
Act the Attorney General's certification is explicitly made con- 
clusive for purposes of removal.45 Thus, a case Congress in- 
tended, and Article I11 seems to require, to be heard exclusively 
in state court may wind up in federal court. I will return once 
or twice to this interesting hypothetical case.46 
B. National Power over Concurrent State Jurisdiction in 
State-Law Cases 
When Congress grants federal courts jurisdiction over 
state-law cases, there is an obvious implicit presumption of 
concurrent state jurisdiction. The important example, of course, 
is the current codification of the grant of diversity jurisdic- 
t i ~ n . ~ ?  This presumption of concurrent state jurisdiction over 
state-law claims is somewhat analogous to the more surprising 
implicit presumption of concurrent state jurisdiction that is 
made when Congress grants federal courts jurisdiction over 
cases likely to be adjudicated under federal law.48 
44. 115 S. Ct. 2227 (1995). 
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (1988). 
46. See infra notes 65-69, 210-13, 233-34 and accompanying text. 
47. 28 U.S.C. $ 1332 (1988). The statute today omits the explicit reference to 
the concurrent jurisdiction of the states seen in 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 
On the presumptive concurrent state jurisdiction over state claims triable in federal 
bankruptcy proceedings, see Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 133 (1876). 
48. The federal common-law rule is that unless Congress explicitly grants 
exclusive federal jurisdiction, there is concurrent state jurisdiction. See, e.g., Tafflin 
v. Levitt, 493 US. 455 (1990) (holding civil RICO claims within the presumed 
concurrent jurisdiction of the states); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 
473, 477-78 (1981) (claims arising on the outer continental shelf); Charles Dowd 
Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962) (same; claims under Q 301 of the Nation- 
al Labor Relations Act); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 133 (1876) (claims in 
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Notwithstanding this presumption, we do see explicit 
conferrals of concurrent jurisdiction over nonfederal claims, or 
at  least allowances for concurrent jurisdiction. The best-known 
example must be section 11 of the First Judiciary Act:' which 
expressly granted diversity jurisdiction to the federal circuit 
courts, "concurrent with the courts of the several States . . . ." 
State jurisdiction in such cases preexisted the federal statute, 
and the states would have continued to adjudicate their diversi- 
ty cases in the absence of the statute. 
Today the phenomenon of explicit recognition of state con- 
current jurisdiction over nonfederal claims can be seen, for 
example, in the statutory charter of the Red cross." That leg- 
islation gives the Red Cross the power "to sue and be sued in 
courts of law and equity, State or Federal, within the jurisdic- 
tion of the United  state^."^' This head of concurrent jurisdic- 
tion has assumed recent importance in the wake of the out- 
break of AIDS cases contracted fi-om transfusions of contam- 
inated blood from Red Cross supplies.52 
Another example is seen in the Foreign Sovereign Immuni- 
ties Act of 1976.~~ The Act provides that its standards of for- 
eign sovereign immunity54 apply in both sets of courts;55 does 
not make its grant of federal jurisdiction exc l~s ive ,~~  and pro- 
bankruptcy [for the effect of the automatic federal stay of state proceedings under 
11 U.S.C. 5 362, see, e.g., In re Garay, 89 N.J. 104, 119, 444 A.2d 1107, 1115 
(1982) (construing the automatic stay as not enjoining a pending state action)]); 
Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 16 (1820) (court-martials of draft evaders). 
The important exception is the implied exclusive federal jurisdiction in antitrust. 
General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261, 287 (1922); see, e.g., 
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 US.  373, 379-83 
(1985); Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 US. 623, 664 (1977); Freeman v. Bee 
Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1943). 
49. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73. 
50. Act of Jan. 5, 1905, ch. 23, 5 2, 33 Stat. 600, 36 U.S.C. $8 1-17 (1988). 
51. 36 U.S.C. 5 2 (1988). 
52. For discussion of American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E., 505 US. 247 
(1992), an Article I11 case that arose in this context, see infra notes 218-36 and ac- 
companying text. 
53. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. $8 1330, 1441(d), 
1602-11 (1988); see Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489 
(1983) (Burger, C.J.) ("The Act expressly provides that its standards control in 'the 
courts of the United States and of the States,' 5 1604, and thus clearly contem- 
plates that such suits may be brought in either federal or state courts."). 
54. 28 U.S.C. 5 1605 (providing generally that there is no immunity for acts 
arising out of nongovernmental conduct occurring in this country or with direct 
effects in this country). 
55. 28 U.S.C. 5 1604. 
56. 28 U.S.C. 5 1330 (granting nonexclusive jurisdiction). 
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vides explicitly for discretionary removal of claims pleadable 
under the The Act is construed as intending that cases 
under it do not arise under federal law. Rather, the liability of 
a foreign sovereign is to be determined under the law that 
would be applicable if the defendant were a private individu- 
al,58 and such law generally would be "the law of the place 
where the act or omission The upshot is that lia- 
bility under the Act typically is governed by the law of a state, 
or of a foreign nation?' 
It might be tempting to think of the jurisdiction Congress 
confers upon the states under the Foreign Sovereign Immuni- 
ties Act as surplusage. The states have always adjudicated 
claims under state and foreign law. One might want to think of 
the Act simply as clearing away the inhibition of a preexisting 
defense, the defense of sovereign immunity, in cases challeng- 
ing only the nongovernmental conduct of a foreign sovereign. 
The Supreme Court similarly cleared away a preexisting de- 
fense to state adjudication when it extended the Federal Arbi- 
tration Act to the states.61 For my purposes it does not matter 
how you think of the effect of the Foreign Sovereign Immuni- 
ties Act upon state courts. But the Act looks increasingly like a 
conferral of jurisdiction upon the states as one recognizes how 
much else Congress does in the Act to open state courts to new 
business. For example, Congress endows the state courts with 
powers of worldwide service of process in cases under the 
57. 28 U.S.C. $ 1441(d). 
58. 28 U.S.C. 5 1606 provides: 
[Tlhe foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same 
extent as  a private individual under like circumstances; but . . . except for 
an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive dam- 
ages . . . . [Ilf, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the law 
of the place where the action or omission occurred provides, or has been 
construed to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the foreign 
state shall be liable for actual or compensatory damages . . . . 
Id.  (emphases added). 
59. Id.  
60. Cf.  First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 
462 U.S. 611, 622 n.11 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) (explaining that, although federal 
common law must govern threshold statutory issues under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, like the amenability of a particular governmental instrumentality 
to suit, the substantive liability of a statutory defendant is not to be determined 
under federal law). 
61. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 US. 1 (1984) (under the Federal Arbi- 
tration Act, the state courts may not refuse to enforce an agreement to arbitrate if 
the agreement is in interstate commerce). 
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1608. 
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There are statutes that may fall into this category of ex- 
plicit provision for concurrent state jurisdiction, but that I am 
hesitant to include in it. I refer to statutes in which Congress 
does not seem so much to be permitting or recognizing state 
law to govern of its own force as it seems to be incorporating 
state law as federal law. Thus, I have not mentioned the inter- 
esting example of the Price-Anderson Amendments of 1988,~~ 
creating a new federal cause of action for damages for nuclear 
accident, with original jurisdiction in both sets of courts, and 
mandating that the liability laws in such cases derive from the 
law of the place of the accident. Of course along the spectrum 
of such statutes there may well be some that could be viewed 
in either light.64 
Gutierrez de Martinez v. L a r n a g n ~ ~ ~  furnishes an example 
of the metaphysical distinction I am trying to describe, al- 
though in the end it has to do with exclusive federal jurisdic- 
tion, and slips outside the category of concurrent cases that I 
have been considering. In Lamagno, eight of the Justices of the 
current Court seem prepared to assume that claims in federal 
court under the Federal Tort Claims Act, as amended by the 
Westfall are governed by state law operating of its own 
force?? This assumption makes sense to me only because the 
Justices in Lamagno were making it in the context of a hypo- 
thetical problem not addressed in the statutory scheme: federal 
adjudication of the liability, under state law, of a federal em- 
ployee in an erroneously removed case? 
63. Price-Anderson Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C. $5 2014, 2273, 2282a 
(1988). The Price-Anderson Act, as amended, creates a new "public liability action" 
for nuclear accidents, and contemplates original jurisdiction over the action in both 
federal and state courts, subject to removal and transfer to a federal court a t  the 
place of accident. The complaint states this new cause of action only if it fulfills 
statutory criteria. See In re T.M.I. Litig. Cases Consol. 11, 940 F.2d 832 (3rd Cir. 
1991) (suggesting that Article I11 jurisdiction in an action under the Act could be 
sustained based on these federal statutory elements). The Act stipulates that the 
law governing liability under the new cause of action shall be derived from the law 
of the state in which the nuclear accident occurs. 42 U.S.C. 5 2014(hh) (1988). 
64. See, e.g., Trade Readjustment Act of 1974, supra note 25. 
65. 115 S. Ct. 2227 (1995). 
66. 28 U.S.C. $ 1346(b) (1988), as amended by the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. 
$$ 2672, 2674 (Supp. 1993); see supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text. 
67. Lamagno, 115 S. Ct. at  2236-37 (Ginsburg, J., for four of the Justices); id. 
at  2239 (Souter, J., dissenting for four of the Justices but making the same as- 
sumption that liabilities under the Act are governed by state law of its own force). 
68. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text. 
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Now, once a defendant employee in a state-court case un- 
der the Act is certified as having acted within the scope of her 
employment, the case is removed to federal court without possi- 
bility of remand. By holding the Attorney General's certifica- 
tion judicially reviewable, Lamagno raises a curious question. 
What happens, if in reviewing the certification, the federal 
court holds that the Attorney General erred? The federal court 
will still have exclusive jurisdiction, but the case will be an 
ordinary tort case. Assuming the constitutionality of such juris- 
diction,69 it is here that state law surely governs of its own 
force. 
On the other hand, in the general run of federal tort claims 
under the Westfall Act, the liability of the United States as 
substituted defendant is governed, in my view, by federal law, 
even though federal law incorporates state law by reference." 
It is true that there is language in the statute,?' similar to 
language we have seen in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act," providing that in ordinary tort cases arising out of the 
activities of federal employees the United States shall be liable 
"in the same manner and to the same extent as a private indi- 
vidual under like circumstances . . . ." And it is'true that I have 
assumed here that state law governs of its own force in cases 
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. But the liability 
of the United States is a federal concern in a direct "comes- 
from-Uncle-Sam7s-treasury" way that the liability of a foreign 
sovereign is not. In actions under the Foreign Sovereign Immu- 
nities Act, the nation has little or no interest in the merits. The 
chief national interest affecting the merits in such suits is the 
foreign-relations interest of assuring foreign governments that 
in this country they are immune from liabilities for actions 
taken within their governmental sphere.73 The Westfall Act 
cases seem quite different to me. Indeed, as we have seen, in 
such cases concurrent state jurisdiction is extinguished when 
the Attorney General makes the triggering determination. 
69. See infra notes 210-13, 233-34 and accompanying text. 
70. 28 U.S.C. 8 1346(b). 
71. 28 U.S.C. 8 2074. 
72. See supra notes 53-62, infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
73. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 
462 U.S. 611, 622 n.11 (1983) (referring to the legislative history to support the 
view that Congress does not intend a federal common law in cases under the Act). 
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C. National Ouster of State Jurisdiction in State-Law Cases 
Ouster of state concurrent jurisdiction over state questions 
is not unknown. There is the explicit grant to federal courts of 
jurisdiction over removed diversity cases from state courts,74 
subject only to a federal court's discretion to remand, and state- 
law governance is likely in such cases. An interesting body of 
federal common law also permits removal of even a 
nondiversity state-law case to federal courts when it can be 
argued that the claim is "really federal."75 An even more exot- 
ic form of ouster of state jurisdiction over state-law questions 
occurs in those rare cases in which federal courts will grant an 
injunction under federal law to restrain state proceedings to 
enforce state law.76 
The Supreme Court can hold state adjudicatory as well as 
legislative jurisdiction over certain state-law cases to be pre- 
empted. But in such cases we find, oddly, that federal jurisdic- 
tion also is likely to be a casualty. We generally suppose that 
74. 28 U.S.C. 1441(a) (1988). 
75. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 US. 394, 397 n.2 (1981) 
(approving the removal of a state-law case as an "artfully pIeaded," "essentially 
federal law" case sounding in antitrust). 
76. The classic case is Ex parte Young, 209 US. 123 (1908). Today the avail- 
ability of this sort of "oustern depends upon exceptions to the general rule of Youn- 
ger v. Harris, 401 US. 37 (1971), which forbids such injunctions. In theory, a 
federal court can enjoin state enforcement proceedings not yet "pending," i.e., before 
they are under way-assuming the federal plaintiff has standing. See Steffel v. 
Thompson, 415 US. 452, 475-76 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring) (explaining that 
standing rarely will be found). For an important example, see O'Shea v. Littleton, 
414 US. 488 (1974) (holding that the named plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge 
criminal procedures when it was speculative that the plaintiffs would commit 
crimes and that they would then be arrested). Even if state proceedings are not 
yet pending when the federal injunction suit is filed, and even if the federal plain- 
tiff has standing, the federal suit can be dismissed under Younger at  any time 
before "proceedings of substance on the meritsn have taken place in the federal 
court. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975). See generally ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 715-56 (2d ed. 1994); LOUISE WEINBERG, 
FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND COMMENTS ON FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL POWER 700- 
47 (1994). There is an exception to these restrictive rules for harassing state prose- 
cutions brought repetitively in bad faith. An example is the federal injunction that 
ended Jim Garrison's repetitive prosecutions of Clay Shaw in New Orleans for 
allegedly conspiring in the assassination of President Kennedy and for perjury. (For 
background see the controversial fictionalizing Oliver Stone movie, JFK, in which, 
among other curious twists of reality, Garrison, the real-life prosecutor, plays Chief 
Justice Earl Warren). See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 US. 584, 586 (1978) (noting 
the District Court's issuance of the injunction); Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d 113 
(5th Cir. 1972) (same case, approving the lower court's issuance of the injunction); 
Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F. Supp. 390 (D. La. 1971) (same case, issuing the injunc- 
tion). 
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the natural congruence between the jurisdiction of state and 
federal courts is a function of the national interest in the mer- 
its; but in these cases the jurisdiction of courts typically is 
ousted to protect the original jurisdiction of some alternative 
forum for dispute r e s~ lu t ion ,~~  or to protect the original juris- 
diction of an administrative agency.78 
There is a similar class of cases in which the jurisdiction of 
courts is ousted to protect the prerogatives of a political branch 
of the go~ernment ;~~  but here, curiously, we find that occa- 
sionally one of these so-called "political questions," although 
not justiciable in federal courts, remains justiciable in state 
courts. Some state courts, for example, will adjudicate cases 
under the Guarantee Clause in which a political minority at- 
tempts a court challenge to the legitimacy of state g~vernment.'~ 
77. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding under the 
Federal Arbitration Act that arbitration agreements must be enforced in state as  
well as  federal courts for all agreements in interstate commerce, notwithstanding 
that the Act seems to have been intended for federal courts only). But see Allied- 
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 845 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(''1 shall not in the future dissent from judgments that rest on Southland. I will, 
however, stand ready to join four other Justices in overruling it."). 
78. E.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) 
(holding that courts may not adjudicate activities arguably protected or prohibited 
by the National Labor Relations Act). 
79. E.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (holding 
under the federal common law governing the foreign relations of the United States 
that the validity of an act of a foreign sovereign is not adjudicable in any court in 
this country, because confided to the political branches). For recent writing on 
Sabbatino, see Jack Garvey, Judicial Foreign Policy-Making in International Civil 
Litigation: Ending the Charade of Separation of Powers, 24 LAW & POLV INT'L 
BUS. 461 (1993). As this reference suggests, the issue in Sabbatino may be viewed 
more broadly as among those legal issues which are held to present "political ques- 
tions" because confided to a political branch. E.g., Nixon v. United States, 113 S. 
Ct. 732 (1993) (holding that courts may not review the legitimacy of impeachment 
proceedings against a federal judge, where trial was by a Senate committee). 
On the political-question problem in the context of the electoral process, see 
Symposium, "Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government," 65 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 709-946 (1994), including articles by Ann Althouse, Kathryn Abrarns, Akhil 
Amar, Erwin Chemerinsky, Jesse Choper, Richard Collins, Julian Eule, Hans 
Linde, Deborah Merritt, Robert Nagel, Louise Weinberg, and G. Edward White. See 
generally PHILIPPA P. STRUM, THE SUPREME COURT AND "POLITICAL QUESTIONS:" A 
STUDY IN JUDICIAL EVASION (1974); Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Poli- 
tics: A Recent History of the Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 643 
(1989); J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. 
L. REV. 97 (1988). 
80. U.S. CONST. art. IV, 8 4 (guaranteeing to every state a republican form of 
government). For state adjudications under the Guarantee Clause notwithstanding 
the political-question doctrine, see In re Initiative Petition No. 348, State Question 
No. 640, 820 P.2d 772 (Okla. 1992); Cagle v. Qualified Electors, 470 So.2d 1208 
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The exclusive state jurisdiction in these "political question" 
cases perplexes me. The Guarantee Clause is held to be 
nonjusticiable because the question of the legitimacy of a state 
government is thought to be a question confided to C o n g r e ~ s . ~ ~  
Although in my view access to courts for the political minority 
is generally a good thing, I fail to see how, once a question is 
held confided to Congress, the state courts can suppose they 
retain jurisdiction over it .82 One suspects that the state courts 
take these cases not because current Supreme Court jurispru- 
dence allows it, but rather because current Supreme Court 
jurisprudence is wrong. 
Another variety of ouster of state jurisdiction might be 
supposed to attend federal preemption of state law. But feder- 
alization of a state-law question will not necessarily oust state 
courts of concurrent jurisdiction over the sorts of disputes fed- 
eralized. Federalization does mean that federal courts will gain 
at  least concurrent jurisdiction over the federalized claims. And 
the state will have to adjudicate the federalized questions as a 
matter of federal, not state law and policy. This is also true 
when a whole field of law is held "preempted" by federal law, or 
when state law in actual conflict with federal law must fall, 
under the Supremacy Clause. The state courts are not neces- 
sarily closed against such issues, but the articulate voice of the 
state sovereign is stilled in its own courts. 
D. National Regulation of State-Court Adjudication of 
State-La w Cases 
The nation pervasively regulates the administration even 
of state law in state courts. The national interest in fair proce- 
dures in state courts, manifest in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, justifies federal constraints upon state 
assertions of jurisdiction over the person83 and upon state pre- 
(Ma. 1985); Opinion of the Justices, 468 So.2d 883 (Ala. 1985). 
81. The classic case is Luther v. Borden, 48 US. (7 How.) 1 (1849); see also 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding justiciable, under the Equal Protection 
Clause, the malapportionment of a state legislature; distinguishing but not overrul- 
ing Luther v. Borden). 
82. For the argument that Guarantee Clause claims are adjudicable in state 
courts, see Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican Government, 65 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 709 (1994); contra Louise Weinberg, Political Questions and the 
Guamntee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 887, 941-45 (1994). 
83. The Supreme Court exercised this power soon after the 1868 ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
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judgment  attachment^.^^ Moreover, if state law does not pro- 
vide an anticipatory remedy, the state must provide "meaning- 
ful backward-looking relief" for unconstitutional taxes collect- 
ed,85 and the Supreme Court suggests that such relief be pro- 
vided under state law.86 The state must furnish appellate re- 
view of punitive damages.87 Also as a matter of due process, 
state courts choosing among state laws must choose reasonably; 
they are free to apply only non-arbitrary, relevant law. On any 
substantive issue the state must apply the law of a state hav- 
ing a significant governmental interest in the issue; to fail to 
do so is held to be as much a violation of substantive as of 
procedural due process.88 
A comprehensive federal code of criminal procedure has 
been imposed by the Supreme Court upon the states, through 
all phases of the state criminal process, in the interest of effec- 
tuating the procedural due process guarantees of the selectively 
incorporated Bill of  right^.^' 
84. E.g., Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). 
85. McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 
(1990). For discussion of McKesson in relation to National Private Truck Council, 
Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 2351 (1995), see LOUISE WEINBERG, 1996 
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 8, a t  92, 241-42 (1995). 
86. National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 
2351 (1995) (holding that a state court need not try a claim against state officials 
as  a federal civil-rights claim when federal courts would not). 
87. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994). 
88. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (holding that a 
state with only insignificant contacts with a multistate case may not apply its own 
law to every issue); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981) (stating 
that to govern an issue by its laws, a state must have a significant contact or 
contacts with that issue, generating governmental interests in the state, such that 
application of its law will be neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair). But see 
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (permitting a state with jurisdiction 
over multistate class claims with which it  had little, if any, significant contact to 
apply its statute of limitations to open the door to claims time-barred in all con- 
tact states, because the forum traditionally applies its own statute of limitations). 
89. Familiar examples include Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Fifth 
Amendment standards of custodial interrogation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) 
(Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches). See Louise Wein- 
berg, The Monroe Mystery Solved: Beyond the "Unhappy History" Theory of Civil 
Rights Litigation, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 737-765 (1991) (arguing that the action for 
damages under the federal civil rights statute that emerged in the Warren Court 
period was a function of the contemporaneous selective incorporation of the Bill of 
Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; showing that 
the nature of such actions is explained by this connection with the criminal pro- 
cess, including the absence of similar actions in equity; distinguishing actions un- 
der the Equal Protection Clause). 
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Arguably it is even possible to read the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of national power to 
confer jurisdiction upon--or at  least to grant procedural or 
remedial powers to-state courts adjudicating nonfederal cases, 
rather than-as we usually read the Clause-as a source of na- 
tional power to impose constraints upon state adjudication. 
In this brief summary we have seen a number of ways in 
which Congress or the Supreme Court can control, modify, 
regulate, or otherwise affect the jurisdiction of state courts over 
cases not likely to involve federal claims. 
We have seen that, among other things, Congress can and 
does allocate jurisdiction to the state courts in matters not 
likely to arise under federal law. We have been introduced to 
the example of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.g0 The 
ALI proposes another such allocation for complex litigation, if 
you discount the provision for state c~nsent .~ '  We also have 
seen the interesting instance of section 11 of the original Judi- 
ciary Act of 1789. Although section 11 of the First Judiciary Act 
vested new jurisdiction in federal courts, it also purported to 
confer their preexisting diversity jurisdiction upon the states. 
The Section is fairly read as at least making room for the pre- 
existing jurisdiction of the states.92 
These federal allocations of state jurisdiction hold little 
difficulty for us. They exhibit no problem analogous to the 
90. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1988). 
91. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
92. In either set of courts, of course, the diversity jurisdiction was one in 
which both nonfederal and federal claims might be heard. There was very little 
federal statutory law, and what there was tended actually to confer new concurrent 
jurisdiction over new federal claims. For example, although federal jurisdiction over 
patent claims is exclusive today, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988), at  one time state 
courts had concurrent jurisdiction over infringement suits, Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 
357, 5 Stat. 117; Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481; Act of Feb. 21, 1793, 
ch. 11, § 6, 1 Stat. 318, 322; and claims of wrongful procurement of a patent, Act 
of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, Q 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111. 
Certain nonstatutory claims even then might have been recognizable as federal. 
In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), recall that Chief Justice 
Marshall thought that Marbury had a cause of action "under the laws of his coun- 
try," id. at  162, and in effect held that although the Supreme Court lacked power 
to hear it, Marbury's petition for a mandamus was triable in any court of compe- 
tent original jurisdiction. Read broadly, Marbury contemplates lawsuits seeking 
enforcement of the Constitution in at  least state courts of first instance, there then 
being no general federal-question jurisdiction. 
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problem presented by cases in which Congress purports to 
confer upon federal courts jurisdiction over state-law claims 
without regard to the citizenship of the parties. The latter 
situation is a hornet's nest. It has become a deeply metaphysi- 
cal specialty of federal-courts learning. The struggle has been 
to reconcile Congress's Article I power with the constraints 
upon the jurisdiction of federal courts imposed by Article III.93 
I reach this latter, more familiar problem later in this article; I 
do so not only for any lessons the federal-courts learning may 
hold for the same problem transposed to state courts, but also 
for any perspectives my analysis may open up when applied to 
the federal courts. But we can see a t  once that when Congress 
confers jurisdiction upon the state courts there is no Article-I11 
problem. The problem simply goes away. The state courts are 
not Article411 courts. The question becomes much more simply 
a question of the power of Congress under Article I. 
Quite a few other issues slip their old knots as well. We 
find that it does not matter in any fundamental sense whether 
jurisdiction conferred by Congress upon the states is jurisdic- 
tion over nonfederal or federal questions. Congress can act only 
in the national interest; Congress must vindicate some national 
93. For a brief introduction to the arcana, one probably cannot do better than 
Justice Frankfurter's talky, under-organized, but illuminating dissent in Textile 
Workers' Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The more recent 
cases, some of which I shall have occasion to touch upon in a later Part, include 
Am. Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E., 505 U.S. 247 (1992); Verlinden B.V. v. Cen- 
tral Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983); and, although it  is not always recog- 
nized as presenting the problem, Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
Marathon Pipe Line was a jurisdictional catastrophe. In Marathon Pipe Line 
the Court declared federal bankruptcy jurisdiction unconstitutional under Article I11 
to the extent state claims affecting the assets of the bankrupt were adjudicated by 
bankruptcy judges. This was done not on the ground that such claims did not 
"arise under" federal law within the meaning of Article 111, but on the spurious 
argument that if nondiversity state-law claims were triable in federal courts they 
must be tried by tenured judges. The actual problem the case presented was bur- 
ied in a footnote, Marathon Pipe Line, 458 U.S. a t  72 n.26, and pasted over by the 
customary citations to Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 653 (1947) and 
Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 374 (1934), neither of which offer supporting 
argumentation. See generally Susan Block-Lieb, The Case Against Supplemental 
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A Constitutional, Statutory, and Policy Analysis, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 721 (1994); John T. Cross, Congressional Power to Extend Feder- 
al Jurisdiction to Disputes Outside Article III: A Critical Analysis from the Perspec- 
tive of Bankruptcy, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1188 (1993); Thomas Galligan, Jr., Article 
III and the "Related To" Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A Case Study in Protective Juris- 
diction, 11 U .  PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1 (1987); Note, Bankruptcy and the Limits of 
Federal Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 703 (1982). 
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interest when it confers jurisdiction, whatever the source of the 
law likely to govern the merits of cases within that jurisdiction. 
Now, when Congress acts in the national interest, the 
Supremacy Clause should be expected to kick in. Obligations 
under the Supremacy Clause should attach. What I am saying 
is that the state cannot decline to exercise federally "conferred" 
jurisdiction even when, in the particular case, it is jurisdiction 
over nonfederal business. 
The intuitive supposition might be that supremacy atta- 
ches to a federal grant of jurisdiction to the state courts over 
federal, but not state, business. In this view there are no feder- 
al "grants" of power over state business to a state court. Rath- 
er, Congress sometimes simply acknowledges the states' preex- 
isting jurisdiction over their own affairs. It might be argued 
that when, for example, in section 11 of the First Judiciary Act, 
Congress recognized concurrent diversity jurisdiction in the 
state courts, Congress merely allowed for a preexisting jurisdic- 
tion which the states would have continued to exercise even 
absent the act of Congress. In the diversity statute as codified 
today:4 concurrent jurisdiction is not even explicit but is left 
to implication. The natural conclusion, it might be argued, is 
that state courts exercise only state power over their diversity 
cases. Congress, in this view, must be read as simply recogniz- 
ing concurrent state power. And of course we do think of the 
states as exercising state, not federal, power over their diversi- 
ty cases. Thus-the argument would conclude-the states re- 
main free to withdraw from diversity cases, at  least those that 
arise exclusively under state law. The states remain free to 
confide such cases to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. No Supremacy Clause obligation could stand in the 
way. That, I should think, is the intuitive position. 
There is a sense in which all the premises of this position 
are true. But the conclusion is not quite accurate. Counter- 
intuitively, the Supremacy Clause in an oblique way does pro- 
hibit the state courts from abjuring their diversity jurisdiction 
over state-law cases. Intriguingly, once Congress grants or even 
acknowledges concurrent jurisdiction, explicitly or by implica- 
tion, the state courts' choices become circumscribed. Whereas 
before the First Judiciary Act-to stay with that example-the 
state courts might on some colorable pretext have declined to 
94. 28 U.S.C. 1332 (1988). 
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adjudicate diversity cases, they cannot do so now. At least they 
cannot do so absent the sort of nondiscriminatory procedural 
bar the Supreme Court recognizes as an exception to the state 
courts' duties to adjudicate federal claims within their concur- 
rent jurisdi~tion.~~ 
This conclusion follows from the premise that the states, 
like the nation, must have a rational basis for the exercise of 
their powers.96 If, for example, a state declined to adjudicate 
cases in which it might have to undertake the onerous task of 
choosing law, whether or not the parties to the case were from 
different states, under current jurisprudence that state would 
be free to dismiss diversity cases as well as nondiversity cases 
on this ground.g7 But there would be no convincing pretext for 
dismissing only diversity cases. At best, the state might argue 
that the reason it declines to hear cases by or against citizens 
of other states is to accommodate the national interest in pro- 
viding a federal forum for diversity cases. The state argues that 
it is exercising a wise comity and deference by carving away its 
own jurisdiction in diversity cases, leaving those cases for the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the presumably less biased federal 
courts. 
But the states are not free to make that accommodation. 
The states are not permitted to discriminate, in giving access to 
local benefits, including, presumably, local courts, between 
those with federal statutory rights and those without, however 
deferential the motive.98 Thus, the states are as powerless to 
95. See infra notes 97, 100, 102 and accompanying text. 
96. See infra part IV, notes 129-56 and accompanying text. 
97. In the analogous context of state duty to adjudicate federal claims, see 
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (holding under the Supremacy Clause that a 
state court may not arbitrarily dismiss a federal statutory claim), it is recognized 
that a state may dismiss a federal claim on a procedural ground on which it  
would also dismiss an analogous state claim. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 
279 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1929). But the state may not discriminate against those rely- 
ing on federal law. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990). 
98. For this sort of reasoning, see Livadas v. Bradshaw, 114 S. Ct. 2068 
(1994) (holding unanimously in a labor case that a state may not, in the interest 
of steering clear of interference with national governance, give the benefit of its 
laws only to those without federal rights); see also National Private Truck Council, 
Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 2351, 2355 (1995) (Thomas, J.) (explain- 
ing that a state is not free to decline jurisdiction on grounds of comity when feder- 
al courts also would decline). In the analogous context of state jurisdiction over 
federal questions, the Court holds that a state may not discriminate, in affording 
access to its courts, against those whose cases arise under federal, rather than 
state, law. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990). But cf: Hilton v. South Caro- 
lina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197 (1991) (Kennedy, J.) (holding that because 
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decline to exercise jurisdiction conferred by Congress in state- 
law cases as they are in federal-law cases," even though the 
latter may seem to come more directly under the command of 
the Supremacy Clause. 
It  also does not matter, for practical purposes, whether 
federally granted state jurisdiction over state-law diversity 
questions is actually in some sense "conferred" or whether 
Congress simply invokes the residualloo or inherent1'' pow- 
many states had excluded railroad workers from their workers' compensation laws 
"because of the assumption that FELA provides adequate protection for those work- 
ers," an  injured railway worker may sue a state in state court under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act, notwithstanding the rule of Welch v. Texas Dep't of High- 
ways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987), that federal courts could not entertain 
such suits under the Eleventh Amendment in the absence of clear statutory autho- 
rization). 
99. Howlett, 496 U.S. at  371; Testa, 330 US. 386. 
100. State power over even federal questions is widely viewed as independent 
of and "residual" to federal power. This belief has roots in history. The so-called 
Madisonian Compromise, by which Article I11 created no federal courts of general 
original jurisdiction, but gave Congress the option of doing so, suggests that a 
plenary original jurisdiction over federal questions resides in state courts. For re- 
cent discussion, see Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and 
the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39 (1995). The Supreme Court's 
appellate jurisdiction, which was established in Article 111, implies that in the ab- 
sence of federal courts of first instance state courts can and must exercise original 
jurisdiction over federal questions, subject to Supreme Court review. Martin v. 
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 339-40 (1816). Thus, in the silence of 
Congress, the states have presumptive concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims. 
E-g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 460-66 (1990) (civil RICO claims); Gulf Off- 
shore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 US.  473, 477-78 (1981) (claims arising on the 
outer continental shelf); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 US.  502 (1962) 
(claims under 8 301 of the National Labor Relations Act); Houston v. Moore, 18 
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 16 (1820) (court-martials of draft evaders). For an interesting 
recent discussion of early concurrent jurisdiction over federal criminal cases, see 
Donald H. Zeigler, Twins Separated a t  Birth: A Comparative History of the Civil 
and Criminal Arising Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts and Some Proposals 
for Change, 10 VT. L. REV. 673 (1995). Indeed, under the Supremacy Clause, the 
state courts have no choice; they must adjudicate federal claims, Testa, 330 U.S. 
386, a t  least if they would adjudicate analogous state claims, F.E.R.C. v. Mississip- 
pi, 456 US.  742, 760 (1982), and must, of course, apply federal law on the sub- 
stantive issues, Testa, 330 US. a t  392, including issues of their own sovereign 
immunity. Howlett, 496 US. 356. 
But it remains a common view that the states perform these duties under their 
own powers. See, e.g., American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E., 505 U.S. 247, 268 
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a federal statute granting the Red 
Cross power to sue cannot be read as a grant of jurisdiction or i t  would become a 
grant of concurrent jurisdiction to the states, and thus "cannot reasonably be read 
as allowing the Red Cross to enter a state court without establishing the indepen- 
dent basis of jurisdiction appropriate under state law"). This view is seen in the 
doctrine that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them; the states are 
obliged to enforce federal law only insofar as their jurisdiction permits. Thus, a 
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ers of the state courts, or invokes the general jurisdiction the 
state legislature happens to have provided.lo2 My own think- 
ing is that in such cases state courts sit as courts of the nation, 
notwithstanding that they continue to administer state 
law,lo3 but it should be unimportant whether one thinks they 
state that would dismiss an analogous state-law claim on procedural grounds may 
similarly dismiss a federal claim; the state is said to have "an otherwise valid 
excuse." Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 US.  377, 387-88 (1929) 
(Holmes, J.). 
This "otherwise valid excuse" doctrine is problematic. Federal supremacy on the 
merits implies federal supremacy over state jurisdictional and procedural law that 
can affect outcomes on the merits. E.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 
US.  229, 238 (1969) (Douglas, J.) ("[The] federal [equitable] remedy for the protec- 
tion of a federal right is available in the state court, if that court is empowered to 
grant injunctive relief generally . . . "); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. 
Co., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) (holding that a state must afford trial by jury in a case 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act). 
101. For the view that state jurisdiction over federal questions is "inherent," 
see TaMin v. Levitt, 493 US.  455, 458 (1990) (O'Connor. J.) ("[We] have consis- 
tently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively 
competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States."). 
102. For this position in federal-question cases, see American Nat'l Red Cross 
v. S.G. & A.E., 505 U.S. 247, 268 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This parallel 
treatment of state and federal courts even further undermines a jurisdictional read- 
ing of the statute, since the provision cannot reasonably be read as allowing the 
Red Cross to enter a state court without establishing the independent basis of 
jurisdiction appropriate under state law."); see also Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 
188 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe jurisdiction conferred upon [the 
state courts] by the only authority that has power to create them and to confer 
jurisdiction upon them-namely the law-making power of the [states]--enables 
them to enforce rights no matter what the legislative source of the right may be."); 
Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 US.  377 (1929) (Holmes, J.): 
As to the grant of jurisdiction in the Employers' Liability Act, that 
statute does not purport to require State Courts to entertain suits arising 
under it, but only to empower them to do so, so far as the authority of 
the United States is concerned . . . . [Tlhere is nothing in the Act . . . 
that purports to force a duty upon [state] [clourts as against an otherwise 
valid excuse. 
Id. a t  387-88 (citation omitted). 
103. In the federal-question case of Howlett v. Rose, 496 US.  356, 366 (1990), 
the Court took the position that the Supremacy Clause requires the two sets of 
courts to "form one system of jurisprudence" (quoting Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U S .  
130, 137 (1876)). See also Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 US.  455 (1990) (Scalia, J., concur- 
ring): 
State courts have jurisdiction over federal causes of action not because 
it is "conferred" upon them by the Congress; nor even because their in- 
herent powers permit them to entertain transitory causes of action arising 
under the laws of foreign sovereigns, . . . but because "the laws of the 
United States are laws in the several States, and just as much binding 
on the citizens and courts thereof as the State laws are . . . . The two 
together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of 
the land for the State; and the courts of the two jurisdictions are not 
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do or not. 
What counts is that only national, not state, policy can 
ground the power of Congress to devolve concurrent jurisdiction 
upon state courts, even when the jurisdiction so devolved or 
even merely acknowledged is over claims unlikely to be federal 
claims. The obligations of federal supremacy must attach to 
national policy in such cases as in others. State courts come 
under Supremacy Clause obligations not only when they adju- 
dicate federal questions, but when they adjudicate those non- 
federal questions which it is national policy that they adjudi- 
cate. It cannot matter to this reasoning whether the state 
court, in some mystical sense, becomes a federal court, or 
whether the parties believe they invoke state jurisdiction inde- 
pendent of that devolved upon the states by the act of Congress 
under which they litigate in the state courts. 
In fact, for reasons structural and practical, duties de- 
volved by Congress upon the states to hear nonfederal claims 
may be stronger than the same duties devolved upon federal 
courts. Even apart from the constraints of Article III,lo4 fed- 
eral courts are under prudential constraints of federalism when 
they deal with nonfederal questions.lo5 These additional con- 
straints, like Article 111, are irrelevant in state courts adjudi- 
cating nonfederal questions. Indeed, the prudential constraints 
on federal adjudication comprise a compelling reason why the 
states should and perhaps must furnish a forum. In federal-law 
cases, when Congress imposes constraints on federal jurisdic- 
tion,lo6 or refuses to grant federal jurisdiction,lo7 the ordi- 
foreign to each other . . . ." 
Id. a t  469-70 (quoting Claflin, 93 U.S. a t  136-37). This position is different from 
and better than the position Justice Scalia was to sign his name to in his dissent 
in American Nat'l Red Cross, 505 U S .  at  268. 
104. See infra notes 159-236 and accompanying text. 
105. See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703-04 (1992) (acknowl- 
edging that federal diversity courts do not issue decrees in divorce or child custody 
cases); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (holding 
that federal courts have no pendent jurisdiction over equitable civil-rights claims 
arising under state law). 
106. See, e.g., Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28 U.S.C. $ 1341 (1988); National 
Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 2351 (1995). 
107. The great example, of course, is the failure of Congress to vest original 
general federal-question jurisdiction in federal trial courts until 1875. Act of March 
3, 1875, ch. 137, $ 1, 18 Stat. 470; see also the 1802 repeal of the abortive 1801 
statute attempting to make the jurisdictional grant. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 
11, 2 Stat. 89, 92; repealed, Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132. The grant 
of general federal-question jurisdiction is codified today at 28 U.S.C. $ 1331 (1988). 
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nary expectation is that the state courts must furnish the need- 
ed forum.1o8 This is not only suggested by the elementary 
concerns of due process, but by federal supremacy. At the end 
of the 1994-1995 Term, in his opinion for the Court in National 
Private Truck Council, Inc. u. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 
Justice Thomas remarked, 
. . . Nor can a desire for "intrastate uniformity" permit state 
courts to refuse to award relief merely because a federal court 
could not grant such relief. [Ilt was not until 1875 that Con- 
gress provided any kind of general federal-question jurisdic- 
tion to the lower federal courts . . . . Because of the Suprema- 
cy Clause, state courts could not have refused to hear cases 
arising under federal law merely to ensure "uniformity" be- 
tween state and federal courts located within a particular 
state.log 
That state courts must furnish a forum should also be the 
ordinary expectation when federal courts labor under analogous 
constraints in adjudicating nonfederal questions. The state 
forum would be especially necessary to the nation in a hypo- 
thetical situation in which the Supreme Court erroneously"0 
strikes down, as applied, an act of Congress under Article 111, 
on the thinking that Congress cannot constitutionally confer 
jurisdiction over nonfederal questions upon federal courts in 
the absence of diversity of citizenship of the parties. State 
courts in such cases would be the only courts that could effectu- 
ate the intentions of Congress, just as they were in most feder- 
108. Cf Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 339-40 (1816) 
(Story, J.) (arguing that the absence of original federal jurisdiction over general 
federal questions, together with the existence of the appellate jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court over federal questions, implies that the states are bound to try 
federal questions subject to Supreme Court review). But see National Private Truck 
Council, 115 S. Ct. 2351 (holding that where state law furnishes a remedy, the 
state need not adjudicate the grievance under federal civil-rights law, if a federal 
court would not). 
109. National Private Truck, 115 S. Ct. at  2355 (citation omitted). 
110. I say "erroneously" because I believe that a sufficient federal ingredient 
may be supplied by national jurisdictional policy. When the states have concurrent 
jurisdiction it is because it is in the national interest for them to have it, whether 
or not Congress has chosen to federalize the substantive law that is applied in cas- 
es within the jurisdiction. In the national interest Congress has power to vest state 
jurisdiction even when Congress does not have power to federalize the substantive 
law applicable to the dispute between the parties, as it does, for example, using its 
foreign relations power, in those cases against foreign sovereigns that are governed 
by foreign law. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. $8 1330, 
1441(d), 1602-11 (1988). 
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al-question cases before Congress enacted the federal-question 
jurisdictional statute in 1875.''' Were the ALI Proposal to be 
enacted as law, the state forum could become especially impor- 
tant. There is a strong possibility-since mass torts are likely 
to arise under nonfederal law-that the Supreme Court would 
hold such an enactment unconstitutional as applied in federal 
courts. l2 
The Supreme Court has the power of summary vacatur or 
reversal if a state court violates the Supremacy Clause by dis- 
missing a federal claim or refusing to decide a federal question 
properly presented to it. Vacatur or reversal is equally appro- 
priate when a state court has violated the Supremacy Clause 
by dismissing a nonfederal claim over which Congress has 
conferred concurrent jurisdiction upon the states. And when 
Congress confers concurrent jurisdiction expressly or implied- 
ly-whether over claims arising under federal or nonfederal 
law-it should come to be understood that state procedural law 
as well as state substantive law or policy may not be permitted 
to frustrate the national policy underlying the conferral.l13 
I have been taking the position that when Congress grants 
jurisdiction to the state courts over state-law claims, it is feder- 
al power that the states exercise, the nation being the formal 
source of their jurisdiction. Interesting theoretical consequences 
flow from this hypothesis, some of which have been foreshad- 
owed in the previous discussion. For one thing, if it is in the 
national interest that the nation confer jurisdiction upon the 
states in a class of cases, it becomes obvious that in the same 
national interest the nation can also bestow remedial and pro- 
cedural powers upon the states, whether or not the class of 
cases is likely to be adjudicated on the merits under federal 
111. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 5 1, 18 Stat. 470. 
112. See infra notes 159-78 and accompanying text. But it  should be noted 
that in the context of (potential) mass torts, the Court sustained the constitutional- 
ity of federal jurisdiction in nondiversity litigation over AIDS-contaminated blood 
transfusions, in actions against the Red Cross, a federally chartered organization. 
American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E., 505 U.S. 247 (1992). 
113. The phenomenon is seen more familiarly in federal-question cases, in 
which from time to time the Supreme Court has forced federal procedures or reme- 
dies upon state courts. E.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 US .  229, 
238 (1969) (Douglas, J.) ("[The] federal [equitable] remedy for the protection of a 
federal right is available in the state court, if that court is empowered to grant 
injunctive relief generally . . . ."); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 
342 US. 359 (1952) (holding that a state must afford trial by jury in a case under 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, even on evidence the state would otherwise 
keep from the jury). 
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law.l14 Thus, whether the claim be a federal or nonfederal 
one, if 'Congress has authorized nationwide service of process 
over that claim, the state court has the power of nationwide 
service of process. So in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
Congress bestows upon both sets of courts worldwide service of 
pro~ess."~ Furthermore, if the state courts in these cases ex- 
ercise federal power, the due process limits on the state's per- 
sonal jurisdiction are not located in the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment, as might have been supposed, but in the Fifth 
114. Cf. F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 760 (1982) (holding that Con- 
gress has Commerce power to implement federal law in state tribunals, including 
the power to establish procedural minima; referring to claims "analogous" to federal 
claims). 
115. 28 U.S.C. 9 1608 (1988). Section 1608(a) in terms provides for "Service in 
the courts of the United States and of the States . . . ." Compare the provision for 
nationwide service in federal courts in the Price-Anderson Act: 
With respect to any public liability action arising out of or resulting 
from a nuclear incident, the United States district court in the district 
where the nuclear incident takes place, or in the case of a nuclear inci- 
dent taking place outside the United States, the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia, shall have original jurisdiction without 
regard to the citizenship of any party or the amount in controversy. Upon 
motion of the defendant, . . . any such action pending in any State court 
. . . or United States district court shall be removed or transferred to the 
United States district court having venue under this subsection. Process 
of such district court shall be effective throughout the United 
States . . . . 
42 U.S.C. 5 2210(n)(2) (1988). The Price-Anderson Act provides for nationwide ser- 
vice in the federal transferee court, but does not do so in the state courts or in 
other federal courts. The exclusion of these courts for this purpose, coupled with 
the acknowledgment of their jurisdiction, suggests that this omission is simply part 
of the provision for venue of all litigation at  the place of accident. 
116. So the Supreme Court assumed in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 
504 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1992). In the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Congress 
grants concurrent jurisdiction to federal and state courts, 28 U.S.C. $5 1330, and 
provides worldwide service of process for both sets of courts. 28 U.S.C. 5 1608. 
Congress further provides that if the nongovernmental commercial activities giving 
rise to a case were conducted in this country or had direct effects in this country, 
the foreign sovereign is not immune from liability in the case. 28 U.S.C. 
5 1605(a)(2). Furthermore, the foreign sovereign, if without statutory immunity, is 
within the personal and subject-matter jurisdiction of the court. 28 U.S.C. 
$ 1330(b); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 
n.3 (1989). In Weltover, the Supreme Court considered the defendant sovereign's 
technical argument that to construe the nexus requirements for statutory jurisdic- 
tion less strictly than the "minimum contactsn requirement for personal jurisdiction 
would be to raise a problem of Fifth Amendment due process. Assuming, without 
deciding, that a foreign state is a "person" for purposes of Fifth Amendment due 
process, the Court pointed out that Argentina's nexus with the United States in 
that case would be sufficient even under a "minimum contacts" analysis. Weltover, 
504 U.S. a t  619-20 (Scalia, J.); see also Lakewood Bank & Trust Co. v. Superior 
Court, 129 Cal. App. 3d 463, 469-70, 180 Cal. Rptr. 914, 918-19 (1982) (sustaining 
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As we have already seen, there is some scope for operation 
of the Supremacy Clause in nonfederal cases in state court 
under an act of Congress. To be sure, there might well be no 
substantive federal law to which federal supremacy could at- 
tach, even over a threshold issue.'" But we should be clear 
that a state exercising power conferred by the nation, even in a 
hypothetical case lacking a single federal-law element, would 
be under a duty to vindicate whatever national interest the 
nation had in bestowing the power upon the state. The state 
the state court's jurisdiction and venue in an action under the Securities Act of 
1933 notwithstanding state-law limitations, since the state court had concurrent 
jurisdiction and venue under the federal statute); David Carlebach, Note, Nation- 
wide Service of Process in State Courts, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 223 (1991) (discussing 
the effect on state courts of federal conferral of nationwide process). 
In more localized state-law cases, even a "congressional grant of nationwide 
jurisdiction to the state courts [might] not withstand a Fifth Amendment challenge 
on the basis of nothing more than the defendant's presence in, or contacts with, 
the United States." Steinman, Reverse Removal, supra note 2, a t  1119. Perhaps in 
such cases, in both federal and state courts, the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause eventually will be construed to incorporate Fourteenth Amendment stan- 
dards. The Supreme Court has avoided this issue thus far in federal-court cases 
through statutory interpretation either of the substantive law or the federal venue 
statute. See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980) (disapproving jurisdiction over 
a remote defendant by a narrow construction of the Mandamus and Venue Act). 
But see id. a t  554 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (assuming the constitutionality of the 
statute under a contrary interpretation); Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 
173 (1979) (striking down jurisdiction in an action under the Securities Exchange 
Act in which an out-of-state defendant was served with process under the state's 
long-arm statute; reaching this result by a narrow construction of the federal venue 
statute). 
It  is not clear how Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), cuts 
on these issues. Shutts is  quite permissive on the power of the state over nation- 
wide class actions, when members of the class are given an opportunity to opt out. 
See Mark C. Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitutional and 
Practical Advantages of the State Fbrum Over the Federal Forum in Mass Tort 
Cases, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 215, 259-62 (1994) (discussing the powers of the 
unaided state forum in complex litigation). 
117. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983) 
(Burger, C.J.) (sustaining federal jurisdiction under art. 111; reasoning that cases 
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act "arise undern the federal substantive 
standards of sovereign immunity which must be applied in every case against a 
foreign sovereign in either set of courts, the Act being the exclusive vehicle for 
suits against a foreign sovereign). On the exclusivity of the remedy provided by the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, see 28 U.S.C. 5 1604 (providing that "a foreign 
state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and 
of the States except as  provided in . . . this chaptern); Argentine Republic v. 
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (reaffirming Verlinden, that the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is the exclusive judicial remedy for the private 
wrongs of foreign sovereigns in both sets of courts). 
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courts cannot adjudicate such cases except in deference to that 
national interest. 
When the nation's policy is unrealized in substantive law, 
the national interest might be a jurisdictional interest simplici- 
ter, or it might be a substantive interest in the body of 
unfederalized law under which these cases will be litigated.ll8 
Either or both of these interests can generate adjudicatory 
policies which, I am arguing, become supreme in state courts to 
which the nation gives, or in which the nation expects, concur- 
rent jurisdiction. At a minimum, this means that the state 
courts must disregard any limitations of state law upon their 
powers which would conflict with the federal policy underlying 
the jurisdictional and procedural grants of power.llg 
This analysis further suggests that, in seeking constraints 
upon national power over nonfederal law in state courts, it is to 
little purpose to round up the usual suspects. The Tenth 
Amendment is especially unhelpful here. It is true that we tend 
to think of state power as constraining federal power. We begin 
to be schooled in this pattern of thinking as we perceive that 
all of our jurisprudence of national constitutional empowerment 
emerges against a backdrop of acknowledged state "police" 
power.120 Even more fundamentally, we are habituated to the 
thinking that federal law is created against a broad back- 
ground of common-law understandings; and when we say "com- 
mon law" in this context, we tend to refer, shedding our post- 
Erie positivism, to the typical law of some state, as modified by 
118. This is an "inchoate" interest, as I have elsewhere described the national 
interest in law "at the pre-federalized moment." Louise Weinberg, Federal Common 
Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 816 (1989); Louise Weinberg, The Curious Notion 
that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 860, 871 (1989). 
119. Also, because of the constitutional pressure for congruence of outcomes in 
both sets of courts, the choice-of-law rule that is part of the ALI Proposal on mass 
torts, 5 6.01, however impolitic and irrational it may be, see Louise Weinberg, 
Mass Torts a t  the Neutral Forum, 56 ALB. L. REV. 807 (1993), if allowed to become 
operative in federal courts should apply in state courts as well. Id. at 852. 
120. The Supreme Court has worked on the "assumption that the historic 
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless 
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). See, e.g., New York State Conference of Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1676 (1995); 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617-18 (1992). It  is thought to 
be a corollary of this presumption that the Constitution withholds "from Congress 
a plenary police powern that would enable Congress to enact any legislation with- 
out limit. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995). 
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local statute. In admiralty cases to this day lawyers will argue 
that some issues should be preserved from federal governance 
by saying, interchangeably, that those issues are for "the com- 
mon law" or "for the states."121 These ingrained understand- 
ings find their nearest constitutional expression in the Tenth 
Amendment. 
But even if one is prepared, with the current Supreme 
Court majority, to move toward preserving a larger residuum of 
state power from interference by the nation,122 the Tenth 
Amendment is not necessarily relevant when brought to bear 
on the question we are considering. The Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, and the ALI Proposal, both bring new jurisdic- 
tion to, rather than take existing jurisdiction from, the state 
courts . 123 
121. This feeling that "the common law" is what is outside admiralty is a 
vestige of the traditional separation of "law" and "admiralty," cf: Romero v. Inter- 
national Terminal Operating Co., 358 US.  354 (1959), and the history in England 
of writs of prohibition issuing from the "common-law" courts to block admiralty 
courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases the "common-law" courts thought 
more appropriately triable to juries, under ordinary case and statute law. In this 
country, the argument that the nation should not intrude upon the states became 
linked in admiralty lawyers' minds with the conventional argument that the admi- 
ralty should not intrude upon "the common law." The reality, of course, is that 
federal courts sitting "in admiralty," and state courts with concurrent jurisdiction 
over maritime cases, 28 U.S.C. $ 1333(1)-like state or federal courts sitting "at 
law" or "in equity'-all sit as common-law courts, deciding issues of law as they 
arise, in light of precedent and reason; and they apply state cases and statutes on 
issues governed by state law, and federal cases and statutes on issues governed by 
federal law. 
122. The modern history of the Tenth Amendment begins with United States 
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941), in which the Supreme Court found the Amend- 
ment to be "but a truism." In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 
(1976) (holding that Congress may not regulate the working conditions of state 
employees), the Supreme Court tried to breathe life back into the Tenth Amend- 
ment; but the Court overruled Usery in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Little was heard from the Tenth Amendment until 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), in which the Court acknowledged 
plenary federal power, id. a t  160 (O'Comor, J.) ("Congress could, if it  wished, pre- 
empt state radioactive waste regulation."), even as i t  struck down an act of Con- 
gress because Congress asserted its plenary power in the wrong fashion. Not until 
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (deciding, under the Tenth Amend- 
ment, that Congress lacks power to regulate guns in schools), has there been a 
clear modern holding that Congress lacks Commerce power to regulate, in the 
perceived national interest, the market for an item in interstate commerce. While 
the Supreme Court has not required Congress to make justifymg "findings," the 
Court in Lopez suggested that a specific congressional "finding" of impact upon 
interstate commerce might have shifted the result. Id. a t  1631. 
123. The reasoning here echoes the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Pana- 
ma R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924), sustaining the constitutionality of the 
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To be sure, in New York v. United States,124 the Supreme 
Court held under the Tenth Amendment that the nation may 
not "commandeery' state processes by requiring the states to 
legislate in the national interest.125 But the Supremacy 
Clause has always required the states to adjudicate in the na- 
tional interest,126 and therefore, even without the explicit ex- 
Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988), as conferring new jurisdiction upon the admiral- 
ty rather than simply transferring cases in admiralty to the federal-question juris- 
diction. 
124. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Query whether New York, read for whatever bearing 
it  may have on the question before us, suggests a Tenth Amendment limit on the 
power of Congress to vindicate a national interest through liabilities imposed under 
unfederalized and unincorporated state law. New York was a challenge to a provi- 
sion of federal environmental law requiring the states to take title to undisposed-of 
hazardous wastes by January 1, 1996, and to become liable for any damages re- 
sulting from failure to dispose of these wastes. 42 U.S.C. @ 2021b-2021j (Supp. 
1994). But, typically, federal statutory environmental law allows recovery only of 
clean-up costs, which are very different from damages for lost profits or for per- 
sonal injuries or death. But see Price-Anderson Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C. 
$8 2104, 2273, 2282a, creating a "public liability action" for nuclear accidents. Nor 
can federal common law fill the gap; the Supreme Court has held that federal 
environmental statutes preempt federal, but not state, common-law remedies. City 
of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 US.  304 (1981). Thus, New York is an implicit disap- 
proval of national imposition upon the state or its officials of liabilities under state 
law. 
Interestingly, the Court has placed the federal judiciary under analogous con- 
straints. E.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) 
(holding that principles of federalism bar federal courts from issuing injunctions on 
state-law theories in cases against state officials). 
New York in this respect is a t  odds with Ex parte Siebold, 100 US .  371 (1879) 
(holding that Congress has power to enact a law regulating federal elections which 
in so doing provides penalties against state officials for violating state law); Ex 
parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1879) (same). 
125. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining 
& Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). Justice O'Connor, writing for 
the New York Court, reasoned that to permit the nation to commandeer state 
legislative processes would be to muddy the lines of political accountability. New 
York, 112 S. Ct. a t  2424. But it is unclear how the Court's reasoning applies to 
the case on its own facts. In New York, the federal statute required a state unable 
to find a site for its hazardous wastes before 1996 to take title to the wastes and 
become liable for all resulting damages. 42 U.S.C. $5 2021b-2021j (Supp. 1994). It 
is not clear that this "take title" provision required the state to legislate. Nor 
would i t  confuse the lines of political responsibility for the nation to act on the 
principle-sound, it seems to me--that in the first instance responsibility for 
wastes within their borders is upon the states. Moreover, far from being "comman- 
deered" by the nation, the concerned states themselves had sought Congressional 
enforcement of their own interstate agreement for disposal of hazardous wastes. 
New York, 112 S. Ct. a t  2435-38 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). For current commentary on New York, see generally the symposium on New 
York in 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. (19941, including articles by Jesse Choper, 
Candice Hoke, and Martin Redish. 
126. F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 US. 742, 760 (1982). 
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ception for adjudication allowed by the Court in New Y ~ r k , ' ~ ~  
the "no commandeering" rationale of that case is quite inappli- 
cable to our problem. 
As for other limitations, Article I11 is not a limit on the 
power of Congress over the state courts. The Fourteenth 
Amendment also becomes less relevant for the state's exercise 
of federal powers in cases under either the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act or the ALI Proposal. It is Congress, not the 
state legislature, that creates the state jurisdiction in the Act 
and in the Proposal, and of course the Fourteenth Amendment 
is no limit on the power of Congress. We are left, rather, with 
the Due Process Clause of the FiRh Amendment, operative in 
this context in both its subs tan t i~e '~~  and procedural aspects. 
In summary, when Congress in the national interest ex- 
plicitly or implicitly devolves upon state courts jurisdiction 
even over possibly nonfederal cases, the states come under a 
duty to vindicate any such national interest in their courts, a 
duty imposed by the Supremacy Clause. The same governmen- 
tal interest that supports the grant to the states of jurisdiction 
supports further grants to them of procedural or remedial pow- 
ers. The constraints of Article I11 or the Tenth Amendment or 
the Fourteenth Amendment are not constraints upon either the 
nation or the states to the extent that the state courts are 
exercising powers conferred by Congress. The relevant con- 
straint in this context, in state as well as federal courts, is the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
127. New York, 505 U.S. a t  178, 179 (07Connor, J.) ("Federal statutes en- 
forceable in state courts do, in a sense, direct state judges to enforce them, but 
this sort of federal 'direction' of state judges is mandated by the text of the Su- 
premacy Clause. No comparable constitutional provision authorizes Congress to 
command state legislatures to legislate."). Presumably a similar distinction would 
enable Congress to confer jurisdiction upon the states notwithstanding a hypotheti- 
cal constitutional amendment prohibiting unfunded mandates. But see H. Jefferson 
Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993) (ar- 
guing that New York is inconsistent with Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 
Wheat.) 304 (1816) (holding that state courts must accept Supreme Court review of 
their final judgments on federal questions). For the argument that  the Supremacy 
Clause "commandeers" all state actors, not only the state judiciary, see Evan H. 
Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State 
Oficers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1038-49 (1995). 
128. See infra notes 129-46 and accompanying text. 
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IV. THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE STATE COURTS 
Of course, Congress, like the Supreme Court, is hardly 
likely to attempt to force state courts to try state-law cases 
otherwise beyond their powers. The nation could not, and as a 
practical matter would not, seek to accomplish such an end 
without some convincing reason. The nation cannot act in the 
absence of a clear national interest-a rational basis for the 
action it takes. The corollary of that proposition is that when 
the national interest-for example in affording due process in 
all courts-so requires, Congress or the courts may condition 
the manner in which state courts try state-law cases, and may 
even force trial of state-law cases upon the state courts.129 
National interest is the foundation of national power130 
even when the national interest is only inchoate-that is, be- 
fore national power has been exercised substantively in its 
vindication. Thus, it often happens that we must glean what 
the national interest is through purposive, teleological reason- 
ing,l3l looking to text, history, analogous legislation, and the 
129. See supra parts 11, 111. 
130. See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U .  L. REV. 805, 809- 
14 (1989) (arguing governmental "empowerment" has its source in legitimate gov- 
ernmental interest, as a corollary to the proposition that a government without 
significant interests in a matter is without power to regulate that matter). 
131. The irrationalities in the lawmaking process that can come between inqui- 
ry and understanding do not affect the purposive reasoning upon which the identi- 
fication of governmental interest depends. The comparative success of purposive 
reasoning flows from the fact that it presumes that the rule or statute under ex- 
amination is based upon intelligible public policy. Actual legislators' choices, howev- 
er confused, bought, or subversive, are not a feature of purposive reasoning. But 
see Courtney Simmons, Unmasking the Rhetoric of Purpose: The Supreme Court 
and Legislative Compromise, 44 EMORY L. J. 117 (1995). The presumption that 
intelligible public policy underlies the laws leads to the presumption that law gen- 
erally should be applied and enforced. Purposive reasoning will reject only those 
laws for which no rational support in public policy can be hypothesized. At a more 
nuanced level, purposive reasoning rejects for application only those laws which, on 
balance, are insufficiently supported by reason, on the particular facts. It is true 
that, without taking countervailing interests into account (or by taking only coun- 
tervailing interests into account, or by taking into account only the interests of 
those in power), judges can manipulate purposive reasoning. But so also can they 
manipulate intentionalist reasoning by relying on selected legislative history, or by 
focusing on expressions of individual legislators' motives. So also can judges ma- 
nipulate textualist reasoning by subordinating the purposes of legislation to its 
"clear" language, or by consulting selected old dictionaries. See generally Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony 
and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1995). It is 
an old Realist insight that no method of reasoning can save us from the predilec- 
tions of judges. That is why judges are politically appointed, or elected outright. 
But purposive reasoning, which seeks an understanding of the mischiefs a rule is 
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analogous opinions of courts and writers. Moreover, a conclu- 
sion about the national interest is likely to be convincing only 
after balancing the perceived interest against equally inchoate 
countervailing policies. 132 
The importance of a finding of national interest before an 
assertion of national power133 in what I have elsewhere called 
"the pre-federalized moment,"134 needs to be emphasized. In- 
deed, it more accurately describes cases not yet decided to say 
that it  is policy, rather than law, that decides them. What is 
"supreme" under Article VI is national policy rather than feder- 
al law. It is a federal view of the issues that the Supremacy 
Clause will compel. To put this another way, under the Su- 
premacy Clause federal law is supreme where it applies even 
when there is no preexisting federal law.135 
meant to control, and an evaluation of the rule's current policy supports and lim- 
its, is probabIy the method that better invites salient debate among lawyers and 
judges. 
For general studies in theories of rational choice as they apply to legislation, 
see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991); Phil- 
ip P. Frickey, Constitutional Structure, Public Choice, and Public Law, 12 INT'L 
REV. L. & ECON. 163 (1992); Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehen- 
sive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 
(1991); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 63 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics without Romance: Implications 
of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988). On 
irrationality in the legislative process in the context of complex litigation, see 
Charles G. Geyh, Complex-Litigation Reform and the Legislative Process, 10 REV. 
LITIG. 401 (1991) (discussing the failure of the well-received proposals for mass 
accident contained in H.R. 3406, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess ["the Kastenmeier Bill"]). 
132. Notwithstanding the usefulness of Justice O'Connor's interest-balancing 
opinion in Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (19891, infra part VI.B, I sympathize 
with Justice Scalia's conviction that "balancing" is not very doable. See, e.g., Bendix 
Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988): 
Having evaluated the interests on both sides as roughly as this, the 
Court then proceeds to judge which is more important. This process is 
ordinarily called 'balancing,' Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 
(1970), but the scale analogy is not really appropriate, since the interests 
on both sides are incommensurate. I t  is more like judging whether a 
particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy. 
Id. a t  897 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of Balanc- 
ing Significant Interests, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 825 (1994); Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding 
Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS 
L.J. 711 (1994). 
133. See, eg., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995) (suggesting 
the helpfulness of a legislative "findingn of national interest when Congress pur- 
ports to assert its Commerce power to ban the possession of guns within 1,000 feet 
of a school). 
134. Weinberg, Federal Common Law, supra note 118, a t  816. 
135. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 US.  205 (1917), in which 
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Where Congress has legislated, or the Supreme Court has 
fashioned a body of jurisprudence, the subject already has been 
federalized. The legitimacy of the federalization remains depen- 
dent on the finding of a national interest or interests that justi- 
fy the exercise of lawmaking power.136 The Supreme Court 
has long recognized that the presumptive power of a sovereign 
is co-extensive with the sovereign's sphere of interest.13? 
Whether the Justices reason under the Commerce Clause,138 
the Due Process Clause,139 the Equal Protection Clause,140 
the Contract Clause,141 or the Full Faith and Credit 
federal law was held to preempt a state statute even though there was no applica- 
ble federal rule or statute a t  the time. For examples of the fashioning of a federal 
common-law rule for a case from identified national policy, see Boyle v. United 
Technologies Corp, 487 U.S. 500 (1988); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 
U.S. 398 (1964). 
136. As the powers of Congress have been read more and more expansively, 
federalization has become increasingly controversial. See the symposium on federal- 
ization a t  44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1995, including Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litiga- 
tion and the Dilemma of Federalization, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 755, 755 (1995). 
137. For Supreme Court discussion of the power of a state, sometimes referred 
to as  its "police power," when measured against federal limitations, see Maine v. 
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (sustaining under the Commerce Clause a state ban on 
the importation of live baitfish, as  within legitimate state governmental purposes, 
relying on Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)); Council of the City of Los An- 
geles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (sustaining under the First 
Amendment an ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public property, as  
within legitimate state governmental purposes, relying on Berrnan and United 
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)); Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 
229 (1984) (sustaining under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause a 
state land-use law as within legitimate state governmental purposes, also relying 
on Berman). See Weinberg, Federal Common Law, supra note 118, a t  809-14. 
138. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1659 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissent- 
ing) (disagreeing with the Court's holding that Congress lacks Commerce power to 
regulate guns in schools in view of the national interest in the safe education of 
the workforce); South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 
(1938) (explaining that, notwithstanding the Commerce Clause's implied limitation 
on state laws affecting interstate commerce, the states retain "police powern over 
matters of local policy concern). 
139. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (holding under the Due 
Process Clause that the state to which a widow executrix has moved after the 
death of her husband has power to declare the value of the proceeds of his insur- 
ance policy; explaining that this contact, a t  least when combined with the defen- 
dant insurer's business presence in the state and other such contacts, generated 
sufficient governmental interest in the state to ensure that application of its law to 
that issue was neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair). 
140. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (explaining that 
generally a state may make classifications for which there is a rational basis in its 
legitimate governmental interests). 
141. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (explaining 
that a state must have power to regulate contracts when its legitimate governmen- 
tal interests so require, notwithstanding the Contracts Clause). 
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Clause,142 the requirement remains constant. A sovereign has 
presumptive governmental power if it has a governmental 
interest. It is the sovereign's governmental interest that the 
Court refers to when it  finds the "rational basis" that enables a 
law to survive minimal constitutional scrutiny.'" 
This threshold of power, when it is the power of a state, is 
sometimes referred to  as the state's "police power." The "police 
power" might be thought a concept that is exclusively described 
as a residuum of general power belonging to the states; and, to 
be sure, it is widely understood that the Constitution does not 
confer on the nation a general "police power."144 But to the 
extent this understanding is sound, it is only because national 
interests and the interests of a particular state are different 
things. In the presence of a national interest the nation can 
and does act even in matters traditionally governed by the 
states. I am arguing at a higher level of generality that the 
true source of state power is analytically the same as the true 
source of federal power: both powers find their source in legiti- 
mate governmental interest. It is true that where Virginia's 
interest ends its power ends; but obviously that is no obstacle 
to the accomplishment of the interests Virginia does have. In 
just the same way, it is true that where the national interest 
ends the power of the nation ends; but obviously that is no 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the interests the nation does 
have. 
Whether the sovereign is a state or the nation, in every 
case the lineaments of empowerment are the same.145 Law 
142. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 
(1939) (explaining that the state where a worker is injured has a legitimate gov- 
ernmental interest in furnishing a remedy to the worker and holding that that 
state may do so; rejecting the argument that the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
requires application of the law of the state where the employment contract was 
made, even when that state's law vests exclusive jurisdiction over such cases in 
the contract state's own workers' compensation board). 
143. I pass over as beyond the scope of this article so-called "intermediate" 
scrutiny, under which the Supreme Court tests for governmental interests that are 
stronger than those having merely a basis in reason, and so-called "strict" scrutiny, 
under which the Court requires a compelling governmental interest. 
144. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995). 
145. See supra notes 137-42. Thus, in Lopez, the Court held that Congress 
lacked Commerce power to ban the possession of guns in schools because it found 
insufficient national interest in so doing, a t  least in the absence of specific "find- 
ings" by Congress of the impact of the subject on interstate commerce. If indeed 
national interest was insufficient, an application of the statute would also violate 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. If the reader believes that in 
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that emanates from a sovereign without a governmental in- 
terest will be arbitrary and irrational, and in this country will 
violate the most basic principle of substantive due process. We 
would no more let stand a Pennsylvania conviction of a Penn- 
sylvania defendant for embezzlement, if the embezzler were 
tried under the laws of Alaska because Alaska comes before 
Pennsylvania in the alphabet, than we would let stand that 
Pennsylvania conviction if obtained on evidence relevant not to 
the alleged embezzlement, but to an unrelated burglary be- 
cause burglary comes before embezzlement in the alphabet. 
Law without a basis in reason is no law at all, and law outside 
the legitimate governmental concerns of the sovereign from 
which it emanates is no law at all. What I am saying is that 
those whose claims or defenses are adjudicated in American 
courts have a due process right to relevant law. That must be 
true whether the issue is one of state law or federal law. We 
have to treat the source of presumptive power of the nation, as 
well as of a state, as an identified legitimate governmental 
interest. 
So, for example, the question whether Congress has power 
to vest jurisdiction in state courts over multistate mass torts 
cannot be answered definitively by searching the Constitution 
for some expressly delegated power. Even if there was a mass 
tort clause in Article I and even if it mentioned state courts it 
would not be conclusive. The answer to the question whether 
Congress may vest jurisdiction over mass torts in state courts, 
in the particular case, can be answered only with reference to 
the national interest on the particular facts. Of course, Con- 
gress has no more power than is necessary and proper to pro- 
vide for our "general welfaren-"We, the people of the United 
States."146 
Similarly, the existence of textual constitutional con- 
straints upon the exercise of national power cannot give us a 
definitive answer in a particular case. Rather, the answer in 
each case will be found by consulting the national interest, and 
such limiting or countervailing interests as we can glean from 
available materials. 
Lopez Congress did not exceed its Commerce powers, it is precisely because the 
reader does not find a prohibition of guns in schools to be beyond the sphere of 
legitimate national governmental interest. 
146. US. CONST. preamble. 
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This is the true usefulness of authoritative legal texts. It is 
a characteristic of the lawyer's analysis that an inquiry into 
governmental interest invites inquiry into analogical materials. 
Although the common law is, above all, an exercise in reason, 
lawyers and judges like to find some piece of authoritative text, 
or some historical practice, the existence of which suggests the 
nature of the underlying policy that might usefully extend to 
the issue before them. So, for example, when the Supreme 
Court federalized state law affecting the foreign relations of the 
United States, the Court sought justification in the fragments 
of constitutional text lodging foreign relations powers in the 
political branches.147 And so, when the Supreme Court autho- 
rized judicial federal lawmaking in maritime cases of wrongful 
death, it suggested that courts in future cases glean national 
policy on the issues presented in those cases from such sugges- 
tions of national policy as could be inferred from preexisting 
analogous acts of Congress.'" Sometimes the Court suggests 
that in fashioning federal common law, courts should refer to 
analogous preexisting cases. 14' 
147. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (even 
though the "act of state doctrine" is not found in the Constitution of the United 
States, it does have "'constitutional' underpinnings"). 
148. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 406 (1970) (rec- 
ognizing a new federal common-law action for wrongful death; suggesting that 
judges fashioning new rules of decision for such cases consult the policies underly- 
ing analogous federal wrongful death statutes). Interestingly, Justice Harlan was 
the author of both Sabbatino and Moragne. See also Textile Workers Union of 
America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957): 
Id. 
Id. 
We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under 5 301(a) 
is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our na- 
tional labor laws. The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnish- 
es some substantive law . . . . Other problems will lie in the penumbra 
of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction 
but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashion- 
ing a remedy that will effectuate that policy . . . . Any state law applied 
. . . will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent 
source of private rights. 
at  456-57 (Douglas, J.) (citations omitted). 
149. E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943): 
In absence of an applicable act of Congress it is for the federal courts 
to fashion the governing rule of law . . . . [Wlhile the federal law mer- 
chant, developed for about a century under the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 
represented general commercial law rather than a choice of a federal rule 
designed to protect a federal right, it nevertheless stands as a convenient 
source of reference for fashioning federal rules applicable to these federal 
questions. 
a t  367 (Douglas, J.) (citations omitted). 
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There is plenty of textual authorization, if that is what is 
wanted, for Congress to devolve jurisdiction in both sets of 
courts, over such currently unfederalized matters as mass tort. 
There is the Commerce power,150 the Fourteenth Amendment 
power over due process in the state courts-including 
Congress's power under Section 5; Congress's powers over fed- 
eral courts in the Tribunals Clause of Article I and in Article 
111; and (by parity of reasoning from the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment) in whatever powers may flow from the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause. Depending upon what is sought to be 
accomplished, there may be other more specific sources of pow- 
er. 151 
Certainly members of Congress have assumed that there is 
national power adequate to the vindication of national interests 
in mass torts, to continue with that example. Bill after bill has 
been introduced that, if enacted, would have federalized the 
substantive law of-for example-products liability, in whole or 
in part, preempting or limiting state power.152 And of course 
Congress continually enacts regulatory legislation with poten- 
tial impact upon state-law tort duties.153 Congress long ago 
150. Cf. F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 760 (1982) (holding that Con- 
gress has Commerce power to implement federal law in state tribunals; referring to 
claims "analogous" to federal claims). 
151. Setting to one side for the moment the subject of jurisdiction, suppose, for 
example, that Congress seeks to enact uniform interstate choice-of-law rules. The 
various powers of Congress to enact such rules would include whatever power is 
conferred under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV, which explicitly 
grants to Congress the power to determine in what way the "acts," as well as "re- 
cords" and "proceedings" of one state are to be given full faith and credit in an- 
other. U.S. CONST. art. IVY § 1. Congress has recently exercised these powers in an 
attempt to assist the states in administering family law. Parental Kidnapping Act 
of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738(a) (1988) (furnishing a rule of decision for the recogni- 
tion of state custody decrees in another state); cf. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 
U.S. 174 (1988) (holding that 4 1738(a) is only a rule of decision and does not 
confer original jurisdiction upon federal courts). 
152. See Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (Jan. 4, 1995). At the time of this writing the substance of this bill has been 
divided among several more specific proposals, including the Common Sense Prod- 
uct Liability and Legal Reform Act, H.R. 917, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 13, 
1995). For commentary critical of these proposals, see Carl Tobias, Common Sense 
and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REV. 699 (1995). Earlier proposals include 
Fairness in Products Liability Act of 1993, H.R. 1910, 103d Cong., 1st Sess (1993); 
Product Liability Reform Act of 1990, S .  1400, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Uni- 
form Product Liability Act of 1989, H.R. 1636, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); and 
Lawsuit Reform Act of 1989, S. 1100, 10lst. Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). 
153. E.g., Children's Bicycle Helmet Safety Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. $9 6001-06 
(Supp. 1995); Agmg Aircraft Safety Act of 1991, 49 U.S.C. 9 1421 (Supp. 1993); the 
Highway Safety Act of 1991, 23 U.S.C. §§ 401-03, 410 (Supp. 1993); the Consumer 
73 11 POWER OF CONGRESS OVER COURTS 777 
used part of its power over multistate tort even in cases involv- 
ing only individual accident rather than mass disaster, for 
example, to address the tort duties of railroads as employers in 
interstate commerce. 
The pressure for federalization of mass torts is particularly 
strong. Widespread but disuniform state tort reforms, coupled 
with equally widespread state abandonment of uniform choice- 
of-law rules, has made rational administration of these cases a 
remote dream. The difficulty is compounded by federal choice- 
of-law and other impediments to mass adjudica- 
t i ~ n . ' ~ ~  Congress appears to be at a permanent impasse when 
Product Safety Improvement Act of 1990, 15 U.S.C. $5 1193-94 & passim; the Ho- 
tel and Motel Fire Safety Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. 5707, 15 U.S.C. $8 2201, 2203, 
2224-25 (Supp. 1993). 
154. See Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. $8 51-60 (1988). 
155. For consolidated and transferred cases in federal courts, the federal com- 
mon law of choice of law makes the mass disaster virtually unadministrable. Van 
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), requires that in a state-law case trans- 
ferred under § 1404(a) on motion of the defendant, the federal transferee court 
apply the whole law of the transferor court's state, including its choice rules. Van 
Dusen as a practical matter is applied in most transfer situations. The effect on 
consolidated mass litigation is to require an individual choice of law under the 
separate choice-of-law approach of each transferor forum state, for each issue in 
the case. 
Similarly, for the class suit in state courts, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 
472 U.S. 797 (1985), requires choosing applicable law under the choice-of-law ap- 
proach of a concerned jurisdiction for each issue in the case. It is not clear how 
Shutts impacts upon federal courts administering state-law cases, since the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause requires contacts with the nation rather than the 
state, and we do not know whether in state-law cases the Fifth Amendment in- 
corporates the Fourteenth. With regard to the difficulties presented by Shutts in 
state courts, see Duvall v. T.R.W., Inc., 578 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) 
(holding that a class should not have been certified in a product liability case 
involving a defective truck steering mechanism, since the difficulties of choosing 
law would create "enormous case management problems"). 
With regard to the difficulties Van Dusen imposes on federal courts, see In re 
San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 745 F. Supp. 79, 81 (D. P.R. 1990) ("In 
this type of litigation, the application of choice of law standards turns into a colos- 
sal struggle for the transferee court . . . ."). In In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 19841, Judge Weinstein famously managed to 
appear simultaneously to follow Van Dusen while evading it, inventing a "national 
consensus lawn which all concerned states "would" apply. But in the recent inter- 
esting case of In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), Judge 
Posner thought that "Esperanto law" could not apply to all issues in a class case, 
and ruled, over a strong dissent, that class certification should be denied in a 
multistate case in part because the jury would be instructed under negligence 
standards applied by no particular state. Id. at  1300. 
156. In federal courts, over and above such impediments to federal complex 
litigation as the class action rule itself presents, Supreme Court decisions have 
severely limited the utility of federal courts to plaintiffs seeking class treatment. 
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it comes to federalizing comprehensive substantive law for 
these cases; but in such circumstances it might be politically 
more feasible for Congress to vest jurisdiction over mass torts 
concurrently in federal and state courts, without substantively 
federalizing mass torts. Whatever the national interests that 
would justify substantive federalization of mass torts, the same 
interests are likely to justify the vesting of jurisdiction in feder- 
al and even state courts without federalizing mass torts. 
Although it is widely recognized that there is a national 
interest in finding a way to deliver health services to the peo- 
ple of the United States, and although Congress might try to 
impose some tort reforms upon medical malpractice litigation, 
it would be at  least controversial to say that Congress has 
power to federalize the tort of medical malpractice. But mass 
tort presents a much easier case for federalization than tort 
law generally. That is true even when mass injuries are local- 
ized rather than dispersed; innumerable presidential declara- 
tions and emergency appropriations by Congress reflect the 
understanding that a single state can suffer a national disas- 
ter. 
So, assuming authorization, the issue, rather, is the exis- 
tence of any national interest in federalizing mass tort liability, 
or at  least the litigation of mass tort liability. If Congress were 
comprehensively to federalize multistate tort cases substantive- 
ly, the fundamental purposes of the legislation presumably 
would have to do with enforcing national goals of safety in the 
interstate transportation networks and in the national market 
for products; in the fairness and integrity of national markets 
for securities or services; and in the safety of air and water. 
These fundamental policies are not merely the policies underly- 
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 US.  156 (1974) (notice must be sent a t  the 
named plaintiff's expense to all reasonably identifiable members of the class in a 
class action for damages under Federal Rule 23(b)(3)); Zahn v. International Paper 
Co., 414 US .  291 (1973) (each member of the plaintiff class in a diversity action 
under Federal Rule 23(b)(3) must meet the statutory jurisdictional amount); Snyder 
v. Harris, 394 US.  332 (1969) (in a diversity class action, claims of the class may 
not be aggregated in determining the existence of the statutory jurisdictional 
amount); see supra note 33. But see Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 US. 
356 (1921) (diversity of citizenship between the defendant and the named represen- 
tative of the class is sufficient to ground diversity jurisdiction regardless of the 
citizenship of absentee class members). Beyond these rulings there is the common 
understanding in both federal and state courts that cases of mass personal injury 
are unsuitable for class certification because they have a tendency to present indi- 
vidual claims too valuable to be precluded by class judgments. 
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ing tort law generally, but are true national policies reflecting 
national concerns about the potential impact on the nation's 
markets of any declining confidence in their safety, fairness, or 
integrity that might result from impeded access to effective 
courts when those markets have a failure. 
The existence of a national interest in the efficacy of justice 
in such cases does not delete these more fundamental substan- 
tive concerns; rather, the need for effective litigation arises, 
precisely, from the substantive national interests in the safety, 
fairness, and integrity of interstate markets. Of course counter- 
vailing enterprise- and development-protecting interests might 
justify Congress in including so-called "tort reform" measures 
to constrain mass tort litigation or alter its ground rules. 
In sum, whatever national interests support the federaliza- 
tion of mass tort liabilities will be attended by interests that 
would furnish at least part of the case for the federalization of 
litigation of mass tort liabilities. 
We have been considering the role of the national interest 
in empowering Congress to "confer" original jurisdiction upon 
state courts over a class of cases likely to arise under law that 
is not federal law. In this Part we will briefly consider possible 
alternative theories of power. My intention is not to show that 
alternative theories are not helpful, but rather to demonstrate 
that better theory is available. The Ptolemaic theory that the 
sun and the planets moved around the earth was wonderfully 
useful; but when Galileo saw the phases of Venus in his little 
telescope he knew for once and for all what he had long sus- 
pected: the Copernican theory was better. The system revolved 
around the sun, not the earth. It was the earth that 
moved. 157 
157. "All the same, it moves (E pur si muove)," Galileo is said to have mut- 
tered after the Roman Inquisition permitted him to recant his Copernican heresies 
in exchange for a sentence of life under house arrest. Three and a third centuries 
later, when asked how he felt after undergoing hip surgery, Pope John Paul I1 
said, "But see, it  moves." Gannett News Services (LEXIS), Sept. 16, 1995. 
At the prompting of my able editors I should acknowledge the limitations of 
my metaphor. Copernicus's theory was "bettern than Ptolemy's only in the sense 
that it  was more directly and simply descriptive of reality. Both theories were only 
Aristotelian metaphysics. For theory with explanatory power the world had to wait 
for Newton. But I do stick up for Galileo, who by himself made the world "move" 
by beginning to do real science. Anyway I am deeply gratified by the suggestion 
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A. The Irrelevance of Constitutional Text 
1. Article I 
It is not a question of finding some express delegation in 
Article I or elsewhere in the Constitution. If Congress enacted 
an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the state courts over a sub- 
ject exclusively governed by state law, we would be skeptical 
enough to question the jurisdiction even if Congress explicitly 
relied upon any of its several more-or-less express constitution- 
al powers over the state courts. As we have seen, there is plen- 
ty of textual authorization, surely. There is the commerce pow- 
er. There is the Tribunals Clause of Article I. There is the 
Fourteenth Amendment power over due process in the state 
courts, notably including the explicit grant of power to Con- 
gress under section 5. Under one or another of these Congress 
arguably could purport to vest jurisdiction in the state courts 
quite freely, and we would still question the constitutionality of 
a particular grant as applied to a case arising exclusively under 
state law. We would feel that something more than a piece of 
constitutional text is needed. 
It helps enormously, of course, if Congress in granting 
jurisdiction can rely upon some more substantive power: its 
power over foreign relations in the case of the Foreign Sover- 
eign Immunities its powers over national markets and 
national disasters in the case of the ALI Proposal. Congress's 
substantive powers are helpful not because constitutional text 
delegating or implying those powers will satisfy our minds, but 
because the acknowledgment of national power in some author- 
itative text is evidence of the likely national interest that gave 
rise to it. But even when the Constitution makes a national 
power explicit, we read meaning into the delegation only to the 
extent we can understand it as a reflection of some existing 
national concern. Only when we see that a matter is within the 
sphere of national governmental interest will we be satisfied 
that there is national power to govern it. 
that the argument of this paper is Newtonian rather than Copernican. 
158. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492-93 
(1983) (justifying jurisdiction on the basis of the foreign relations and international 
commerce powers of Congress). 
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2. Article 111 
If we move on to the context of federal jurisdiction over 
state-law  question^,'^^ perhaps we can see more clearly the 
inadequacy of constitutional text, without more, to legitimize 
an exercise of power, including a grant of jurisdiction to courts. 
For this purpose and for the separate purposes of the remain- 
ing Parts of this article, discussion fi-om this point on will deal 
with cases on federal, rather than on state, jurisdiction. But 
this discussion of federal jurisdiction will remain relevant to 
the inquiry into. state jurisdiction with which we began; the 
focus will be on cases in which Congress has granted concur- 
rent jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
The question becomes, then, what is the relevance of Arti- 
cle I11 to what has been said thus far? 
For background here it will be necessary for me to touch 
upon the classic case of Osborn v. Bank of the United 
States.160 That case, together with Planters' Bank of Geor- 
gia,16' its companion case, traditionally is remembered16' as 
159. Implicitly assuming that the "arising under" powers of Article I11 are 
insufficient to justify grants of federal jurisdiction over mass torts, earlier commen- 
tators recommended expansive readings of the "diversity" powers. The leading arti- 
cle is Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multi- 
party, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7 (1986). 
160. 22 US. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
161. Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
904 (1824). The problem of federal jurisdiction over an ordinary state-law action on 
the contract was actually presented not in Osborn, but in this companion case. 
Osborn nevertheless is the case conventionally cited for the proposition that Con- 
gress has Article I11 power to grant federal courts jurisdiction over cases arising 
under state law, if the defendant is a national instrumentality, since its capacity to 
sue or be sued is a federal-law "ingredientn of a case by or against the instrumen- 
tality. 
162. Osborn itself was an action by a branch of the Bank in Ohio to restrain 
collection of an unconstitutional Ohio tax. As such it clearly was within the broad 
Article I11 powers of federal courts, at  least under modern understandings that a 
claim for an injunction must state a cause of action. See Justice Harlan's post-Erie 
flash of insight about federal equitable remedial rights in Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 400 (1971) (Harlan, J., con- 
curring) ("However broad a federal court's discretion concerning equitable remedies, 
it is absolutely clear-at least after Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938)-that in a nondiversity suit a federal court's power to grant even equitable 
relief depends on the presence of a substantive right derived from federal law."). 
The reasoning behind the broad construction of Article 111 is that the Supreme 
Court must have Article I11 appellate power over a federal question, even when 
that question is a narrow sub-issue in a case. Thus, there is Article I11 jurisdiction 
over a state-law tort action alleging negligence per se, when the statutory violation 
grounding the per se allegation is a violation of a federal statute. Cf: Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986), pointing out that an alle- 
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deciding per Chief Justice Marshall that an ordinary state-law 
action on a contract by a federal instrumentality "arises under" 
federal law for purposes of satisfying Article 111. 
There are two separate messages one might glean from 
Osborn. Either all suits involving federal instrumentalities 
"arise under," a possibility to which I shall return later, or 
cases "arise under" when they include some "ingredient" of 
federal law, notwithstanding that on the merits the rights of 
the parties are exclusively determinable under state law. In 
Osborn, the federal "ingredient" was the issue of the Bank's 
capacity to sue.163 The act of Congress establishing the Bank 
gave it capacity to sue. Chief Justice Marshall's theory of Arti- 
cle I11 jurisdiction was that the federal issue of the Bank's ju- 
ridical capacity was a sufficient basis to hold that a case by a 
branch of the Bank "arises under" federal law for purposes of 
Article 111. 
Chief Justice Marshall's "ingredient" theory of Article I11 
jurisdiction is seductive when one sees, with him, that the 
Supreme Court must have power to review any federal ques- 
tion, even one that, at  the time of filing of the complaint, arises 
only potentially, perhaps by way of defense, even in a state-law 
case, even in state court. Thus, Chief Justice Marshall rea- 
soned, federal trial courts must have the same broad Article I11 
power. Dissenting in Osborn, Justice Johnson complained that 
Osborn trashes Article I11 as a limiting principle; virtually any 
state-law claim potentially raises some federal question. 164 
Perhaps for this reason, Osborn's "ingredient" theory of Article 
I11 jurisdiction was not very prominent in our thinking until, in 
1982, the Supreme Court surprised the lower courts165 by 
gation of a federal statutory violation sufficient to raise a rebuttable presumption 
of negligence under state law is a question "arising under" federal law, an "ingredi- 
ent" that under art. I11 might give the Supreme Court the power of review, id. at  
807, but distinguishing the case at  bar because federal statutory "arising under" ju- 
risdiction is narrower and must arise on the face of the well-pleaded complaint; 
noting, further, that there is no federal cause of action for a violation of the Feder- 
al Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Id. at  811. 
163. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at  822, 824. 
164. Id. at 875 (Johnson, J., dissenting) ("[Iln all such cases, there is not only 
a possibility, but a probability, that a question may arise, involving the constitu- 
tionality, construction, &c. of a law of the United States. If the circumstance, that 
the questions which the case involves, are to determine its character, whether 
those questions be made in the case or not, then every case . . . may as well be 
transferred to the jurisdiction of the United States, as those to which this Bank is 
a party"). 
165. 461 US. 480 (1983) (reversing the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir- 
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dredging it up from the distant past. The case was Verlinden v. 
Central Bank of Nigeria? 
Verlinden was a case under the Foreign Sovereign Immuni- 
ties Act, and that statute, as we have seen, contemplates state 
as well as federal jurisdiction, subject to re1nova1.l~~ The Arti- 
cle I11 problem in Verlinden was that the statute provides for 
liability in tort or contract under the law which would have 
determined liability had the defendant been a private per- 
son.168 Thus, under the Act, the ordinary expectation is that 
state or foreign law will determine liability. In Verlinden, the 
Supreme Court laid it down that cases under the Foreign Sov- 
ereign Immunities Act nevertheless "arise under7' federal law 
within the meaning of Article 11I.l~' Citing Osborn, Chief Jus- 
tice Burger reasoned, for the Verlinden Court, that the immuni- 
ty of a defendant sovereign is an "ingredient7' of federal law 
that must be decided "at the outset" of every case.'?' 
As an "ingredient theory" case, Verlinden in fact makes 
more sense than Osborn. One would suppose that stare decisis 
would establish the juridical capacity of a plaintiff branch of 
the Bank of the United States after the first case brought by 
that branch. But the immunity of a defendant sovereign in an 
action under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act involves an 
cuit). For an earlier critique of the Second Circuit's position, see Note, Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 68 VA. L. 
REV. 893 (1982). 
166. 461 U.S. 480 (1983). 
167. 28 U.S.C. 8 1441(d) (1988). 
168. 28 U.S.C. 8 1606 provides: 
[Tlhe foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same 
extent as a private individual under like circumstances; but . . . except for 
an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive dam- 
ages . . . . [Ilf, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the law 
of the place where the action or omission occurred provides, or has been 
construed to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the foreign 
state shall be liable for actual or compensatory damages . . . . 
Id. (emphases added). These provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
are construed as intending that federal law not apply. Cf. First Nat'l City Bank v. 
Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 622 n.11 (1983) 
(O'Connor, J.) (explaining that, although federal common law must govern thresh- 
old statutory issues such as the amenability of a particular governmental instru- 
mentality to suit, the liability of a statutory defendant is not to be determined 
under federal law but rather under the law of the state or nation where the act or 
omission occurred). These provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act sub- 
stantially parallel the language of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 
$8 1346(b), 2674 (1988), as amended. 
169. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983). 
170. Id. at  492, 493 (Burger, C.J.). 
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inquiry specific to the facts of the particular case,171 and in 
every case would have to be established under the statute's 
complex standards.172 The national interest in assuring de- 
fendant sovereigns in this country that they will be held liable 
only for their nongovernmental acts is advanced by the express 
provision that those same federal standards of immunity will 
govern in both sets of ~ 0 u r t s . l ~ ~  
Just the same, Verlinden remains unconvincing. A glimpse 
at  the facts will help to explain why. Verlinden arose when 
Nigeria could not continue to take deliveries of vast quantities 
of cement for which its agents had contracted. The Nigerian 
authorities notified sellers and factors that they would not ac- 
cept further deliveries of cement. One of the cement owners, 
Verlinden, a Dutch company, decided to bring suit in this coun- 
try. Numerous other Nigerian cement claims were pending 
here as well.174 This exercise in shopping for effective courts 
was encouraged by the then recent Foreign Sovereign Immuni- 
ties Act of 1976, since the statute makes commercial disputes 
against foreign sovereigns, if arising out of non-governmental 
activities,lT5 triable in this country. 
But the statute also requires that the alleged activities 
occur here or have direct effects here.lY6 To the Dutch compa- 
ny this meant that it needed to connect its case somehow with 
American territory. There was only one such connection: Under 
the terms of Verlinden's contract with Nigeria, Nigeria had 
placed a letter of credit on deposit with a New York bank. So 
Verlinden framed its claim-at bottom a simple action for 
171. Under the Act, a defendant sovereign is amenable to ordinary tort suits 
only if the activity giving rise to the suit was commercial activity conducted in this 
country or having direct effects in this country. 28 U.S.C. 5 1605(a)(2). 
172. The mechanistic argument might be made that Verlinden's "ingredient" 
theory could sustain federal "arising undern jurisdiction over mass torts in complex 
litigation, since a t  the "outset" of every case, federal requirements for transfer and 
consolidation would have to be met. The argument seems unsound. It  is hard to 
see how limits upon the exercise of federal jurisdiction can be construed as ground- 
ing federal jurisdiction. 
173. Verlinden, 461 U.S. a t  488; 28 U.S.C. 1604. Similarly, the Immunities 
Act's limitation of liability to compensatory damages only in personal-injury and 
death cases is applicable in both sets of courts. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1606. 
174. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 
F.2d 300, 310-13 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). 
175. The statute is intended to codify the "restrictive" view of sovereign immu- 
nity, opening a foreign sovereign to suit only for its nongovernmental wrongs. 
Verlinden, 461 U.S. a t  487-88; 28 U.S.C. § 1602. 
176. 28 U.S.C. 8 1605(a)(2). 
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breach of contract obviously governed by either Nigerian or 
Dutch law-as one for anticipatory breach of Nigeria's letter of 
credit. 
This piece of smart pleading should not be allowed to con- 
fuse the issue. The letter of credit was incidental to the agree- 
ment of the parties, as was the state of New York and the 
temporary deposit of a letter of credit in a bank there. Even if 
the deposit somehow enabled New York to pick up an interest 
in governance of this dispute,177 the United States itself had 
about as much interest in it as you do. 
Seeing those facts, I think what we feel wanting in 
Verlinden has little to do with Article 111. What we feel want- 
ing is a convincing argument from the national interest. We 
want to see what national interest justifies a federal district 
court in asserting statutory jurisdiction over a case that de- 
pends for substantive governance on the law of contracts of 
either Holland or Nigeria, when neither party is an American, 
and none of the events relevant to the agreement or breach has 
occurred in this country. 
B. The Relevance of Nexus 
Although Verlinden leaves the database after the Supreme 
Court's decision, the inevitable question arises whether-had 
the parties continued their struggle on remand-even the stat- 
utory requirements of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
would have been met. In order to ground a finding of sovereign 
immunity under the statute, Nigeria would have had to show 
only that its refusal to accept Verlinden's cement did not have 
direct effects in the United States in order to win a quick dis- 
missal under the statute.17' It is true that in the Weltover 
177. See, e.g., the much-criticized casebook classic, In re Jones's Estate, 182 
N.W. 227 (Iowa 1921) (applying Iowa law, on the strength of a temporary deposit 
of the decedent's funds a t  an Iowa bank, to be paid to him on his return to the 
country of his birth, to a dispute between two Welsh claimants over the estate of 
an intestate decedent who went down with the Lusitania). 
178. See Verlinden, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981). 
179. 28 U.S.C. 8 1330(a) (1988). Under the Act, "sovereign immunity is a n  
affirmative defense that must be specially pleaded," H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487 a t  17. 
Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court pointed out in Verlinden, 461 U.S. a t  493-94 
& n.20, subject-matter jurisdiction under the Act "turns on the existence of an  
exception to foreign sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. 5 1330(a). Accordingly, even if 
the foreign state does not enter an appearance to assert an immunity defense, a 
district court still must determine that immunity is unavailable under the Act." 
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caselgO the Court held that the statute's requirement of "di- 
rect effects" was not a requirement of "substantial" or "foresee- 
able" effects; but the Court did hold that the statutory effects 
must be the "immediate consequence of defendant's activi- 
ty."lgl Moreover, Weltover arose on very different facts from 
those of Verlinden. Weltover was a dispute over the restructur- 
ing of the very debt that was represented by the bonds payable 
in this country. It was not about supply and delivery of foreign 
goods abroad for foreign purposes.lg2 In other words, the Fed- 
eral Sovereign Immunities Act requires a nexus between the 
case and the United States. lg3 
When American law requires a nexus between the forum 
and the case before it, the purpose of the requirement is to help 
ensure the reasonableness of an assertion of forum power-to 
avoid arbitrary or irrational governance.'" But surely the 
Constitution requires non-arbitrary, rational governance as a 
matter of due process. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments protect respectively against irra- 
tional assertions of federal or state power. The point is to weed 
out governance that is so irrelevant as to amount to a denial of 
due process. As the Supreme Court puts this test of substantive 
due process in the context of state legislative power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the state must have a contact or con- 
tacts with the facts of a case, generating a governmental inter- 
est or interests, such that governance by the state on those 
180. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
181. Id. at 618. 
182. The place of performance of a contract may well be an interested sover- 
eign in an action on the contract; as Brainerd Currie once remarked, a contract to 
dance naked in the streets of Rome cannot be performed without reference to the 
laws of Rome. 
183. 28 U.S.C. $ 1605 provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts 
of the United States or of the states in any case- 
. . .  
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried 
on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act per- 
formed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity 
of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of 
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the 
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the Unit- 
ed States . . . . 
184. Cf. the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. $9 702, 706(2)(A) (provid- 
ing federal judicial review over federal agency action that is "arbitrary and capri- 
cious .") 
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facts will be neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.lB5 
This fundamental requirement of reasonableness, under what- 
ever constitutional language it is imposed, and however it is 
expressed, is as applicable to federal186 as to state assertions of 
governmental power.18' 
Once we internalize this very basic premise, it becomes 
easier to see what has been missing from the cases and much 
of the commentary on the powers of Congress over the subject- 
185. I am paraphrasing the test laid down in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 
U.S. 302, 313 (1981), and repeated in Phillips Petroleum Co. v, Shutts, 472 US .  
797, 818 (1985). The line of thinking goes back a t  least to Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 
281 US. 397 (1930) (holding under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that a state may not govern a contract case if it is without significant 
contacts with the contract or the parties). 
For an interesting recent elaboration of nexus requirements in the context of 
the power to tax, see Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2286 
(1994) (sustaining under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause 
California's worldwide combined reporting requirement for calculation of its corpo- 
rate franchise tax where taxpayers had an adequate nexus with the State. That is, 
the tax was fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory, fairly related to the services 
provided by the State, and its imposition did not inevitably result in multiple taxa- 
tion). 
186. Cfi, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991) (sustaining 
the constitutionality of a federal mandatory minimum penalty for distribution of 
LSD imposed under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, in part on the ground that 
"Congress had a rational basis for its choice of penalties for LSD distribution"). 
The classic cases are Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); 
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 147, 151-54 (1938) (Stone, J.) 
(sustaining an act of Congress under various due process challenges; stating that 
"regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pro- 
nounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally 
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon 
some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators"). 
187. See supra note 186; cf. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) 
(striking down under the Commerce Clause, as without rational basis, the Gun- 
Free School Zones Act of 1990, which forbids "any individual knowingly to possess 
a firearm a t  a place that [he] knows . . . is a school zone," 18 U.S.C. 
0 922(q)(l)(A)): 
But even these modern-era precedents which have expanded congres- 
sional power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is sub- 
ject to outer limits . . . . Since that time, the Court has heeded that 
warning and undertaken to decide whether a rational basis existed for 
concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate com- 
merce. 
Id. a t  1628-29 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (citations omitted); see also id. at  1653 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) ("In due process litigation, the Court's statement of a rational basis test 
came quickly. . . . The parallel formulation of the Commerce Clause test came lat- 
er. . . .") (citations omitted); id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Courts must give 
Congress a degree of leeway in determining the existence of a significant factual 
connection between the regulated activity and interstate commerce . . . . The tradi- 
tional words 'rational basis' capture this leeway."). 
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matter jurisdiction of courts. If the assertion rings hollow to 
you that Congress can give jurisdiction to courts over state-law 
cases over which those courts otherwise would not have had 
jurisdiction, it is because it is too bald an assertion. What is 
wanting is a convincing argument from the national interest. 
We would like to see a rational basis for the act of Con- 
gress. We would like to see a nexus between a particular case 
in which the conferred jurisdiction is challenged, and the par- 
ticular goals Congress is trying to achieve by conferring the 
particular jurisdiction. If the holding in Verlinden, not- 
withstanding the obvious inevitability of some sort of "ingredi- 
ent" theory of Article 111, remains unconvincing to us, it is not 
because Verlinden does not contain a federal ingredient, or 
because that federal ingredient is insufficient to fall within the 
"arising under" language of Article I11 as interpreted in Osborn, 
but rather because we do not see any national interest in the 
taking of jurisdiction in Verlinden. The fact that Article 111, 
without more, has been sufficient to preserve federal courts 
from jurisdiction over innumerable cases outside the national 
interest is a happy incident of the adroitness of the Framers, 
but it should not be allowed to obscure the necessity of iden- 
tifylng a national interest to justify application of an act of 
Congress, including an act of Congress conferring jurisdiction. 
As cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts 
show, that question is one that can and must be isolated from 
Article III.ls8 
C. A Useful Hypothetical 
Recall that under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
there is concurrent jurisdiction over cases like Verlinden in 
both state and federal courts. Suppose that the Dutch seller, 
for unknown tactical reasons, files its suit in New York in the 
state court, and that, also for unknown tactical reasons, Ni- 
geria makes no attempt to remove the case to federal court. 
188. For similar perspectives expressed almost two centuries apart, compare 
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 871 (Johnson, J., 
dissenting) ("[Tlhe present act [states], 'in all State Courts having competent juris- 
diction, and in any Circuit Court of the United States.' . . . But . . . the clause 
could not have been intended to enlarge the jurisdiction of the State Courts, and 
therefore could not have been intended to enlarge that of the federal Courts.") with 
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring) (complaining that Judge Bork's concurrence "completely overlooks the 
jurisdiction of the state courts"). 
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Instead, Nigeria moves to dismiss, challenging the constitution- 
ality of the jurisdictional grant by Congress on the facts of the 
particular case. Nigeria argues that Congress lacks power to 
subject it to jurisdiction in this country when this country has 
no significant contact with the case. 
We do know that, as an initial proposition,189 under the 
Supremacy Clause the state court must take the federal 
case,lgO if the jurisdictional grant is constitutional as applied 
189. The exceptions to the duty of state courts to adjudicate federal claims are 
only procedural or otherwise off the merits. This follows in part from the fact that 
defenses on the merits fall a t  once, under the Supremacy Clause. The further 
thinking behind the procedural exception is that federal law takes the state courts 
as it finds them. The theory is that nothing in federal law requires states to build 
courts; thus, even if a state has courts, it  is obliged to enforce federal law only 
insofar as its own jurisdictional and procedural law permits. Hence the doctrine of 
the "otherwise valid excuse," under which it  is held that a state that would dis- 
miss an analogous state-law claim on procedural grounds may similarly dismiss a 
federal claim. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 US .  377, 387-88 (1929). 
This thinking is flawed, as I have tried to show elsewhere. See my widely 
ignored Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: "Actual" Conflicts, 70 
TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1773-76 (1992); see also S. Candice Hoke, Transcending Conven- 
tional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the Supremacy Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV. 
829, 879-80 (1992) (arguing that the Supremacy Clause serves as a toggle, switch- 
ing supremacy on when issues become federalized, and that Supreme Court doc- 
trines in excess of this only produce confusion). For one thing, there is no courtless 
state. For another, the Supremacy Clause arguably does require a state to have 
courts. For a third, once we see the force of federal supremacy on the merits, of 
necessity we begin to see the force of federal supremacy over state procedures that 
might affect outcomes on the merits. E.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 
396 US.  229, 238 (1969) (Douglas, J.) ("[The] federal [equitable] remedy for the 
protection of a federal right is available in the state court, if that court is empow- 
ered to grant injunctive relief generally . . . ."); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngs- 
town R.R. Co., 342 US. 359 (1952) (holding that a state must afford trial by jury 
in a case under the Federal Employers' Liability Act even on an issue deemed 
unsuitable for the jury under state standards). Thus, I question the cases holding 
that a state should be permitted to dismiss a federal case for forum non conveni- 
ens, even if the federal courts would not. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. S. Ry. Co. v. 
Mayfield, 340 US.  1 (1950); Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 US.  377, 
387-88 (1929). What I am saying is that it does not matter to their obligation to 
try federal cases whether or not the state courts have tried similar state-law cases. 
It  is a very different question whether a state should be permitted to try a 
case that federal courts would dismiss. E.g., American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 
S. Ct. 981 (1994) (holding in an admiralty case that federal law on forum non 
conveniens does not preempt state law not recognizing that doctrine). Indeed, a 
state court is under special obligation to try a federal claim in the absence of a 
federal forum. This may be as much a matter of due process, see supra note 8, as 
a matter of supremacy, see supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text. 
190. Testa v. Katt, 330 US.  386, 387 (1947) (holding that a state must adjudi- 
cate a federal statutory claim when Congress grants jurisdiction to "any court of 
competent jurisdiction"); see also Howlett v. Rose, 496 US.  356 (1990) (holding that 
a state court may not immunize from suit under federal civil-rights law a defen- 
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in the particular case. But is the jurisdictional grant to state 
courts constitutional in cases like this hypothetical variant of 
Verlinden? If not, what can save it in the real Verlinden? Even 
if you think New York might have some rational basis of its 
own for trying the case, the question is whether Congress has a 
rational basis for requiring a court in this country to hear 
Verlinden7s case. In thinking about the power of Congress in 
our hypothetical case, obviously nothing in Article 111, and 
nothing in the analysis in Verlinden, can help us to answer it. 
We see this at  once, as an obvious fact, without any of the 
usual confision, because state courts are not Article I11 courts. 
But that means that this same constitutional question about 
the power of Congress was never answered in Verlinden. 
I am saying that the power of Congress to grant federal 
jurisdiction must be controlled at a deeper level than Article I11 
by concepts of substantive due process. 
VI. REASONING FROM THE NATIONAL INTEREST 
A. The Example of Verlinden 
What was the national interest, if any, in taking jurisdic- 
tion over Verlinden? The answer to that question depends on 
the reasons for the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. When 
granting jurisdiction, just as when enacting substantive legisla- 
tion, Congress must provide for "the general Welfare"lgl of 
"the People of the United States."lg2 In cases like Verlinden, 
Congress could do so by creating a forum for the enforcement of 
contracts Americans may enter into with any foreign sovereign 
anywhere;lg3 or, for the enforcement of the contracts with for- 
eign sovereigns of those foreigners whom we welcome to the 
dant not immune under federal law). 
191. "We start from the settled proposition that the subject-matter jurisdiction 
of the lower federal courts is determined by Congress 'in the exact degrees and 
character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.'" Argentine 
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 433 (1989) (quoting Cary 
v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845)). 
192. U.S. CONST. preamble. 
193. The House Report refers to the growing number of disputes between 
"American citizensn and foreign states, and expresses the desire to ensure "our 
citizens . . . access to the courts." H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487 at  6. See, e.g., Texas 
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 310-13 (2d 
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982) (finding the statutory requirement of 
"direct effects" in this country, 28 U.S.C. !j 1605(a)(2) (1988), to be satisfied in a 
case similar to Verlinden except that the plaintiff was an American cement suppli- 
er). 
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United States to make or perform those contracts.'" Of 
course all law has limits. For reasons of foreign policy, Con- 
gress also would seek in creating such forums to ensure that 
they are well-regulated forums. Congress would want to protect 
foreign sovereigns from excessive litigation, or litigation giving 
the appearance of local bias, or litigation under disuniform 
standards of sovereign immunity.lg5 In accordance with these 
purposes, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act codifies the 
"commercial activities" exception to the common-law doctrine of 
sovereign immunity;lg6 confers jurisdiction upon both federal 
and s ta te  courts;lg7 provides world-wide service of 
process;'98 provides for removal by the defendant sover- 
eign;"' and provides a single uniform standard of sovereign 
immunity applicable in all courts.200 But Congress could not 
constitutionally have created, and did not intend to create, an 
international court of claims in cases in which the nation had 
no interest at  
A shorthand way of describing the difference the statute 
makes would be to say that it opens the foreign sovereign to 
some of the liabilities a private person might be subject to in 
our courts in similar circumstances. It is very hard, then, to 
say that we should construe the statute to subject a foreign 
sovereign to suit in a case in which we would subject no private 
194. The statute limits its otherwise seemingly universal coverage to cases 
having substantial contact with the United States. See 28 U.S.C. 9 1605. 
195. Verlinden, 461 U.S. a t  492 (1983) (describing the defendant-protective 
interests of Congress). 
196. 28 U.S.C. $5 1605, 1607. 
197. 28 U.S.C. 5 1330 (vesting federal courts with original jurisdiction not 
exclusive in terms over cases against foreign sovereigns); 9 1441(d) (vesting federal 
courts with removal jurisdiction over cases against foreign sovereigns that are first 
filed in state courts); 5 1605 (creating uniform standards of immunity applicable in 
both federal and state courts). 
198. 28 U.S.C. 9 1608. 
199. 28 U.S.C. 5 1441(d). 
200. 28 U.S.C. $9 1604-05, 1607; Verlinden, 461 US.  a t  489. 
201. Congress was aware of concern that "our courts [might be] turned into 
small 'international courts of claims' . . . open . . . to all comers to 
litigate any dispute which any private party may have with a foreign 
state anywhere in the world ...." Congress protected against this danger 
not by restricting the class of potential plaintiffs, but rather by enact- 
ing substantive provisions requiring some form of substantial contact 
with the United States. 
Verlinden, 461 U.S. a t  490 (quoting Testimony, Bruno A. Ristau, Hearings, 
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations., House Judiciary 
Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1976); referring to 28 U.S.C. 5 1605). 
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person to suit in our courts in similar circumstances. The na- 
tional interests that support provision of a well-regulated fo- 
rum for certain suits against foreign sovereigns by Americans 
wherever the parties transacted, or by foreigners transacting 
here, cannot support the provision of a forum, however well- 
regulated, for foreigners' suits here against foreign govern- 
ments, even over disputes arising out of nongovernmental ac- 
tivities, when those activities are conducted abroad and have 
no direct effects within this country. And if the private defen- 
dant without a significant contact with this country is protected 
from having to submit to its governance, then the foreign sover- 
eign must be similarly protected. At a minimum both must be 
protected by the basic substantive due process guarantee 
against arbitrary or unreasonable assertions of governmental 
power. 
Against this background, it becomes evident that Verlinden 
was wrongly decided on its facts. Jurisdiction in that case was 
unsustainable, as we have seen, under the statute itself, for 
want of the nexus with the United States that Congress re- 
quired. And for the same reason jurisdiction was unsustainable 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, even if 
it was sustainable under Article 111. Whether or not the 
Verlinden Court "correctly" found Article I11 jurisdiction will 
not help us over the difficulty-one of substantive due pro- 
cess-that a court in this country could not exercise any sort of 
jurisdiction over Verlinden that would not be arbitrary and 
irrational. 
B. Justice O'Connor Tries Her Hand 
In the post-Verlinden Article I11 cases we can see the Su- 
preme Court struggling toward some such recognition of the 
need to identify a national interest to justifjr an assertion of 
national power. 
The background here also traces back to Osborn, but it 
follows the other strand of thinking for which Osborn is cited; 
that cases against federal agents or instrumentalities "arise 
under" for Article I11 purposes. In 1885, in the Pacific Railroad 
Removal Cases,202 the Supreme Court had even extended this 
latter reading of Osborn to cover federally chartered railroad 
stock companies. But thirty years later, in 1915, Congress 
202. 115 U.S. 1 (1885). 
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partially overrode that view, requiring, at  least in the case of a 
railroad, that the United States own at least half the capital 
Despite the narrowness of this legislation, it had the effect 
of putting the "agents-or-instrumentalities" reading of Osborn 
under a cloud, much as the alternative "ingredient" reading of 
Osborn had been before Verlinden breathed new life into it in 
1983. In 1989 the Supreme Court gave the agents-or-instru- 
mentalities theory what one might have supposed to be its coup 
de grke. The case was Mesa v. California.204 
Mesa should have been a somewhat easier case for federal 
jurisdiction than Verlinden, to the extent that the statute in- 
voked in Mesa seemed explicitly to support federal jurisdic- 
t i ~ n , ~ ' ~  unlike the jurisdictional statute in Verlinden. But in 
Mesa, the Supreme Court came close to holding that if there is 
no national interest justifying an exercise of jurisdiction on the 
particular facts, clear statutory language under explicit consti- 
tutional authority will not save it. 
Mesa began in state criminal prosecutions against two 
truck drivers working for the United States postal service. One 
of the drivers in the course of her government employment had 
negligently caused the death of a bicyclist and was charged 
with misdemeanor manslaughter. The other driver, within the 
course of his employment, had collided with a police car, and 
was charged with speeding. Both defendants removed to federal 
court under the federal officer-removal statute.'06 Notwith- 
203. Act of 1915, ch. 22, 5 5, 38 Stat. 803-04 (codified a t  28 U.S.C. 9 1349 
(1988)). 
Id. 
204. 489 U.S. 121 (1989). 
205. This was the federal officer-removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 5 1442(a). 
206. The statute provides: 
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court 
against any of the following persons may be removed by them to the 
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing 
the place wherein it  is pending: 
(1) Any oficer of the United States or any agency thereof, or 
person acting under him, for any act under color of such office . . . . 
The purpose of 5 1441(a) and its various predecessor statutes was to protect 
federal officials from state courts in which locals might be hostile-not to the fed- 
eral officer as such, but rather to the federal governmental function the officer was 
performing a t  the time of the alleged wrong or crime. Federal officer removal was 
first authorized to deal with local hostility to what would come to be called federal 
"revenuers." In 1815, during a time of deep resentment in the New England states 
against federal duties, and against the embargo on trade with England, Congress 
enacted a temporary measure providing for removal of cases against federal cus- 
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standing the clear language of the officer-removal statute, the 
Court of Appeals ordered the case remanded.207 In the Su- 
preme Court, the drivers, of course, needed to argue that there 
was federal jurisdiction. For this purpose they relied on the 
agents-or-instrumentalities reading of Osborn v. Bank of the 
United States.208 The state argued, against this, that Osborn 
should not be read to authorize federal removal mechanically 
whenever the state criminal defendant happened to be a feder- 
al agent. Although Article III's "arising under" clause-the 
state argued-extends federal judicial power to every issue of 
national interest, there simply was no national interest in 
furnishing a federal forum for the state's prosecution of these 
two drivers. 
Arguably Osborn's "ingredient" theory also was available to 
the drivers in Mesa. There is a threshold issue of federal law in 
every such case: whether a defendant federal employee's al- 
leged tort occurred when she was acting in the course of her 
employment as a federal officer. This is also certainly an issue 
in every case under the Federal Tort Claims Act, both before 
and after the Westfall Act of 1988.~~' 
That this is so after the Act can be seen in Gutierrez de 
Martinez u. Larnagn~ .~ '~  Recall that in Lamagno the Court 
toms officials. In one form or another this jurisdiction was available for the dura- 
tion of the War of 1812. In 1833, as hostility to federal revenue collection was 
intensifying secessionist pressures in South Carolina, Congress provided for federal 
removal of state prosecutions against federal revenue officials. In Tennessee v. 
Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879), the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of 
federal officer removal in a case in which the defendant revenuer had killed a 
citizen of the state in the course of confiscating an illegal distillery. In the wake of 
the Civil War, the hostility of southern courts to federal officials performing duties 
under the Reconstruction Acts led to the more general precursors of 5 1441(a). 
The Mesa Court saw, citing Maryland v. Soper (No. 21, 270 US.  36, 43-44 
(1926), that the purpose of the statute, narrowly construed, was to protect, not 
federal officers as such, but rather their federal functions. Mesa, 489 U.S. a t  127- 
28. Nevertheless the Court assumed the statutory purposes to encompass protection 
for a federal official attempting to assert a federal defense even in today's state 
courts-in most of which the constitutional presumption of local bias, seen in Arti- 
cle III's provision of diversity jurisdiction, might be thought fanciful. 
For pre-Mesa discussion of earlier jurisprudence, see Kenneth S. Rosenblatt, 
Removal of Criminal Prosecutions of Federal Oficials: Returning to the Original 
Intent of Congress, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 21 (1989). 
207. California v. Mesa, 813 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1987). 
208. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824). 
209. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 
(commonly known as the Westfall Act), Pub. L. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563-67; see 
supra notes 41-46, 66-69 and accompanying text. 
210. 115 S. Ct. 2227 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.) (holding judicially reviewable an 
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held judicially reviewable, in Federal Tort Claims Act cases, 
the Attorney General's certification that an employee was act- 
ing within the scope of her employment at the time of the al- 
leged tort."' Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the 
Lamagno Court. In a part of her Lamagno opinion for a plurali- 
ty only,''' Justice Ginsburg also used this "ingredient" argu- 
ment in support of Article I11 jurisdiction in considering a 
much more difficult question under Article 111, a devil of a 
problem that, in Lamagno, was only hypothetical. By sustain- 
ing judicial review of the scope-of-employment issue, the Court 
had, in effect, given federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of 
unremandable removed claims which might, in fact, not be 
federal at all. The federal court reviewing the Attorney 
General's certification might hold it  erroneous-that is, hold 
that the employee was not acting within the scope of her feder- 
al employment at the time of the alleged tort. Before and after 
the Westfall Act that case is clearly an ordinary state-law tort 
case and is governed by state law operating of its own force. 
Under the Act, such a case belongs in the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the state court. If a federal court holds that the Attorney 
General's scope-of-employment certification was in error, the 
United States cannot remain substituted as defendant, any 
more than it could have been substituted as defendant had the 
Attorney General refused to certify scope of employment in the 
first place. In this hypothesized federal case, the employee 
must be restored as party defendant, and must stay on in fed- 
eral court and defend alone, in an unremandable case governed 
by state law. 
Justice Ginsburg reached the question whether such feder- 
al jurisdiction could be sustained as "arising under" federal law 
for purposes of Article 111. For the plurality, she reasoned that 
the threshold question in every case under the Act-whether 
the federal employee was within the scope of her federal em- 
ployment-was a federal question within the meaning of 
Verlinden and Osborn. This federal question was sufficient a t  
least to bring the case into federal court, and "considerations of 
judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants" were 
sufficient to keep it there even afker a judicial determination 
administrative determination of the issue of scope-of-employment in a case brought 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act as amended by the Westfall Act in 1988). 
211. Id. at 2228. 
212. Id. at 2236-37. 
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that the employee was not acting within the scope of her em- 
ploy~nent.~'~ Thus, the plurality opinion in Lamagno furnish- 
es some support for the "ingredient" theory in a case removed 
by a federal employee. 
In Mesa, in the different setting of the general officer-re- 
moval statute, the Government did not make an ingredient- 
theory argument. The Supreme Court roundly rejected the 
agents-or-instrumentalities argument the Government did 
make, affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Justice 
O'Connor, writing for the unanimous Mesa Court, thought i t  
immaterial that these defendants happened to be federal offi- 
cials falling within the literal language of the statutory juris- 
dictional grant. What concerned her was the want of national 
interest in removing the case.214 Even if there were some na- 
tional party-protective interest, it would have to be balanced 
against the considerable costs removal would impose upon the 
prosecution, and against the strong federal policy disfavoring 
federal interference with state criminal  proceeding^.^'^ On 
balance the national interest was in~ufficient.~'~ Justice 
O'Connor thought that at  a minimum the defendant must 
plead some federal defense. But she also suggested that remov- 
al might have been warranted if the post office drivers could 
have alleged local hostility to federal officials or to their partic- 
213. Id. at 2237. Justice Souter, for the four dissenting Justices in Lamagno, 
took strong issue with the plurality's reasoning, calling it circular. Id. at  2240 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plurality's reasoning was "tantamount to 
saying the authority to determine whether a Court has jurisdiction over the cause 
of action supplies the very jurisdiction that is subject to challenge"). 
214. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989). 
215. Id. at 137-38. Notwithstanding the Mesa Court's emphasis on the costs 
removal imposes on state prosecutors, id. at  137-38, those costs are sufficiently 
lower than the costs imposed by a federal injunction suit based on the same feder- 
al defense to warrant access to federal courts in removed cases but not in injunc- 
tion suits. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (barring federal injunctions 
interfering with pending state criminal proceedings). A removed criminal case can 
proceed intact in the federal court. But a federal action in equity in which a pre- 
liminary injunction has issued will adjudicate the federal question only, and the 
state prosecutor will be enjoined from trying the criminal case at  all. 
216. Mesa, 489 US. at  137-38 (O'Connor, J.): 
(Wle do not recognize any federal interests that are not protected by 
limiting removal to situations in which a federal defense is alleged. In 
these prosecutions, no state court hostility or interference has even been 
alleged by petitioners and we can discern no federal interest in potential- 
ly forcing local district attorneys to choose between prosecuting traffic 
violations hundreds of miles from the municipality in which the violations 
occurred or abandoning those prosecutions. 
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ular function.217 In Mesa, in sum, an overt interest analysis is 
all the content Article I11 holds. Under Article 111, the Court in 
Mesa simply attempted to discern a reasonable basis for the 
lower court's removal jurisdiction and found none. 
C. Justice Souter Loses the Thread 
I .  Red Cross and capacity clauses 
Consider, now, the very different analysis in the 1992 
American National Red Cross case.218 There, a recipient of a 
blood transfusion brought an action against the Red Cross to 
recover for an AIDS infection allegedly caused by contaminated 
blood. The Red Cross, a federally chartered corp~ration,~'~ re- 
moved. Its charter gives the Red Cross the power "to sue and 
be sued in courts of law and equity, State or Federal, within 
the jurisdiction of the United States."220 The Court of Appeals 
held that insofar as the statute purported to give federal courts 
jurisdiction over this state-law personal-injuries case without 
regard to the citizenship of the parties, the statute was uncon- 
stitutional under Article III.221 
The Supreme Court reversed, 5:4. Justice Souter's opinion 
for the Court literalistically held, among other things, that "a 
congressional charter's 'sue-and-be-sued' provision may be read 
to confer federal court jurisdiction if, but only if, it specifically 
mentions the federal courts."222 Justice Scalia wrote a prolix 
217. One might have supposed that Mesa overrules The Pacific Railroad Re- 
moval Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885), insofar as those cases read Osborn as authorizing 
removal by federal agents or instrumentalities even in the absence of a national 
interest in the merits. The Pacific Railroad Removal Cases retain some scope be- 
yond the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1988) (limiting federal removal jurisdiction 
over federally chartered railroads to companies in which the United States owns 
over half the stock). But if Mesa did kill the agents-or-instrumentalities theory, the 
Court was shortly to breathe life back into it. See American Nat'l Red Cross v. 
S.G. & A.E., 505 U.S. 247 (1992). 
218. American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E., 505 U.S. 247 (1992). For inter- 
esting commentary on American Nat'l Red Cross, see Lorretta Shaw, A Compre- 
hensive Theory of Protective Jurisdiction: The Missing "IngredientJJ of "Arising Un- 
der" Jurisdiction, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1235 (1993). 
219. 36 U.S.C. 1-17. 
220. 36 U.S.C. $ 2. 
221. S.G. & A.E. v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 938 F.2d 1494 (1st Cir. 1991). 
222. American NatJl Red Cross, 505 U.S. at 255. This is an astonishing re- 
mark, and not only for its literalism. Although I read Justice Souter here as talk- 
ing only about the sufficiency of the language that will achieve a vesting of juris- 
diction, an over-enthusiastic reader might take him to be saying that explicit lan- 
guage is the only condition on the power of Congress, and that all i t  takes is 
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and heated dissent focusing on the literalism of this wing of 
Justice Souter's opinion, charging the majority with construing 
law by "magic but ironically bringing little further 
to the problem before the Court than a different, more doctrinal 
reading of the same text. Justice O'Connor, the author of Mesa, 
joined in Justice Scalia's dissent; but one wishes she had dis- 
sented separately to give us the sort of rational analysis she 
had deployed in Mesa. 
2. Red Cross and agents-or-instrumentalities 
Justice Souter did not rely on the language of the capacity 
clause alone. He thought the case controlled by Osborn, reading 
Osborn for the proposition that "Article 111's 'arising under' 
jurisdiction is broad enough to authorize Congress to confer 
federal court jurisdiction over actions involving federally char- 
tered  corporation^."^^^ He argued that "Congress has surely 
been entitled to rely" on Osborn and the long line of cases un- 
der it, and that Red Cross gave the Court "no reason to contem- 
plate overruling" Osborn .225 
This wing of Red Cross might seem particularly at  odds 
with Mesa. But tucked away in a footnote is the special prob- 
lem Justice Souter was trying to solve.226 Congress had modi- 
fied Osborn's agents-or-instrumentalities rationale, a t  least for 
federally chartered railroad stock companies.227 Justice 
Souter agreed with the Court of Appeals that this legislation 
had implications that were at least unclear for organizations 
like the Red Cross that do not have stockholders. Indeed, this 
legislation had put the agents-or-instrumentalities reading of 
explicit language to give Congress power to trump the limits of Article 111. Only 
three Justices have ever been found willing to say that Article I can trump Article 
I11 in cases not arising under federal law. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Trans- 
fer Co., 333 U.S. 860 (1948) (Jackson, J., for the plurality, joined only by Justices 
Black and Burton) (arguing that Congress has Article I power to vest diversity ju- 
risdiction in federal courts over cases in which a citizen of the District of Columbia 
is a party). 
223. Justice Scalia argued that the Court had disregarded the "natural read- 
ing" of a capacity clause referring generically to all courts. American Nat'l Red 
Cross, 505 U.S. a t  265 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
224. Id. at 264 (Souter, J.). 
225. Id. at 265. 
226. Id. at 251 n.2. 
227. See 28 U.S.C. 5 1349 (limiting federal removal jurisdiction over federally 
chartered railroads to companies in which the United States owns over half the 
stock; overriding to that extent The Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 
(1885)). 
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Osborn under a cloud in the lower courts ever since it was 
enacted.228 
In Red Cross, then, the Court is telling the country that 
Osborn's agents-or-instrumentalities theory is alive and well. 
That is an intelligible holding. But if there is Article I11 "aris- 
ing under" jurisdiction over federally chartered corporations, it 
ought to exist whether or not the chartering statute mentions 
"federal courts" explicitly. On the other hand, Chief Justice 
Marshall had relied on explicit statutory language to sustain 
jurisdiction in O s b ~ r n ; ~ ~  and one can swallow this on the 
thinking that the Supreme Court can require Congress to 
speak clearly. It may be appropriate to give narrow readings to 
Article 111. But were it not for Justice Scalia's lengthy dissent 
on the "magic words" issue, the reader might forget all about it. 
Justice Souter fairly drops the issue after raising it, and his 
thundering peroration on the continuing vitality of Osborn 
never specifically mentions the supposed clear-statement re- 
quirement .230 
3. Red Cross and the federal "ingredient" 
By now a further question might be troubling the reader. 
Why did the Red Cross Court finesse Osborn's "ingredient7' 
theory? The "sue-and-be-sued" clause in Red Cross so plainly 
invited the "ingredient" rationale. Under Osborn, Justice 
Souter could have used the capacity clause not as a piece of 
clear language, but rather to furnish a federal "ingredient:" the 
threshold federal issue of the Red Cross's capacity. Of course by 
now the juridical capacity of the Red Cross is not a real issue, 
but the Bank's juridical capacity presented an equally unreal 
issue in Osborn. As long as the Court was prepared to rely on 
Osborn, why not rely on it whole hog? 
Justice Souter shrugged off this possibility at  the outset of 
his analysis. At the time when the sue-and-be-sued clause was 
included in the Red Cross charter, he said, Congress did not 
have to include it to ensure jurisdiction; the Red Cross already 
was within federal jurisdiction under the decisional law then 
applicable because it was a federal instr~mentality.~~'  Yet by 
228. Lower federal courts were divided on the effect of $ 1349 in litigation 
specifically against the Red Cross. American Nat'l Red Cross, 505 U.S. at 250 n.1. 
229. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 818 (distinguishing an earlier case on this ground). 
230. American Nat'l Red Cross, 505 U.S. at 264-65. 
231. Id. at 251 (citing the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885)). 
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analogy to Verlinden's sovereign-immunity "ingredient" and 
Osborn's capacity "ingredient," the capacity "ingredienty' in Red 
Cross seemingly should have been enough for Article I11 ju- 
risdiction, whether or not Justice Souter is right that Congress 
thought there would be jurisdiction even without the sue-and- 
be-sued clause. 
What really stood in the way, we may speculate, was Mesa. 
When I say this I do not mean to refer to the implicit federal 
"ingredient" in Mesa. Recall that in that case, federal post office 
drivers sought to remove their state criminal prosecutions to 
federal court. In holding that there was no jurisdiction under 
Article 111, the Government did not argue, and the Court did 
not deal with, the federal threshold issue of scope-of-employ- 
ment in every such case. As the Government saw, i t  was the 
true difficulty of the position that scope of employment might 
not be enough. Any national interest in taking jurisdiction 
would have to overcome the countervailing national interests 
Justice O'Connor identified in Mesa.232 As the 1995 Lamagno 
case233 makes plain, only four of the current Justices234 
might be prepared to open federal courts to state-law tort cases 
against federal employees on mere allegations that the tort 
occurred while the defendant was acting within the scope of 
federal employment. 
When I say that Mesa stood in the way in Red Cross, I 
mean, simply, that a federal party-protective policy failed to 
justifjr jurisdiction in Mesa, but seems to do so in Red Cross. 
Yet nothing in Red Cross confronts Mesa explicitly. Rather, it 
appears that a majority of the Justices thought that cases 
against the Red Cross must come within federal jurisdiction 
anyway-but no majority could be found to overrule Mesa 
232. See supra notes 204-08, 214-17 and accompanying text. 
233. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 115 S. Ct. 2227 (1995); see supra 
notes 44-46, 65-69, 210-13 and accompanying text. 
234. In Lamagno, Justice O'Comor concurred separately to distance herself 
from the Court on the point, maintaining the consistency of her position in Mesa. 
She disagreed with Justice Ginsburg's opinion that exclusive federal jurisdiction 
would be constitutionally authorized in a state-law case irrevocably removed under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act even after it was ascertained that the case did not 
fall within the scope of the Act. Lamagno, 115 S. Ct. at  2227 (OYConnor, J., con- 
curring). Thus, on this issue Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court becomes a 
plurality opinion only. 
It should be noted as well that Justice Ginsburg's Lamagno opinion does not 
rely solely on an "ingredientn rationale. She buttresses her conclusion under Article 
I11 with arguments about ancillary jurisdiction and efficiency. 
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overtly. To be blunt about it, Red Cross is an intellectual mud- 
dle. 
4. A better analysis 
Whatever national interest supports the chartering of a 
federal entity like the Red Cross might very well support the 
furnishing of a federal forum for suits by or against that feder- 
al entity. In Red Cross, the question about national interest 
needed to be asked. To the extent the Article I11 jurisdiction in 
Red Cross is a party-protective jurisdiction, Red Cross, like 
Verlinden, is a modern refutation of Justice Frankfurter's view 
that the diversity grant exhausts the national interest in pro- 
viding unbiased forums for litigation of nonfederal matters.235 
Reasoning purposively for ourselves, we can speculate that 
in chartering the Red Cross, Congress means to take advantage 
of a cost-effective way of devolving some of the nation's need to 
respond to national disasters upon an independent entity with 
access to private funds. But to protect the public from the 
entity's mistakes, and, a t  the same time, to protect the entity 
from local bias, Congress also sees an interest in giving the Red 
Cross juridical capacity and furnishing it with the option of a 
federal forum. 
These identifiable national interests are what sustain the 
jurisdiction in Red Cross, not the wording of the statute, or 
Congress's entitlement to rely upon Osborn. A jurisdictional 
statute vindicating national policies will be within the pre- 
sumptive power of Congress even if it contains no express lan- 
guage about federal courts but simply gives jurisdiction to "any 
competent After all, we have seen the other side of 
this coin. If there is no national interest in furnishing a federal 
forum, no weight need be given even to express language pur- 
porting to do so, as Mesa holds. This suggests not merely that a 
235. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 475 (1957) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting): 
The theory [of protective jurisdiction] must have as its sole justifica- 
tion a belief in the inadequacy of state tribunals in determining state 
law. The Constitution reflects such a belief in the specific situation within 
which the Diversity Clause was confined. The intention to remedy such 
supposed defects was exhausted in this provision of Article 111. 
236. The example that comes immediately to mind is the Emergency Price 
Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 34, as amended, 58 Stat. 632, 640, the basis of the 
Rhode Island court's jurisdiction in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
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rational basis is a threshold condition of Article I11 jurisdiction, 
but even that Article I11 is satisfied when there is a rational 
basis for a grant of federal jurisdiction. 
VII. PROBLEMS OF RAW JURISDICTIONAL POWER 
In this section I will press on and take the view that the 
test of national interest, without more, should satisfy Article 
111. This position raises the question whether a federal case can 
"arise under7' a rationally-based but purely jurisdictional grant. 
This issue comes up for the most part in cases questioning 
the Article I power of Congress to confer jurisdiction upon fed- 
eral courts within the limits of Article 111. By continuing to 
refer our inquiry to the state courts as well, we become better 
equipped to deal with the classic Article I11 problem of federal 
courts, because we begin to see a way of generalizing it. 
I think we are beginning to see that the effective, however 
generous, measure of constitutional jurisdiction over state-law 
cases in either set of courts is the presence of a national inter- 
est in affording the particular jurisdiction. 
Interestingly, it is a real plus for the power of Congress 
even over state courts that a given case within the ambit of 
national policy does "arise under" federal law in some sense, 
even under law that is only jurisdictional. The interest directly 
generates the power. Once the power is exercised, even if only 
by an allowance of jurisdiction to the state courts, the states 
come under the obligations imposed upon them by the Suprem- 
acy Clause. The limits of national interest are also the first 
limits on national power. 
But the power of Congress over federal courts seems to 
present a harder question. We have nearly two centuries of 
debate on the extent to which Article I11 stands in the way of 
Congress. We have come to suppose that federal jurisdiction 
cannot constitutionally "arise under" a purely jurisdictional 
~ ta tu te .~"  Fortunately, Congress is generally able to confer 
federal jurisdiction when the national interest so requires, 
because it is usually possible to argue that some substantive 
policy underlies and explains what appears to be at  first blush 
a purely jurisdictional national interest. When Congress con- 
fers jurisdiction over unfederalized cases, I would also argue 
237. See infra note 253. 
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that inchoate national substantive policy, not embodied in law, 
may and often does empower Congress to do so.238 
But it should not be necessary for Congress to manifest its 
substantive concerns in substantive law in order to grant juris- 
diction within the meaning of Article 111. Indeed, let me inch 
out a bit further on this hitherto-unoccupied limb to suggest 
that there also may be national policies which are wholly juris- 
dictional in nature and which may also empower Congress. The 
widely-held view endorsed by the Court in ~ e s a ~ ~ '  and 
~e r l inden~~~- tha t  federal jurisdiction cannot constitutionally 
"arise under" a purely jurisdictional statute-is a fallacy. 
A. The Party-Protective Paradox 
At this point a most intriguing paradox presents itself. If 
we try to suppose that a purely jurisdictional inchoate national 
interest-without more-can ground federal-question jurisdic- 
tion, a scary apparition will loom up before us, clanking its 
chains, ominously threatening our whole line of thought. I 
should give fair warning that this specter materializes whether 
or not I can make it vanish. 
Return with me for a moment to the agents-or-instrumen- 
talities strand of thought in Osborn v. Bank of the United 
States. The thinking there is that federal jurisdiction can be 
grounded in a national interest in providing the option of a 
presumptively more protective forum than the state provides, 
for litigation involving federal officers or instrumentalities. 
If Congress wishes to assert a national party-protective 
interest by creating a head of jurisdiction, it is hard to believe 
that it cannot do so. To the extent this power of Congress 
seems evident, we wiIl think that-whatever its rationale-the 
238. Thus, for example, in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) 
(as amended), there is exclusive federal jurisdiction over federal tort claims against 
the United States. I do not doubt the constitutionality of this jurisdiction, notwith- 
standing that the liability is under the law of a state. Congress can provide a 
protective forum for tort claims against the United States, even claims governable 
by state law. Section 2074 of the same Title provides (with exceptions for punitive 
damages in death cases and for interest) that "The United States shall be liable 
. . . in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under 
like circumstances." And 28 U.S.C. 5 2674 (1988), dealing with punitive damages in 
death cases, refers to the Yaw of the place where the act or omission occurred." 
The language of these sections has always been construed under the predecessor 
legislation as requiring state law. Richards v. United States, 369 US. 1 (1962). 
239. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989). 
240. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at  495. 
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Supreme Court got it about right in Red Cross. To be sure, 
Justice Souter cannot persuade us, any more than he persuad- 
ed Justice Scalia, that the fragment of statutory text mention- 
ing "federal courts" matters; if the jurisdictional statute is 
unconstitutional i t  cannot matter what the statute says. And it 
cannot matter either that there exists a threshold "ingredient" 
of federal law in every case by or against the Red Cross, the 
ingredient of the Red Cross's juridical capacity. That is a non- 
issue; it was decided long ago and is a matter of stare decisis. 
Justice Souter was right not to rely on it in this context. What 
does seem to matter in Red Cross is the national interest in 
furnishing a presumptively protective forum for state-law liti- 
gation that could threaten the assets and even the viability of a 
federally chartered instrumentality performing a vital national 
service. 
But this party-protective argument seems to prove too 
much. The diversity jurisdiction of federal courts is a party- 
protective jurisdiction. An identifiable party-protective national 
policy sustains the diversity jurisdiction. Does this mean that, 
paradoxically, the diversity jurisdiction "arises under" federal 
law? To the extent we see that as an appalling question, we are 
going to think that the Supreme Court got it wrong in Red 
Cross. There was nothing in that case except the nation's par- 
ty-protective interest to support-in a way that would convince 
us-the constitutionality of federal jurisdiction over the Red 
Cross. 
For those whom a national party-protective interest cannot 
ground federal-question jurisdiction, then, it may seem that the 
Supreme Court got it about right in Mesa. They will overlook 
Justice O'Connor's consideration of other national interests in 
that case, and be content to read Mesa as declining to acknowl- 
edge the power of Congress to act in an identified national 
interest when that interest is merely a party-protective one. 
The argument from this position is that a national party-pro- 
tective interest is without constitutional significance. To see it 
otherwise would be, in effect, to say that even diversity cases 
"arise under" federal law. Those for whom such a proposition 
can only seem perverse are not falling into the trap of suppos- 
ing that diversity cases necessarily arise under state law. But 
they would argue that the judicial power that Article I11 ex- 
tends to diversity cases is separate and distinct from the power 
it extends to cases "arising under" federal law. They would 
argue that these categories cannot be collapsed. They feel that 
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diversity cases do not "arise under" the diversity statute for 
purposes of Article 111, not only because there is no need for 
such interpretive agility, since diversity jurisdiction is autho- 
rized independently in Article 111, but simply because no one 
ever supposed diversity cases to be cases "arising under" feder- 
al law, and there seems to be no good reason for starting to 
think so now. 
There you have the problem. If you tend to think that Red 
Cross was right but also think that diversity cases do not "arise 
under" the federal diversity statute for purposes of Article 111, I 
think I have shown you that for you the problem of state law in 
federal courts is not going to be resolved any time soon. That is 
not because, as Justice Frankfurter the diversity 
jurisdiction exhausts all of the power Congress has over cases 
arising under state law; it does not.242 Rather, it is because 
you are not prepared to say there is constitutional federal-ques- 
tion jurisdiction over diversity cases. Sooner or later you will 
conclude from this that a federal case cannot constitutionally 
"arise under" when the only national interest in its doing so is 
a party-protective interest. You will then, in the good company 
of the United States Supreme Court, try to explain Red Cross 
some other way. 
But for a few intrepid readers for whom thinking the un- 
thinkable is good sport, let me press the argument just to see 
how far it will go. Let me broach the question whether it is 
really unbearable to suppose that the diversity statute "arises 
under" federal law. Doesn't it, after all?243 It is an act of Con- 
gress like any other. Congress has plenary power over the 
extent to which federal courts can invoke it.2M In every case 
the Supreme Court must have Article I11 power to review the 
proper exercise of diversity jurisdiction, and it does so.245 In 
reviewing the propriety of diversity jurisdiction, the Supreme 
Court does not exercise diversity jurisdiction; it exercises feder- 
241. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U S .  448, 460, 475 
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
242. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is a counter-example. So are the 
assertions of jurisdiction tested in Osborn, American Nat'l Red Cross, and Mara- 
thon Pipe Line. See supra notes 160-64, 204-08, 213-17 and accompanying text; 
note 92. 
243. For a valiant recent struggle with this apparent anomaly, see Steven A. 
Childress, Judicial Review and Diversity Jurisdiction: Solving an Irrepressible Erie 
Mystery, 47 SMU L. REV. 271 (1994). 
244. U.S. CONST. art. 111, 9. 1; Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). 
245. E.g., cases cited supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text. 
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al-question jurisdiction. No Congress has given the Court ap- 
pellate jurisdiction over diversity cases as such; the Court 
hears cases about the proper scope of the diversity jurisdiction 
of the lower federal courts in its "arising under" jurisdiction, 
because the existence and proper exercise of federal statutory 
diversity jurisdiction present questions of federal law. 
It is true that the Supreme Court has no power over the 
merits in issues governed by nonfederal But the Su- 
preme Court's appellate Article I11 power over diversity cases is 
co-extensive with and limited by the same national jurisdiction- 
al interest that justifies the jurisdictional grant. This is a clear 
example of the fact we have been so reluctant to admit, that a 
mere jurisdictional statute can "arise under" federal law for 
purposes of Article 111. 
So it is a fallacy to say that federal jurisdiction cannot 
constitutionally "arise under" a purely jurisdictional federal 
statute. In fact, it always does. The familiar but anomalous tag 
of jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction is a superficial way of de- 
lineating this phenomenon because it lacks explanatory power, 
and fails to capture the obligation of the federal courts to de- 
cide the jurisdictional issue in conformity with the limits of the 
national interest, a duty they share with state courts when the 
nation allocates similar jurisdiction to those courts. 
B. A Test Impossible to Fail? 
The general theory of the jurisdictional power of Congress 
which I have been trying to set out is not most accurately de- 
scribed as an "Article I" theory. Rather, it is a product of sub- 
stantive due process thinking. It is interest-analytic, and has to 
do with the rational bases of exercises of sovereign power. 
In this reasoning, then, the national interest is the effec- 
tive measure of the power of Congress over state-law cases in 
federal as well as in state courts. An alternative hypothesis 
might be that Congress could vest jurisdiction over nonfederal 
cases in state courts more easily than it could in federal courts, 
since in state courts no one cares whether or not cases "arise 
under" federal law for purposes of Article 111. But the source of 
the power of Congress over state courts, which we now under- 
stand, may suggest to us, rather, that the effective measure of 
246. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Of course this is true 
whether those issues arise in diversity or in any other head of federal jurisdiction. 
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the power of Congress over state-law cases in federal courts 
also is the national interest; that the "arising under" language 
of Article I11 should have no narrower meaning. 
The conclusion that a party-protective interest can sustain 
a grant of federal jurisdiction under Article I11 would not re- 
quire a conclusion that Mesa v. California247 was wrongly de- 
cided. It will be remembered that in Mesa the Court struck 
down under Article I11 an application of an apparently party- 
protective jurisdictional grant, the federal officer-removal stat- 
ute. In her opinion for the Court Justice O'Connor acknowl- 
edged the potential national interests in protecting federal offi- 
cials from local biases, and in furnishing a forum for trial of a 
federal defense. She found no jurisdiction because these inter- 
ests simply were not invoked on the facts. Any merely potential 
national jurisdictional interest was outweighed by other, limit- 
ing national 
The reader will at once take the altogether lawyerly view 
that the test of national interest is so all-capacious and elastic 
as to amount to no test at  all. That the national interest is all- 
capacious and elastic is undoubtedly the case. Our Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence establishes that. But that does not mean 
that it is not the test of the power of Congress, or that Con- 
gress will never fail that test. If minimal scrutiny for rational 
basis is what Article I11 in fact requires, the limiting case, I 
would submit, ought to have been Verlinden.249 
As we have seen, the national interest in furnishing a 
regulated forum for suits in this country against foreign sover- 
eigns when such suits are actionable in this country does not 
support the furnishing of a forum for such suits when they are 
not otherwise actionable in this country. When both parties are 
foreign, even a party-protective interest cannot be attributed to 
the United States; only a national interest in the merits could 
247. 489 U.S. 121 (1989). 
248. Id. a t  137-38. 
249. See also Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800) (holding under 
Article III's diversity grants that there could be no state-law action in federal court 
between aliens). Arguably the ongoing litigation of several other Nigerian cement 
claims in federal court in New York, some of which did involve American interests, 
see, e.g., Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 
300, 310-13 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982), justified an exten- 
sion of jurisdiction over Verlinden's case. But the Second Circuit found no basis for 
jurisdiction. Verlinden, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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justify suit in this country when both parties are foreign. In- 
deed, nothing supported jurisdiction in Verlinden. 
There have arisen numerous other attractive theories pur- 
porting to justify federal jurisdiction over state-law cases, and I 
need not go over all that ground; we have said enough to en- 
able us to see that no theory intended to overcome only the 
constraints of Article I11 is likely to be a useful general theory 
of power applicable in both sets of courts. Even if you extended 
such a theory-I suppose the theory of "protective jurisdic- 
t i ~ n " ~ "  is probably the most appealing candidate-to support 
250. Although writers do not often take note of the usage, "protective jurisdic- 
tion" often refers simply to any grant of federal jurisdiction which, like the diversi- 
ty jurisdiction, depends upon the nature of the parties rather than on the subject 
matter of the cases. Paul Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 
53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 184 (1953). 
The "theory" of "protective jurisdiction" is usually thought to be a bit more 
complex. In the simplest variant of this more complex thinking, the theory stands 
for the proposition that federal courts have Article I11 power when Congress affords 
federal jurisdiction over an area of law without regulating it  substantively. See 
Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (Frank- 
furter, J., dissenting). The thinking here is that the law that the cases will then 
"arise under7' for purposes of Article I11 is the jurisdictional grant itself. This rea- 
soning is sometimes supported by the argument that the greater substantive power 
subsumes the lesser jurisdictional power of Congress. The policy argument is also 
sometimes made that a grant of federal protective jurisdiction over a state-law case 
is much less intrusive than federalization of the substantive issues. Of course, af- 
fording a special state forum might be thought to be the least intrusive federal 
approach imaginable. 
The Supreme Court has noted, but never relied upon, the theory of "protective 
jurisdiction." See, e.g., Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 115 S. Ct. 2227 (1995) 
(speculating that jurisdiction over a personal-injuries claim would exist in cases 
removed under the 1988 amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act, even if the 
defendant employee was eventually held not to have been acting within the scope 
of her employment, under a combined "ingredientn and "pendent jurisdiction" theo- 
ry, the scope-of-employment issue furnishing the ingredient); id. a t  2237 n.11 (cit- 
ing Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 
30 UCLA L. REV. 542, 549 (1983)); see also Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 137 
(1989) (seeing no need to adopt the theory); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of 
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 496 (1983) (suggesting, in my view erroneously, that purely 
jurisdictional statutes cannot ground federal-question jurisdiction for purposes of 
Article 111). For one of the few of Justice Frankfurter's effusions with which I find 
myself in agreement, a t  least for a couple of sentences, see Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 
a t  474-75 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (" 'Protective jurisdiction' is a misused label 
. . . properly descriptive of safeguarding some of the indisputable, staple business 
of the federal courts. It is a radiation of an existing jurisdictionn). 
From the enormous literature on the subject not otherwise mentioned in this 
Article, see generally John T. Cross, Viewing Federal Jurisdiction Through the 
Looking Glass of Bankruptcy, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 530 (1993); John E. Kenne- 
dy, Federal Jurisdiction, 19 TEX. TECH L. REV. 603 (1988); William R. Casto, The 
Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law 
of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467 (1986); Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering "One 
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an act of Congress granting jurisdiction to both sets of courts in 
eases not arising under federal law, what would you add to the 
requirement of an identified national interest in furnishing a 
forum on the facts of the case? Certainly, in the absence of 
such an interest no conceivable theory could sustain the juris- 
dictional grant. 
C. Whatever Happened to Article III? 
Some commentators will object to "the national interest" as 
a test of the power of Congress in the context of a jurisdictional 
grant and insist that something more, some further test, must 
be imposed by Article 111. Article I11 has been throwing liti- 
gants out of court for over 200 years, and it will go on doing so. 
History has taken it seriously, and no piece of academic theo- 
rizing is likely to make a jot of difference. 
What is it, then, that Article I11 requires? Chief Justice 
Marshall long ago in Osborn v. Bank interpreted Article I11 as 
requiring only some small item of substantive federal law. We 
may not have believed this "ingredient" theory of Article I11 
before Verlinden, but after Verlinden that is the reinvigorated 
and now orthodox position. Verlinden is pitched squarely on the 
substantive threshold "ingredient" of foreign sovereign immuni- 
ty.251 By insisting on at least this substantive "ingredient," 
Verlinden strongly implies that under Article I11 a federal case 
cannot "arise under" a purely jurisdictional statute. 
Some and writers2" rely also on The Genesee 
Constitutional Case:" Procedural rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Sup- 
plemental Jurisdiction, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1399 (1983); Scott A. Rosenberg, Note, The 
Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 933 (1982). The classic articles 
include, apart from the Mishkin article already cited, David P. Currie, The Federal 
Courts and The American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1968); Alexander M. 
Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The 
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957); Herbert Wechsler, Federal Juris- 
diction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 
224-25 (1948). 
On protective jurisdiction for cases of mass tort, see generally Erwin 
Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 67 (1990); George Conway, Note, Protective Jurisdiction and Adop- 
tion as  Alternative Techniques for Conferring Jurisdiction on Federal Courts in Con- 
sumer Class Actions, 69 MICH. L. REV. 710 (1971). 
251. Verlinden, 461 U.S. a t  495, 496. 
252. See, e.g., Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989); Verlinden, 461 US. 
480, 495-96 (dealing with the Second Circuit's reading of the cases). The Verlinden 
Court itself did not quite make this mistake, although, assuming the Second 
Circuit's reading to be correct, Chief Justice Burger did distinguish the Great 
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Chief v. ~ i t z h u g h ~ ~ *  for the proposition that a case cannot 
arise under a naked jurisdictional grant, even if enacted pursu- 
ant to Congress's Commerce power. But the Verlinden Court 
itself was quick to distinguish the case before it from The 
Genesee Chief, and in any event correctly saw that that case 
would not bear such an i n t e r p r e t a t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  In that grand old 
admiralty case, the nub of the Supreme Court's difficulty was 
its own previous interpretation of the scope of Article I11 juris- 
diction in admiralty cases. 
In The Thomas Jefferson,256 Justice Story, writing for the 
Court and relying on his own opinion on circuit in De Lovio v. 
had limited the constitutional admiralty jurisdiction 
to the "ebb and flow of the tides."258 But by the time of The 
Thomas Jefferson, the jurisdiction that had seemed so expan- 
sive to Story in De Lovio v. Boit had become much too narrow. 
Even Story queried whether the jurisdiction might be extended 
by Congress to take in the great inland seas and western riv- 
Lakes Act from the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. He reasoned that the for- 
mer was an attempt to pass off a grant of admiralty jurisdiction under the inter- 
state commerce power, whereas the latter was grounded on the power of Congress 
over international commerce, and on its foreign relations power as well. Verlinden, 
461 U.S. a t  493. The trouble with the Great Lakes Act, though, is not that The 
Genesee Chief declared it unconstitutional, but rather that The Genesee Chief made 
it obsolete. See infra note 263 and accompanying text. 
253. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform And Article III 
Jurisdiction, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 169, 225 (1990) (stating that "the Supreme 
Court has explicitly held that Congress may not legislatively expand federal court 
jurisdiction through a purely jurisdictional statute passed pursuant to the Article I 
power over interstate commerce") (citing Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 
(1989) and, for the same, but implicit, proposition, The Propeller Genesee Chief v. 
Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 451-52 (1851)). For a different exposition of the Court's po- 
sition in The Genesee Chief, see infra text accompanying note 263; cf. supra note 
228 on Panama u. Johnson. For a different exposition of the Court's position in 
Mesa, see supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text; infra note 281 and accom- 
panying text. For a refutation of language in Mesa suggesting on the strength of 
an ancient case that federal-question jurisdiction cannot arise under a jurisdictional 
grant, see infra notes 264-75 and accompanying text. 
254. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 451-53 (1851). 
255. Verlinden, 461 US.  at  495, 496. 
256. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825) (Story, J.). 
257. 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815). One gleans from Story's sweeping 
language in De Lovio that he imagined that his tidewater test was carving out an 
enormous jurisdiction for federal admiralty; he seems to have been trying to draw 
the commercial life of the nation, then largely maritime, into the federal courts. As 
we can see from his even more disastrous opinion in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 
Pet.) 1 (1842), Story was still trying to draw the commercial life of the nation into 
the federal courts in 1842, and yet for all his intellect he was still too much of a 
creature of his time to invoke sufficient federal power. 
258. The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. at  429. 
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A delegation from Congress accepted Story's invitation, 
approaching Story himself for help. It was Story himself who 
drafted the Great Lakes trying to patch up the tide- 
water difficulty; he even submitted the draR bill to each of his 
brethren on the Court to review and approve before sending it  
on to its sponsors in Congress.261 Story drafted the Great 
Lakes Act expressly under the commerce power to avoid the 
argument that the Act added cases to the admiralty jurisdic- 
tion; adding to the admiralty jurisdiction is always textually 
awkward because "all" of the jurisdiction is granted al- 
ready.262 But by the time The Genesee Chief came before the 
Supreme Court, the Justices had reconsidered the whole posi- 
tion. Back in 1852 the Commerce power seemed inadequate to 
them, on reflection, to authorize the needed federal jurisdiction 
over intrastate admiralty cases. So in The Genesee Chief the 
Court simply leapfrogged over Story's Great Lakes Act. The 
Court explained that the true test of admiralty jurisdiction 
under Article I11 had never been tidewater, as the Court had 
mistakenly supposed, but had been navigable water all 
along.263 In this, the Court was not impermissibly adding 
more cases to "all cases" in admiralty, jurisdiction over which 
was given in Article 111; no, the Court was merely correcting its 
own interpretive error. This was a master-stroke, but The 
259. Whether, under the power to regulate commerce between the States, 
Congress may not extend the remedy, by the summary process of the 
Admiralty, to the case of voyages on the western waters, it is unnec- 
essary for us to consider. If the public inconvenience, from the want 
of a process of an analogous nature, shall be extensively felt, the 
attention of the Legislature will doubtless be drawn to the subject. 
Id. at  430 (Story, J.). 
260. Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 20, 5 Stat. 726. 
261. The story is told in DAW W. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 
106-16 (1971); Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty 
Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1214 (1954). 
262. U.S. CONST. art. 111, 8 2; Judiciary Act of 1789 8 9, 1 Stat. 73. The oppo- 
site problem was the subject of Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924). 
There, the railway challenged the constitutionality of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 
8 688 (1988), which creates a cause of action in negligence for injured seamen 
against their employers. Congress intended that Jones Act cases in federal courts 
be pleaded under the statutory federal-question jurisdiction. The railway argued 
that the Jones Act thus took these maritime cases away from the admiralty, which 
was supposed to have jurisdiction over "all" maritime cases. But the Supreme 
Court managed to sustain the Act by holding that it implicitly made these new 
cases concurrently pleadable under federal admiralty jurisdiction. 
263. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at  452. 
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Genesee Chief simply does not speak to the question whether a 
case can "arise under" a jurisdictional grant. 
In Mesa v. California, Justice O'Connor also referred to the 
ancient case of Mossman v. H i g g i n ~ o n ~ ~ ~  as holding that 
"pure jurisdictional statutes which seek to do nothing more 
than grant jurisdiction over a particular class of cases cannot 
support Art. I11 'arising under' jur isdi~t ion."~~~ But that is not 
what Mossman was about, any more than it was what The 
Genesee Chief was about. 
Mossman held, per curiam, that the statutory grant of 
jurisdiction to federal circuit courts in cases in which "an alien 
is a party"266 could not constitutionally be applied, within the 
meaning of the diversity language of Article 111. Mossman was 
a case in which both parties were foreigners. As far as the 
opinion in Mossman goes it is quite right and I have no quarrel 
with it. The whole of the Court's opinion can be set out in a 
footnote.267 As you can see, the opinion in Mossman is utterly 
silent on the "arising under" language of Article 111. 
Between the report of the case by Dallas268 and the argu- 
ments of counsel, one can glean that in the circuit court Moss- 
man was an action in rem to foreclose on a mortgage of land in 
Georgia.269 No one would have dreamed that the case "arose 
under" any other law than Georgia's; the Supreme Court took 
judicial notice of Georgia law.270 Mossman cannot be cited for 
the proposition that Congress, having identified a national 
264. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800) (per curiam). 
265. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989) (selectively quoting from 
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Verlinden, 461 US. at  496). 
266. First Judiciary Act of 1789, 11. 
267. By the COURT: "The decisions, on this subject, govern the present 
case; and the 11th section of the judiciary act can, and must, receive 
a construction, consistent with the constitution. It says, it is true, in 
general terms, that the Circuit Court shall have cognizance of suits 
'where an alien is a party;' but as the legislative power of conferring 
jurisdiction on the federal Courts, is, in this respect, confined to suits 
between citizens and foreigners, we must so expound the terms of the 
law, as to meet the case, 'where, indeed, an alien is one party,' but a 
citizen is the other. Neither the constitution, nor the act of congress, 
regard, on this point, the subject of the suit, but the parties. A de- 
scription of the parties is, therefore, indispensable to the exercise of 
jurisdiction. There is here no such description; and, of course, The 
writ of error must be quashed." 
Mossman, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at  14. 
268. Oddly, Dallas represented Mossman also. Id. at  13. 
269. Id. at 12. 
270. Id. at 13. 
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interest in conferring a head of federal-question jurisdiction, 
cannot do so. 
On the other hand, the "arising under" clause of Article I11 
might well have sustained jurisdiction on the particular facts. 
The mortgagor of the Georgia land in question had been its 
original owner. In 1778, during the Revolutionary War, Georgia 
expelled the owner as a loyalist and confiscated the land. The 
English creditor apparently sued virtually every surviving 
holder in the post-confiscation chain of title.271 But the Eng- 
lish creditor failed t o  challenge the validity of the confiscation 
itself under the Peace Treaty of 1783, which the debtor had 
pleaded in bar. The creditor raised that federal question only 
belatedly and regretfully at oral argument before the Supreme 
It would be very hard to argue that there was no national 
interest in enforcing debts held by English creditors in the 
wake of the Revolutionary War, even as against English debt- 
ors, if security for the debt was land in this country. One of the 
reasons the Federalists supported the establishment of federal 
diversity courts in the first place was to assure lenders abroad 
that the nation would enforce obligations to foreigners flowing 
from their private investments here.273 To be sure, pro-debtor 
sentiment in 1789 was at  least as strong. But my point is that 
the problem was a national one, certainly insofar as it con- 
cerned the states' wartime confiscations of loyalists' lands. That 
was one of the very problems the Peace Treaty of 1783 was 
supposed to resolve. Of course Congress had Article I11 power 
to create a forum for hearing claims "arising under" the Treaty; 
apparently Congress did create a forum for federal decision of 
questions on the validity of a treaty.274 Certainly under the 
271. Apparently only Mossman showed up. He was the surviving executor of 
the second owner in the post-confiscation chain of title. But the second owner had 
resold the land to a third. The English creditor acknowledged that Mossman was 
not a proper party, but argued that the action was in the nature of a n  action in 
rem and should go forward anyway. Dallas does not report whether Georgia's sale 
of the land pre-dated or post-dated the Treaty of 1783. 
272. Mossman, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) a t  13 (argument of Tilghman and Reed for the 
original plaintiffs). 
273. See supra note 29. 
274. Counsel for the debtors cited an act of Congress, apparently providing for 
direct removal to the Supreme Court of questions on the validity of a treaty: 
The jurisdiction of the federal Courts (US. CONST. ART. I11 s. 2.) is 
not where a question arises, that may be affected by a treaty, but where 
a case arises under a treaty; and if a question on the validity of a treaty, 
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reasoning of Osborn and Verlinden, a threshold federal "ingre- 
dient''-the effect of the Treaty-would ground Article I11 juris- 
diction in every such case. Justice Story used the Treaty in 
similar fashion to sustain the Supreme Court's former juris- 
diction in another, much more famous litigation flowing from a 
state's confiscation of a loyalist's land, Martin v. Hunter's Les- 
see .275 
What is helping us in our understanding of the cases, 
plainly, is that we are looking to the national interest as we 
can glean it  on the facts of the particular case. Article I11 can 
be taken to reflect or subsume national adjudicatory interests. 
If the Supreme Court were suddenly, unanimously, to see Arti- 
cle I11 as merely reflecting the national interests that underlie 
it, and were to consider the national interest directly in Article 
I11 cases, I think it fair to say, based on the analyses we have 
made here, that little, if anything, would be lost. 
The greater danger, it seems to me, is that this will not 
happen, and that Article I11 will continue to be deployed with- 
out regard to the national interest. We should not have to read 
cases like Verlinden, in which a nodding Court acts against its 
every characteristic instinct and every dictate of reason and 
substantive due process, and relegates to statutory tests the job 
of preserving the courts of this country fkom universal juris- 
diction over the world's grievances against sovereigns other 
than the United States.276 We should not have to read cases 
like Marathon Pipe Line,277 in which the vital services of the 
nation's courts in their bankruptcy jurisdiction are disrupted on 
the incredible reasoning that in the absence of diversity, Article 
I11 requires private state-law, but not private federal-law 
claims,"* to be heard by judges with life tenure.279 We 
should not have to read cases in which no majority rationale 
can be found to support diversity jurisdiction in a controversy 
arises in a state Court, there is a special provision for transferring it to 
the Supreme Court; 1 vol. 61. s. 22. But, in the present instance, it does 
not appear that any question can arise under the treaty; for, it is not 
referred to, directly, nor indirectly, in any part of the record. 
Mossman, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 13-14. 
275. 14 US. (1 Wheat.) 304, 356 (1816). 
276. See supra notes 166-78 and accompanying text. 
277. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 
(1982); see discussion supra notes 69, 93. 
278. Marathon Pipe Line, 458 U.S. at 84. 
279. Id. at 85-87. 
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between a citizen of a state and a citizen of the District of Co- 
l ~ r n b i a . ~ ~ '  
And if the best way to capture the national interest in 
preserving federal courts from having to entertain the local 
prosecution of every criminally negligent post-office driveP8' 
is to conclude that Article I11 stands in the way, it seems to me 
that the Supreme Court could not do better than to summon 
Article I11 to the aid of the courts below. As long as the Court 
does so in the light of reason and with an eye on the competing 
national interests at stake, as it did in Mesa, it must be doing 
it right. 
VIII. REMARKS IN CLOSING 
We now have a reasonably general theory. At its narrowest 
it is a theory of the power of Congress to confer jurisdiction 
over nonfederal cases upon the state courts. At a more general 
level it is a theory of the power of Congress to confer nonfeder- 
a1 business upon federal courts as well. We see that the first 
determinative factor is, and ought to be, the existence of an 
identifiable national interest in devolving such jurisdiction 
upon the states. 
The inquiry into governmental interest is familiar to Arner- 
ican courts and lawyers. It derives from the ordinary purposive 
reasoning characteristic of the common law. Courts tend to 
seek reasons for the common-law rules they apply, and purpos- 
es behind the statutory provisions they apply, to ensure that 
applications of law on the particular facts will be reasonable. 
This sort of inquiry is familiar, too, across the range of consti- 
tutional jurispruden~e.~" The inquiry into governmental in- 
terest is seen in its most fundamental form when the Supreme 
Court imposes a requirement of minimal rationality upon law. 
We traditionally have conceived of such rationality review as a 
matter of substantive due process. 
In the absence of an identifiable national interest in con- 
ferring a particular jurisdiction over state-law matters upon 
state courts, the nation has no power to act, and no other limit- 
ing tests are salient. Of course there are extrinsic constraints 
upon the rational exercise of national power to confer jurisdic- 
280. See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 333 U.S. 860 
(1948). 
281. Cf. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (1989). 
282. See supra notes 131, 137-45 and accompanying text. 
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tion upon the states, as there are upon any exercise of govern- 
mental power. But in the presence of a national interest in 
conferring a certain jurisdiction over nonfederal questions upon 
the states, no other theory is needed to support the jurisdic- 
tional grant. 
The theory extends usefully to the more familiar problem 
of the power of Congress to devolve jurisdiction upon the feder- 
al courts over state-law questions in nondiversity cases. To the 
extent Article I11 is serving as a surrogate for this theory, we 
can reason more clearly if we reason directly from the national 
interest. Under this theory as a theory of jurisdiction it be- 
comes a matter of no concern in either set of courts whether a 
particular grant of jurisdiction by Congress is accompanied by 
substantive federal law, or even substantive national policy. As 
the numerous heads of federal party-protective jurisdiction 
make plain, rational national interests are possible even if they 
are almost wholly jurisdictional. Thus, unless it is a rational 
purpose of Article I11 to frustrate national jurisdictional policy, 
an identified national jurisdictional policy should support juris- 
diction in federal as well as state courts; no additional theory 
in the nature of a theory of "protective jurisdiction" is needed. 
This reflection suggests that in itself Article I11 probably 
should not be seen as imposing some further constraint upon 
Congress than the requirement of acting within an identified 
national interest. 
One constraint upon the power of Congress which does go 
beyond minimal rationality may be viewed as intrinsic to this 
theory. Today we understand that whatever the underlying 
policy that we glean from a rule or statute, that policy is likely 
to be limited and conditional. Usually we can hypothesize coun- 
tervailing policies which explain certain features of the case 
law or legislation. Moreover, we note the existence of relevant 
more general governmental policies, which we find reflected in 
other decisions and statutes, together with their bounds. Thus 
it sometimes becomes necessary, however awkward or difficult 
the process, to weigh countervailing policies in order to deter- 
mine, if not the legitimacy of a jurisdictional grant, then its 
feasibility as applied on the particular facts. 
As a theory of jurisdiction in this federal system, this theo- 
ry implies that once the nation allocates jurisdiction supported 
by an identified national interest, concomitant judicial duties 
arise under the Supremacy Clause, even under a purely juris- 
dictional act of Congress. This is true even in the intuitively 
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limiting case of the states' concurrent jurisdiction over diversity 
cases. However counter-intuitive the proposition may seem, we 
have seen that the states have no option to forego their juris- 
diction over their diversity  case^.^" 
The generalizability of the described theory is unsurprising 
because it is the same general theory that is already implicitly 
used both to explain and test other exercises of governmental 
power. A government's power derives from and is limited by 
that government's interests, in this country of course always 
within any more exacting extrinsic constitutional constraints. 
Using rational-basis scrutiny to test Article I11 jurisdiction 
has the further advantage of making the power of Congress 
congruent in state and federal courts when Congress seeks to 
provide concurrent jurisdiction. If additional, prudential, con- 
straints on the exercise of federal power seem appropriate, 
history tells us that federal decisional law will supply them 
whether or not the Constitution does.284 
We have taken up a classic problem of federal courts 
law-the power of Congress to vest jurisdiction in federal 
courts beyond the limits on federal judicial power imposed by 
Article 111. By generalizing that problem to both sets of courts, 
we have been able in large part to resolve it. Once one isolates 
the problem from its usual Article I11 context, one is able to 
identify the actual sources of, and limitations upon, the power 
of the nation to vindicate national substantive policy through 
allocations of adjudicatory power. The textual constraints of 
Article I11 then can become more fully understood. Questions 
"arise under" federal law, including jurisdictional questions, 
across the broad field of national policy concerns. 
283. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
284. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text; cf .  Martin H. Redish, Ab- 
stention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L. 
J. 71, 89-90 (1984) (criticizing the abstention doctrines as unauthorized departures 
from jurisdictional statutes). 
